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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
A housing market allows each household to select a dwelling that most
closely suits its needs, within the framework of budget limitations. If a
household cannot allocate enough means to purchase housing, then its
housing conditions fall below the socially acceptable level. The state can
adjust the housing market in order to minimize the number of house-
holds with socially unacceptable housing and, as a rule, such regulation
is more or less being implemented.
In this paper, we analyze only one aspect of the housing market regula-
tion problem. Namely, we consider two alternatives for regulating a local
housing market in the short-run: state housing construction (regulation
from the supply side) and housing subsidies (regulation from the de-
mand side). Our purpose is to suggest and to substantiate some meth-
ods for achieving optimal (or quasi-optimal) regulatory action in housing
markets.
Detailed literature comments are incorporated into the body of the pa-
per; here we only explain the logic employed in the study and the main
results.
It is natural to suppose that the expediency of a regulatory action (a pro-
gram directed towards either municipal housing construction or subsi-
dizing market agents) can be evaluated using the allocation of dwellings
and the price structure in the equilibrium attained after and, partly, owing
to realization of this action. This assumption is true if the following condi-
tions are met: (a) equilibria exist and they are effective; (b) some
mechanism intrinsic to housing markets leads them to equilibrium from
any initial situation. Therefore, theoretical analysis of the equilibria in a
housing market is indispensable and  a significant part of the paper is
devoted to this topic.
First of all, in Section 1 we formulate a plausible model of a housing
market for the short-term. We assume that neither new households nor
new dwellings emerge and that market agents' preferences do not
change during this period. The model presents the market as a monetary
exchange economy and takes into account the indivisibility of dwellings.
The model covers two sectors of the market: dwellings for sale and
dwellings for rent, with an invariable distribution of dwellings between
them.
It is known that in a market model of this type, an equilibrium exists and
that there can be many equilibria. Therefore, we need a convenient de-
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scription of all possible equilibria for the given initial situation. Such a
description (in terms of solutions and dual prices of some linear pro-
gramming problem) is presented in Section 2.1. It is then proved that the
core of the market coincides with the set of all equilibrium distributions
and is a proper subset of the set of all Pareto-maximal distributions.
Hence, competitive equilibria are the desirable (efficient) states of the
given market. Also, some properties of the equilibria, for example, that
each consumer has an acceptable level of non-housing consumption,
are proved in this section.
The numerousness of equilibria in the considered model is the rule
rather than the exception. Thus, it would not be enough only to show
that the market necessarily will come to some equilibrium from any initial
situation; we also have to understand how the market "selects" one
equilibrium out of the myriad possibilities. For this reason, we construct
some rationing schemes in Section 2.2 (we believe that the analogous
schemes are inherent to housing markets in the short-run). These
schemes create the demand and/or supply constraints perceived by
market agents under a system of fixed prices. Consumers enter the
market in some order and each "examines" the dwellings available to
him or her in some order. It is these orderings that determine the spe-
cific rationing scheme and each scheme creates a unique and efficient
fixed-price equilibrium.
In Section 3, we then construct a hypothetical, but plausible, market
mechanism for ensuring transition to equilibrium through a finite se-
quence of fixed-price equilibria with respect to a rationing scheme.
The specific rationing scheme determines the resulting competitive
equilibrium.
The above mechanism of market equilibrating explains some features of
housing market activity. For example, it is not unusual in many local mar-
kets for there to be many dwellings for sale that are not in demand given
current prices, yet the prices do not come down. Does this mean that
the market is not in equilibrium? The answer is negative. First, if the
current price of a dwelling owned by a supplier is lower than his/her res-
ervation price, then the supplier receives maximum utility by taking this
dwelling off the market. Second, a reduction in the price of a dwelling
owned by a consumer does not change the utility of this dwelling for
him/her, but only moderates the utility he/she can receive when choos-
ing some other dwelling. Therefore, at some base price, the best choice
for an agent is to keep the dwelling and he/she will not agree to a lower
price. The mechanism described in Section 3 shows how an agent can
determine this base price boundary.
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In order to separate the essentially different equilibria from among all the
competitive equilibria possible in a given market situation, we introduce
in Section 4 some classifications of market agents and dwellings by
types and groups, respectively. Then we define the "standard" equilib-
rium. In such an equilibrium, dwellings of the same type are equally
priced, consumers from the same group initially occupying dwellings of
the same type receive equal utility, and no consumer leaves his/her oc-
cupied dwelling for a dwelling of the same type. It is proved that stan-
dard equilibria exist and can be described through solutions and dual
prices of some linear programming problem.
The partial comparative statics analysis for the studied model is carried
out in Section 5. Namely, the consequences of the appearance of an
additional (tenantless) dwelling are analyzed. We suggest some methods
for calculating the exact boundaries of this dwelling's equilibrium price.
The following results assume that the initial equilibrium is disturbed by
the appearance of a new dwelling and that some new equilibrium
emerges.
The components of any price system in equilibrium for the new situation
can be "truncated" to the level established by the initial equilibrium. If
the new equilibrium is generated by the market mechanism mentioned
above, then only one (equilibrating) chain of agents' movings can be re-
alized; the new dwelling is the last one in this chain. In such an equilib-
rium, the prices do not exceed initial prices and the closer a dwelling is
to the end of the equilibrating chain, the more its price drops. The set of
all equilibrating chains coincides with the set of all paths of maximal
weight in some graph. This graph allows for the easy construction of a
natural equilibrium price system for each equilibrating chain. The new
dwelling's price is constant in all such price systems. An example shows
that the emergence of an additional dwelling may change the equilibrium
without changing either prices or the values of consumers' utility func-
tions.
So, the market will necessarily come to some equilibrium, this equilib-
rium is effective, and we have the description of all possible equilibria.
Based on these results, various approaches to regulating the housing
market in order to decrease the number of households lodged in socially
unacceptable dwellings are studied in Section 6. Financing housing con-
struction affects the number of tenantless dwellings (regulation of the
market from the supply side) and subsidizing market agents affects res-
ervation prices (regulation of the market from the demand side). Some
methods are suggested for detecting consumers who need support, se-
lecting the dwelling types for a housing construction program, and de-
termining the value of housing subsidies.
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A model for selecting an expedient housing construction program is cre-
ated. This model rationally distributes the program budget by dwelling
type and calculates one of the possible resultant equilibria. A model for
selecting an expedient housing subsidies program is also described. This
model rationally distributes the program budget among consumers and
calculates one of the possible resulting equilibria. By establishing the
rules for market agents' access to programmatic dwellings, regulators
can influence the rationing scheme and thus "direct" the market to the
most desirable equilibrium.
Both of the models discussed can be used for developing  profitable
housing programs, the earnings from which can partially offset the costs
of housing market regulation.
For technical reasons, proofs for all the results are not included in the
printed version of the paper. They can be found on EERC’s site
(www.eerc.ru) or obtained from the author.
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1. HOUSING MARKET MODEL
The object of the study is a local (urban, for example) housing market
within a short-term period. During this period neither new households
emerge nor market agents change their preferences. The model de-
scribed below presents the market as an exchange economy with money
and takes into account the indivisibility of dwellings. It details the model
suggested by Quinzii (1984) as applied to a housing market. The models
of such type were also by Gale (1960, Chapter 2, § 6), Shapley and
Shubic (1972), Shapley and Scarf (1974), Roth and Postlewaite (1977),
Kaneko (1983), Demange and Gale (1985).
1.1. Basic concepts and assumptions
The following condition (see Quinzii, 1984, p. 41) is true for the above
mentioned models.
Assumption 0. In the considered market, each agent does not initially
own more than one indivisible item and has no use for more than one of
these items.
The model considered below fulfils Assumption 0. Some of our results
are probably true without this condition, but quasilinearity of utility func-
tions is essential. The last conclusion follows from Bevia, Quinzii and
Silva (1999), here one can find the review of the works where Assump-
tion 0 was relaxed.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977), and Demange and Gale (1985) consider
some abstract indivisible goods; Gale (1960), and Shapley and Shubic
(1972) mention dwellings for sale; Kaneko (1983) studies the market of
rental dwellings. The likeness of the listed models indicates the possibil-
ity of constructing a model covering both sectors of a housing market.
Such a model is presented below. The model does not reflect the choice
of a dwelling's tenure type, however. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For every dwelling, a tenure type has been determined:
a dwelling is either for sale (occupied by the owner and/or intended for
sale), or for rent (rented by a tenant or intended for rent); the dwelling's
tenure type is invariable within the period.
Thus we distinguish only two sectors in a housing market. In most coun-
tries (and certainly in Russia) there is also a municipal housing sector,
with relatively low prices and restricted access (social rent). Incorpora-
tion of this sector in the model will be discussed in Section 6.
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It follows from Assumption 1 that an owner-occupant can sell his dwell-
ing but cannot rent it out, and a dwelling rented at the beginning of the
period should be rented or be tenantless at the end of the period.
We shall use the considered period as a unit of time and call it "year."
The commodities are dwellings (all different and indivisible) and money.
Let I be the set of all dwellings; I = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ {0}, where I1 and I2 are the
sets of dwellings for sale and dwellings for rent, correspondingly; zero
symbolizes a dummy "dwelling." Each dwelling i ≠ 0 is owned by some
agent g(i). An agent, g, owns dwelling d(g) and occupies dwelling δ(g) at
the beginning of the period; d(g) = 0 (respectively, δ(g) = 0), if agent g
owns (respectively, occupies) no dwelling in the considered market.
Assumption 0 can be reformulated now as follows.
Assumption 2. The values d(g) and δ(g) are uniquely defined; if g ≠ h
and δ(g) = δ(h) = i, then i = 0; if d(g) ≠ 0 and δ(g) ≠ 0, then d(g) = δ(g).
The last condition means that the owner of a non-dummy dwelling lives
either in this dwelling or outside of the considered local market.
Definition. Agent g is a supplier if δ(g) = 0 and d(g) ≠ 0, agent g is a
consumer otherwise.
Let G be the set of all market agents, G = G1 ∪ G2, where G1 is the set
of all consumers and G2 is the set of all suppliers.
A supplier owns some dwelling in the considered market but prefers to
live outside this market in the beginning of the period. Assuming the
agents' preferences to be invariable, let's suppose that each supplier is
not going to acquire or to lease a dwelling in the considered market
within the year, and he wants to sell or to lease out the dwelling he
owns.
Let us formulate some obvious consequences arising from Assump-
tion 1. The dwelling d(g) for g∈G2 is tenantless if d(g)∈I1, and this
dwelling can be occupied (rented) by some consumer if d(g)∈I2; a
consumer is living in his own or a rented dwelling, or occupies a
dummy "dwelling"; a consumer may own only the dwelling he occu-
pies; if g∈G1, then d(g)∈I1 ∪ {0}. Suppliers "make it possible" to in-
troduce rental dwellings and newly constructed ones into the model
without violating Assumption 2.
The set of consumption bundles for an agent g is Zg = R × Jg, where
Jg = I for g∈G1 and Jg = {0, d(g)} for g∈G2. For z = (y, i)∈Zg let us put
y(z) = y and j(z) = i.
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By choosing (y, i), an agent defines the money equivalent y of his
demand for annual consumption outside the considered market
(non-housing consumption). By choosing (y, i), consumer g also defines
his demand for purchasing or leasing dwelling i (in the case of i = d(g),
the agent "buys" d(g) from himself), and the supply of d(g) for sale if
d(g)∉{i, 0}. For a supplier, g, the choice (y, i) means zero supply if
i = d(g) (he leaves the market) and the supply of d(g) for sale or for
lease (depending on tenure type) if i = 0.
Assumption 3. Each dwelling creates a uniform ad infinitum flow of
services (infinitely-lived, non-depreciating assets in a stationary state).
Each agent has uniform ad infinitum income flow beyond the considered
market. All agents have equal access to perfect capital markets; the
interests on deposits and loans are equal and their common value ρ is
the same for all agents; all agents have the same (annual) discount fac-
tor (1 + ρ)−1.
We denote by P the set of all possible systems of prices for dwellings;
P = {p∈ |I|R+ | p0 = 0}. Let us fix some price system, p∈P. We assume
that the components of p are consistent with the dwellings tenure types,
namely, pi is the value of dwelling i if i∈I1, and pi is the annual rental rate
for this dwelling if i∈I2.
Definition. To each vector p∈P, we relate the vector of compatible
prices c(p) = (c(pi)|i∈I) such that c(pi) = ρ⋅pi if i∈I1, c(pi) = pi otherwise.
It follows from Assumption 3 that c(pi) is the price of services created by
dwelling i within the year. If agent g leases out dwelling d(g), then he will
draw income c(pd(g)) in the considered year; if the agent sells this
dwelling, then he will gain the stock pd(g), which is equivalent to the flow
of annual incomes c(pd(g)). In any case, the agent's income will increase
by c(pd(g)) in the considered year.
Let us denote by 1giq  and 
2
giq , correspondingly, the non-recurrent and
recurrent (annual) fixed costs connected to the choice of dwelling i∈Jg
by agent g. The "flow equivalent" of the fixed costs is qgi =
2
giq + ρ⋅ 1giq .
As provided by Assumption 3, the annual income of agent g will de-
crease by c(pi) + qgi as the result of purchasing or renting dwelling
i ≠ d(g).
The dwellings prices define the payments among market agents, while
fixed costs are payments by market agents to some aggregated external
agent (persons and institutions beyond the market: intermediaries, gov-
ernment agencies, etc.). In fact, choosing a consumption bundle, a mar-
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ket agent demands some services of the external agent, and the price of
these services is fixed. Surely, fixed costs involve transaction costs. Also,
one can take into account the money value of non-moneyed expenses
(e.g., the time and efforts spent for searching for new dwelling, the in-
convenience of repairing and moving, etc.). For the owner of a non-
dummy dwelling, the choice of this dwelling is connected to the costs as
well (taxes, maintenance, etc.). It is natural to assume that the non-
recurrent costs are absent if agent g does not change his place of resi-
dence: 1giq = 0 if i = δ(g) ≠ 0. If dwelling i does not satisfy consumer g in
some aspects (for example, it is too far from his place of work), then
compensatory costs may be included in 2giq . Thus, the value of a dwell-
ing for a consumer consists of some fixed costs determined by factors
exogenous to the considered market, and a price created by market
competition.
For a given agent, the dummy dwelling is some housing unit (specified
by location, size, and so on) outside the considered local market; the
agent would like to occupy such a dwelling if he didn't choose any non-
dummy dwelling in the considered market. For consumer g, the values
1
0gq  and 
2
0gq  reflect his expected costs for sufficing his housing needs
from beyond the considered market; these costs are determined
by housing prices outside the considered market (surely, we suppose
these prices are stable). For supplier g, the dummy dwelling may be
thought of as the occupied dwelling beyond the considered market; his
non-recurrent expenses connected with occupying this dwelling are
equal to zero, and his recurrent expenses do not depend on his choice
(d(g) or 0). Therefore, assuming that the buyer (renter) bears all fixed
costs in the case of selling (renting) a dwelling, we can set qg0 = 0
whenever g∈G2.
Let us put ψgd(g) = b ≥ 0 if supplier g wants to lease out d(g) at least for
b money units per year, and ψgd(g) = ρ⋅b ≥ 0 if he wants to sell d(g) at
least for b money units; let us also set ψg0 = 0.
Definition. Supplier g's reservation price for dwelling i∈Jg is bgi =
ψgi + qgi.
Thus bg0 = 0. The definition of bgd(g) for g∈G2 may be justified as fol-
lows. If c(pd(g)) = ψgd(g), then supplier g is indifferent between selling
(leasing out) d(g) and leaving the market. Choosing d(g), he refuses an-
nual income ψgd(g) and bears annual fixed costs qgd(g); thus, the agent is
ready to sacrifice at most bgd(g) amount of annual income for this
choice.
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Definition. Agent g's utility function has the form ug(z) = y(z) + egj(z),
z∈Zg. If g∈G1, then egi is some moneyed value of the utility, providing to
consumer g within the year with the services, created by dwelling i. If
g∈G2, then egi = bgi for i∈Jg.
Let us put Z = ×g∈GZg. We shall call elements of set Z distributions. If
z∈Z, then we put y(z, g) = y(zg), j(z, g) = j(zg), ug(z) = ug(zg). Each z∈Z
defines the allocation (distribution of dwellings) ζ(z) = ( j(z, g)|g∈G).
The purpose of the next section is to describe the agents' budget re-
strictions and to specify (following the suggestion of R.E. Ericson) the
interpretation of quantities egi for g∈G1.
1.2. Reservation prices
Let wg be the full annual income agent g is earning beyond the consid-
ered market. Agent g chooses (y, i) under prices p, solving the optimiza-
tion problem: max{y + egi | (y, i)∈Zg} s.t. y + c(pi) + qgi − c(pd(g)) ≤ wg.
For p∈P, g∈G, and i∈Jg, let us set βgi(p) = c(pi) + qgi − c(pd(g)) − qgd(g).
Suppose agent g has chosen dwelling i∈Jg at prices p; the maximal pos-
sible value of his non-housing consumption and that of his utility function
we denote by ygi(p) and vgi(p), correspondingly. It is clear that ygi(p) =
wg − βgi(p) − qgd(g), and therefore,
vgi(p) = ygi(p) + egi = wg + egi + c(pd(g)) − c(pi) − qgi.   (1)
Note that βgd(g)(p) = 0, ygd(g)(p) = wg − qgd(g), and vgd(g)(p) = wg −
qgd(g) + egd(g) regardless of prices.
Supplier g can obtain utility wg + ψgd(g) if he chooses d(g), or wg +
c(pd(g)) if he chooses zero. He will choose zero (will offer d(g) for sale or
for rent) if c(pd(g)) + qgd(g) > bgd(g) (i.e., an increment of his annual in-
come and a saving of the fixed costs, in totality, exceed the reservation
price), and he will leave the market if ψgd(g) > c(pd(g)).
Let us now consider a consumer's behavior.
Definition. 0gy  is the minimum annual non-housing consumption ac-
ceptable for consumer g; clearly, 0 ≤ 0gy ≤ wg.
Assume that the following condition is satisfied:
egi − egd(g) ≤ wg − 0gy  − qgd(g) for i∈I, g∈G1.     (2)
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Consumer g should pay qgd(g) per year for possessing the dwelling d(g),
and he cannot allocate more than wg −
0
gy  per year for housing con-
sumption. The increment of housing utility in the case of choice i in
comparison with the choice d(g) cannot exceed the increment of the
corresponding expenses. This substantiates (2) with i ≠ d(g) .
Assume that i = d(g); then (2) takes the form 
wg −
0
gy  − qgd(g) ≥ 0. (3)
If d(g) = 0 then (3) requires that the sum of the agent's expected costs
for sufficing his housing needs beyond the considered market and for
non-housing consumption would not exceed his annual income. If (3) is
not fulfilled with d(g) ≠ 0, then the consumer owns a dwelling, which is
too expensive for him (and occupies it at the beginning of the period). If
he will remain in d(g), then he will not be able to pay qgd(g) in full and will
reduce the fixed payments to an acceptable level de facto; eventually he
will lose his possessive rights for this dwelling, whereupon d(g) will be-
come zero. Consequently, we assume that all insolvent owners had al-
ready lost their dwellings before the beginning of the period. So, (2) is a
consistency condition for the model's parameters.
For (g, i)∈G1×I, let ∆bgi be the greatest value of βgi (p) over p∈P subject to
vgi(p) ≥ vgd(g)(p), (4)
ygi(p) ≥ 0gy . (5)
The value βgi(p) = (c(pi) + qgi) − (c(pd(g)) + qgd(g)) is the increment of
the agent's annual expenses in the case of choice i, in comparison with
choice d(g). Therefore, ∆bgi is the maximal additional annual expenses
the agent would be willing to bear for the sake of owning/renting dwell-
ing i (if ∆bgi < 0, then the agent will approve choice i under the condition
of increasing his non-housing consumption at least by |∆bgi| per year as
the result of this choice). So, we can interpret ∆bgi as the difference in
the reservation prices of agent g for the dwellings i ≠ d(g) and d(g). The
greater this difference, the greater is the utility of dwelling i for agent g.
Besides, increasing the reservation price (asking price) for d(g) and ex-
pecting nonzero demand for d(g) at this price, the agent can increase
his reservation prices (bid prices for purchasing or renting) for other
dwellings.
Definition. Reservation prices bgi (i∈I) of consumer g are the solution to
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the following set of equations:
bg0 = qg0 and bgi − bgd(g) = ∆bgi for i ≠ d(g).     (6)
A reservation price bgi is the maximal annual expenses acceptable for
agent g in connection with choice i. In particular, bg0 − bgd(g) = ∆bg0 =
βg0(p) for some p∈P, then bgd(g) = c(pd(g)) + qgd(g). That is, bgd(g) in-
cludes the missed profit (the "flow equivalent" of the minimum price,
which the agent would accept when selling d(g)) plus the fixed costs.
Note that bgi is agent g's reservation price for the annual service flow
from dwelling i; if i∈I1, then the "true" reservation price (bid price of pur-
chasing or selling) is bgi⋅ρ−1.
Theorem 1. If g∈G1, then bgi = egi − eg0 + qg0 for all i.
According to Theorem 1, the reservation prices exist and the difference
bgi − egi does not depend on i. Therefore, replacing each egi by bgi in the
utility function ug, we shall obtain the equivalent utility function. Thus
we assume in what follows that ug(y, i) = y + bgi for all g. Note that
conditions (2) remains true after replacing all egk by bgk since egi − egj =
bgi − bgj for all i and j according to Theorem 1. Kaneko (1976) had found
the necessary and sufficient condition for an individual preference or-
dering to be represented by a quasilinear utility function. Theorem 1
states that under natural condition (2), an agent's reservation prices for
dwellings can be used in his quasilinear utility function as a measure of
housing utility.
Remark. If egi − eg0 ≥ 0 (with the same level of non-housing consump-
tion, dwelling i is not worse than the dummy one to agent g), then
bgi ≥ qg0 ≥ 0.
Our ultimate purpose is to point out some approaches to the regulation
of housing markets. The results of regulatory actions reveal themselves
in equilibrium, that is why the following section deals with equilibria for
the considered model.
2. EQUILIBRIA
2.1. Walrasian equilibria
In this section, we shall describe all Walrasian equilibria for the consid-
ered model by means of some simple linear programming problem and
study some properties of equilibria. Existence of Walrasian equilibria was
proved by Gale (1984) for a very general model. In some particular
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cases, Gale (1960) and Kaneko (1983) had found the complete descrip-
tions of all equilibria that makes it possible to calculate some equilibrium
for any initial situation. Theorem 2 strengthens the first of these results
and is independent of the second one (Kaneko has assumed that all
market agents have the same preferences of a general form on the set
of dwellings).
Definition. Distribution z is feasible if
∑g y(z, g) + ∑g qgj(z,g) = ∑g wg,            (7)
g ≠ h and j(z, g) = j(z, h) = i imply i = 0.        (8)
Equality (7) is the condition of market clearing with respect to money
(the total of internal payments is zero); (8) means that the demand for
each dwelling does not exceed the corresponding supply (the supply of
dummy dwellings is not restricted). Denote by FD the set of all feasible
distributions.
Definition. A Walrasian equilibrium is a collection (z, p)∈FD×P such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
ug(z) = max{ug(z1) | z1 = (y, i )∈Zg, y + c(pi) + qgi − c(pd(g)) ≤
wg} for g∈G, (9)
if i∉{j(z, g)|g∈G}, then pi = 0.               (10)
By (9), each agent obtains the maximum utility under the budget restric-
tion, and (10) is the condition of market clearing for dwellings.
The value ψgi = bgi − qgi we shall call the pure utility of dwelling i to
agent g. Lemma 1 gives a convenient criterion for verifying condition (9)
(Bevia, Quinzii, and Silva (1999) have used the analogous criterion), and
Lemma 2 describes some properties of the equilibria.
Lemma 1. Condition (9) is equivalent to ψgj(z,g) − ψgi ≥ c(pj(z,g)) − c(pi)
for all g and i∈Jg.
Lemma 2. Let (z, p) be some equilibrium, and put π = c(p).
(a) For all g, ug(z) = wg + ψgj(z,g) + πd(g) − πj(z,g); if g∈G2, then ug(z) =
wg + max{ψgd(g), πd(g)}.
(b) If g∈G1, then y(z, g) ≥
0
gy .
(c) If g∈G2, then πd(g) ≥ ψgd(g) whenever d(g)∈{j(z, h) | h∈G1} and
ψgd(g) ≥ πd(g) otherwise.
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It follows from statement (b) of Lemma 2 that all consumers are solvent
in equilibrium. Besides, ug(z) ≥ wg + ψgd(g) for all g by Lemma 5 and
Theorem 3 (see below).
For π∈P, let us put r(π) = (r(πi) | i∈I), where r(πi) = πi ρ−1 if ∈I1 and r(πi) = πi
otherwise (reconstruction of the "true" prices).
If dwelling i owned by supplier g is not in demand in equilibrium, then we
can reckon that the compatible price of this dwelling is equal to ψgi, be-
cause its owner is willing to "pay" this price. Lemma 3 formalizes this
reasoning.
Lemma 3. Assume that p∈P, π = c(p), and the vectors π1, p1 are
defined as follows: if g(i)∈G2, then 
1
iπ  = max{πi, ψg(i)i}, πi otherwise;
1
ip  = r(
1
iπ ) for all i∈I. If (z, p) is an equilibrium, then (z, p1) is an equilib-
rium too.
Now we shall establish the correspondence between equilibria and
the triplets (x, α, π), where x is a basic optimal solution of some linear
programming problem and (α, π) is an optimal solution of the dual prob-
lem. Suppose S0 is some sufficiently large integer, õ = (xgi | g∈G, i∈Jg)
is a vector of variables, and let us formulate the linear programming
problem T:
max ∑g,i ψgi⋅xgi s.t.           (11)
∑i xgi = 1, g∈G,            (12)
∑g xgi ≤ 1, i∈I \ {0},           (13)
∑g xg0 ≤ S0,              (14)
x ≥ 0.                (15)
The dual problem T* has the form: 
min (∑g αg + ∑i πi) s.t.            (16)
π ≥ 0 and αg + πi ≥ ψgi for g∈G, i∈Jg,      (17)
where α = (αg | g∈G) and π = (πi | i∈I) are the vectors of dual variables
corresponding to constraints of problem T.
T is a transportation type problem, thus all its basic feasible solutions
(bfs) are integral and all bfs of problem T* are integral if ψgi are integers
(Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1982, section 13.2, Corollary). Thus we can
interpret the variables and constraints in problem T as follows: xgi = 1 if
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agent g chooses dwelling i, zero otherwise; each consumer chooses just
one dwelling (possibly, a dummy one); each dwelling may be chosen by
no more than one consumer; the number of dummy dwellings is not re-
stricted.
Lemma 4 states some properties of duals, in particular it explains why
the summand S0⋅π0 is absent in objective function (16).
Lemma 4. If (α, π) is the optimal solution of problem T*, then α ≥ 0
and π∈P.
For z∈Z and p∈P, let us put x(z) = (xgi(z) | g∈G, i∈Jg)), where xgi(z) = 1
if i = j(z, g), zero otherwise; put also α (z, p) = (αg (z, p) | g∈G), where
αg (z, p) = ug(z) − (wg + ñ(pd(g))).
Let FS be the set of all integral feasible solutions to problem T (clearly,
FS ≠ ∅). For any x∈FS, we define k(x, g), g∈G, as follows: k(x, g) = i if
xgi = 1 (k(x, g) is well defined because each vector x∈FS has a unique
non-zero component xgi = 1 for any g∈G). For x∈FS and π∈P, let us put
yg(x, π) = wg + πd(g) − πk(x,g) − qgk(x,g), zg(x, π) = (yg(x,π), k(x,g)), z(x, π) =
(zg(x, π) | g∈G).
Theorem 2. If (z, p) is an equilibrium, then x(z) is a basic optimal solu-
tion of T and (α(z,p), c(p)) is an optimal solution of T*. If x is a basic op-
timal solution of T and (α, π) is an optimal solution of T*, then
(z(x,π), r(π)) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 2 proves the correspondence between equilibria and optimal
solutions of problems T and T*. It gives the exact formulation of
the result discussed (without reference) by Bevia, Quinzii and Silva
(1999, p. 3, 4), adding to this result the convenient description of all
equilibria and the efficient way of calculating the equilibria for any market
situation. The definitions of α(z, p) and c(p) suggest an interpretation of
duals in problem T: αg(z, p) is the utility obtained by agent g in the equi-
librium without his initial income and the revenue from selling the dwell-
ing owned by him; πi is the compatible price of dwelling i. Theorem 2 im-
plies that each system of equilibrium prices equilibrates any equilibrium
allocation of dwellings; this is true in a more general model too (Bevia,
Quinzii, and Silva, 1999, the proof of Preposition 2.1).
If consumer g has bought (rented) a new dwelling and has not sold his
old one (d(g) ≠ 0), then, in equilibrium, he owns the "excess" dwelling
with zero price. It is the price of d(g) as an asset, because d(g)∈I1. But
we have used the flow equivalents of all money amounts in our argu-
ments, thus it follows from Assumption 3 that there would not be de-
mand also for renting this dwelling at a positive price. Let us assume that
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such a dwelling is taken off the market: the owner reconstructs, or de-
molishes, or neglects it.
We shall call z an equilibrium distribution if (z, p) with some p is an
equilibrium. Let E be the set of all equilibrium distributions. Denote by f0
the optimal value of the objective function in problem T and put F0 =
∑g wg + f0.
Corollary 1. If z∈FD, then ∑g∈G ug(z) = ∑g wg + ∑g,i ψgi⋅xgi(z); in par-
ticular, if z∈E, then ∑g∈G ug(z) = F0.
By Corollary 1, the total value of agents' utility functions is the same in
all equilibria. Corollary 2 gives the sufficient condition of an equilibrium.
Corollary 2. If z∈FD, x(z) is a basic optimal solution of problem T, and
there exists an optimal solution of problem T* such that ug (z) = α g +
wg + π d(g) for all g∈G, then (z, r(π)) is an equilibrium.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the efficiency analysis of
equilibrium distributions (Theorem 3).
An arbitrary set Q such that ∅ ≠ Q ⊆ G will be called a coalition. For any
coalition Q, we put D(Q) = {d(g) | g∈Q} ∪ {0} and Z(Q) = ×g∈Q Zg.
Definition. Distribution z∈Z(Q) is feasible for coalition Q if
{j(z, g) | g∈Q} ⊆ D(Q) (members of Q choose dwellings only in D(Q));
{g, h} ⊆ Q, g ≠ h, and j(z, g) = j(z, h) = i imply i = 0; ∑g∈Q y(z, g) +
∑g∈Q qgj(z,g) = ∑g∈Q wg (agents in Q do not pay to and do not obtain the
payments from agents in G \ Q).
Let FD(Q) be the set of all distributions feasible for coalition Q. If z∈FD,
z1∈FD(Q), and ug(z) < ug(z1) for all g∈Q, then we say that coalition Q
blocks z by means of z1. The core C of the market is the set of all distri-
butions z∈FD such that no coalition blocks z.
A distribution z∈FD is Pareto-maximal if there is no distribution z1 in FD
such that ug(z) ≤ ug(z1) for all g∈G and ug(z) < ug(z1) for some g. Let PM
be the set of all Pareto-maximal distributions.
Lemmas 5 and 6, being of autonomous interest, are needed to prove
Theorem 3.
Lemma 5. If z∈Ñ, then ∑g∈G ug(z) = F0 and ug(z) ≥ wg + ψgd(g) for all
g∈G.
Lemma 6. Assume that z∈Ñ, x = (xgi | g∈G, i∈Jg), and cgi = ψgi −
ug(z) + wg for all g∈G, i∈Jg. Then the following problem is bounded:
max ∑g, i xgi⋅cgi s.t.              (18)
x ≥ 0 and ∑g xgi − ∑j xg(i) j ≤ 0 for i ≠ 0.       (19)
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Theorem 3. E = Ñ ⊆ PM. If |G| ≥ 2, then E ⊂ PM.
Equality E = Ñ means that every distribution lying in the core may be de-
centralized by means of prices. Quinzii (1984, Theorem 3) has proved
E = Ñ with utility functions monotonous and continuous with respect to
the quantity of money and under conditions denoted as A.1, A.2, A.3. In
our model, A.1 follows from the quasilinearity of utility functions, A.2 is
the consequence of (2), and A.3 is equivalent to egi − eg0 ≥ 0 (see Re-
mark to Theorem 1). We do not use (2) in the proof of Theorem 3.
Therefore, if utility functions are quasilinear, then E and C coincide with-
out additional conditions.
Svensson (1983) has studied the market model (let us denote it by SV),
which describes the distributions of some number of indivisible goods
and some amount of money under weak restrictions on agents' prefer-
ences; he has introduced the metric d((x, i), (y, j)) = |x − y| + |i − j|. Pref-
erence relations created with functions ug are continuous and locally
non-satiated with respect to this metric, whence E ⊆ PM follows (see
Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995, Proposition 16.C.1); when prov-
ing Theorem 3, we give the simple straightforward proof of this fact.
Svensson (1983) has shown that in the model SV, a distribution z∈PM is
an equilibrium one if it satisfies some non-trivial condition; for our model,
this condition takes the form
ug(z) > wg + ψgj(z,g) for all g.      (20)
But, if (z, p) is some equilibrium and g∈G1, then ug(z) = wg − c(pj(z,g)) +
c(pd(g)) + ψgj(z,g) (Lemma 2). Thus (20) implies c(pd(g)) > c(pj(z,g)): each
consumer chooses in equilibrium a dwelling cheaper than the one initially
owned by him. The last statement can be confuted easily (consider, for
example, the case of d(g) = 0). Consequently, our model differs essen-
tially from the model SV.
2.2. Equilibria with respect to rationing schemes
From Theorem 3 it follows that Walrasian equilibria are the desirable (ef-
ficient) states of the market. But is it possible to assert that the market
necessarily will come to some equilibrium from any initial situation? The
numerosity of equilibria in the considered model is rather the rule than
the exception. How does the market "select" one of all possible equilib-
ria? What is the market agents' behavior ensuring transition to some
equilibrium? To answer these questions we shall describe some family of
rationing schemes; in my opinion, such schemes are inherent in housing
markets in the short-run, and we shall study the equilibria with respect to
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these schemes (under fixed prices). Generally speaking, a rationing
scheme is some mechanism peculiar to the specific market, "part of
the institutional arrangement of the economy" (Schwödiauer, 1978,
p. XXXIII). This mechanism "distributes" the demand and/or supply
shortage (if such shortage exists at the current prices) among the mar-
ket agents.
Equilibria with respect to rationing schemes were introduced by Benassy
(1975), Drèze (1975), Younès (1975), Grandmont, Laroque and Younès
(1978), Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978). We shall use these defini-
tions for the considered model in the formulation given by Grandmont
(1993) with a small modification: the current price of a dwelling may be
equal to zero, and agent g's demand for 0 and d(g) cannot be con-
strained.
The dwellings allocations under fixed prices were analyzed first,
seemingly, by Herbert and Stevens (1960). Gustafsson et al. (1980,
p. 85 – 90) have applied the ideas of this paper to markets of rental
dwellings. The authors describe the allocations maximizing "consumer
surplus" at given prices. The problem is reduced to some linear pro-
gramming problem similar to problem T (see Section 2.1). Wiesmeth
(1985) has studied "fix-priced equilibria" under the assumption that for
each household, the set of acceptable dwellings undistinguished in utility
is defined. Khutoretsky (1999) has constructed and reduced to a linear
programming problem a model generalizing the models by Gustafsson
et al. (1980) and Wiesmeth (1985). Fix-priced equilibria studied by Wi-
esmeth (1985) and Khutoretsky (1999) are the equilibria with respect to
some rationing schemes; these schemes are not explicitly described in
the mentioned works.
In this section we shall work with some invariable vector p∈P of fixed
prices for dwellings, taking into account the tenure types (i.e., pi is the
value of dwelling i if i∈I1, and pi is the annual rental rate for this dwelling
if i∈I2).
Definition. Let I+ be some collection of sets I+(g) for g∈G, satisfying
condition {0, d(g)} ⊆ I+(g) ⊆ Jg for all g, and let s
− be some collection of
numbers s−(g) for g∈G such that s−(g)∈{−1, 0} and s
−(g) = −1 in the
case of d(g) = 0. Then the triplet σ = (p, I+, s
−) is called a market signal.
A signal describes the constraints of demand and supply perceived by
agents. Agent g is not constrained in demand just for the dwellings in
I+(g); an agent's demand for money, dummy dwelling, and his own
dwelling cannot be constrained by the definition. Whence it follows that
suppliers are not constrained in demand: I+(g) = Jg for g∈G2. If agent g
ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM EQUILIBRIA IN A HOUSING MARKET22
is not constrained in the supply of dwelling d(g), then s−(g) = −1, and
s−(g) = 0 otherwise; the supply of dummy dwellings is not constrained.
Up to here we have assumed that an agent owning a non-dummy dwell-
ing offers it for sale (rent) if he chooses an other dwelling (Section 1.1).
Now we change this agreement as follows.
Assumption 4. When choosing a dwelling other than d(g), agent g of-
fers d(g) for sale or rent if and only if d(g) ≠ 0 and s−(g) = −1 (the
agent's supply is not constrained).
An allocation is a vector ζ∈×g∈GJg satisfying condition (8): g ≠ h and
ζg = ζh = i imply i = 0; ζg is the dwelling allocated to agent g. Let DA be
the set of all allocations.
From Assumption 4 it follows that prices, the choice of dwelling, and
constraint s−(g) uniquely determine the maximal possible non-housing
consumption of agent g subject to his budget restriction. Therefore, un-
der fixed prices, we can describe demands only by allocations, assuming
that the budget restrictions and condition (7) are fulfilled.
In this section, at fixed prices, we shall consider the utility functions of a
general form: wg(i) for g∈G, i∈Jg.
Definition. Allocation ζ is feasible with respect to signal σ = (p, I+, s−) if
ζ∈×g∈GI+(g) (the agents' choices are matched with the constraints of
demand).
Let us denote by DA(σ) the set of all allocations feasible with respect to
signal σ. The quantity Ug(σ) = max{wg(i)|i∈I+(g)} will be called a re-
stricted optimum for agent g.
Definitions. The constraint of demand for i∈Jg \ I+(g) is binding to
agent g∈G1 if wg(i) > Ug(σ). A signal (p, I+, s
−) is orderly if, for each g,
either s−(g) = −1 or the constraint of demand for d(g) is not binding to
any agent (only one side of the market may be rationed).
A trade offer of agent g is an arbitrary set Θg ⊆ Jg \ {0, d(g)}. A trade
offer may be interpreted as some list of dwellings desirable for agent g
and different from 0 and d(g). If d(g) ≠ 0 and s
−(g) = −1, then, in agree-
ment with Assumption 4, agent g will offer d(g) for sale or for rent when
choosing i∈Θg. It is clear that Θg = ∅ for g∈G2.
Definition. A rationing scheme ρ is a rule that for each collection Θ =
(Θg | g∈G) of trade offers determines constraints I+(ρ, Θ) =
(I+(ρ, Θ, g) | g∈G) and s−(ρ, Θ) = (s−(ρ, Θ, g) | g∈G) such that the signal
(p, I+(ρ,Θ), s−(ρ,Θ)) = σ(ρ, Θ) is orderly and the following conditions hold
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for all g∈G:
the set Θg ∩ I+(ρ, Θ, g) contains no more than one element, (21)
if i∈Θg ∩ I+(ρ, Θ, g), then s−(ρ, Θ, g(i)) = −1,       (22)
Θg ∩ I+(ρ, Θ, g) ∩ Θh ∩ I+(ρ, Θ, h) = ∅ if h ≠ g.      (23)
A rationing scheme "resolves the conflicts" of trade offers; conditions
(21) − (23) ensure the balance of demand and supply in equilibria with
respect to a rationing scheme (see below).
Now we shall describe a family ℜ of rationing schemes. We hypothesize
that the schemes of this kind really act in housing markets in the
short-run.
Let n(g), g∈G1, be some numbering of all consumers, and let ng(i) for
each g∈G be some numbering of dwellings i∈Jg in order of non-
increasing values wg(i). The numbering n(g) specifies an order of con-
sumers' entering the market, and the numbering ng(i) specifies an order,
in which consumer g "examines" the available dwellings (the natural pre-
sumption is that the agent examines the better dwellings before the
worse ones; the numbering ng(i) is necessary to arrange the equivalent
dwellings).
Definition. t(g, A) = argmin{ng(i) | i∈A} for g∈G, A ⊆ Jg.
Clearly, wg(t(g, A)) = max{wg(i) | i∈A}.
Numberings n(g) and ng(i) determine the specific scheme, ρ∈ℜ. The
constraints created by this scheme (see below) for an arbitrary collection
of trade offers Θ do not depend on Θ : I+(ρ, Θ) = I+(ρ), s−(ρ, Θ) = s−(ρ).
The constraints-constructing algorithm (we shall name it ρ-algorithm)
works step by step. At the preliminary step 0, for g∈G2, we set I+(ρ, g) =
{0, d(g)} (in accordance with the definition of a signal) and t(g) =
t(g, Jg). In other words, each supplier decides whether he will offer his
dwelling for sale (rent) at current prices. Also, we define the set of
dwellings available to consumers at step 1: D1 = (I \ {t(g) | g∈G2}) ∪ {0}
(each supplier g is not constrained in the dwelling choice; if he has cho-
sen d(g), then this dwelling is not available for consumers). If δ(h)∉D1 for
h∈G1, then we put δ(h) = 0 (consumer h lives in the dwelling owned by
some supplier g, δ(h) = d(g); therefore, h rents d(g) at the beginning of
the period; when choosing d(g), the supplier does not extend the terms
of the lease and the consumer becomes homeless). We define the set of
active consumers and that of vacant dwellings at this step, A1 = G1
and F1 = (D1 \ {δ(g) | g∈G1}) ∪ {0}. For each g∈G1, an "initial" subset
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of the set I+(ρ, g) should be constructed before the first step; it is
I+(ρ, g, 0) = {0, d(g)}.
Assume that before step k, the sets Dk, Ak, Fk, and I+(ρ, g, k−1) are de-
fined and the initial condition Dk = Fk ∪ {δ(g)|g∈Ak} holds. This condi-
tion demands that those dwellings either occupied by active consumers
or unoccupied would be available to consumers at step k. The initial
condition is fulfilled in the first step and the algorithm ensures it at sub-
sequent steps.
Definition. A sequence 〈g1, …, gn 〉 of elements belonging to Ak is feasi-
ble at step k if t(gn , Dk)∈Fk ∪ {δ(g1)} and t(gs , Dk) = δ(gs+1) whenever
1 ≤ s < n.
A feasible sequence describes either a cycle or chain of realizable con-
sumers' moves (Fig. 1).
At any step k, ρ-algorithm calculates the values t(g, Dk) for g∈Ak in order
of increasing numbers n(g). It is easy to see that the feasible sequences
exist if Ak ≠ ∅. Let 〈g1, …, gn 〉 be the first such sequence that emerged
at step k. Put t(gs) = t(gs , Dk) and I+(ρ, gs, k) = I+(ρ, gs , k−1) ∪ {t(gs)},
1 ≤ s ≤ n ; now agent gs is not constrained in demand for dwelling t(gs).
By definition, put: Dk+1 = {0} ∪ (Dk \ {t(gi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}); Fk+1 = Fk if
t(gn) = δ(g1), otherwise Fk+1 = (Fk \ {t(gn)}) ∪ {0, δ(g1)}; Ak+1 =
Ak \ {gi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Step k is finished, and we turn to step k+1.
Obviously, ρ-algorithm will complete its "activity" at some step r such
that Ar+1 = ∅, and the dwelling t(g) is defined for each g∈G1 after step
r. Let us put I+(ρ, g) = I+(ρ, g, r) for g∈G1. Put also s−(ρ, g) = 0 if
d(g)∉{0} ∪ {t(g) | g∈G}, −1 otherwise.
Now I+(ρ) = (I+(ρ, g) | g∈G) and s−(ρ) = (s−(ρ, g) | g∈G) are defined,
and therefore, σ(ρ) = (p, I+(ρ), s−(ρ)) is the signal created by scheme ρ.
With this ζ(ρ) = (t(g) | g∈G) is the allocation created by scheme ρ.
g1
t(g1, Dk) = δ(g2)
gn …
t(gn, Dk) = δ(g1)
g2
g1 g2 gn
…δ(g1) t(g1, Dk) = δ(g2) t(gn)∈Fk Chain
Cycle
Fig. 1. Sequences feasible at some step k.
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Lemma 7 proves that ρ is really a rationing scheme.
Lemma 7. If ρ ∈ℜ, then σ(ρ) is an orderly signal and conditions
(21) − (23) are satisfied for any collection of trade offers Θ = (Θg | g∈G).
The schemes belonging to ℜ combine the advantages of "queue" and
the Gale algorithm (top trading cycle algorithm). The rationing schemes
corresponding to the Gale algorithm (see Shapley and Scarf, 1974) cre-
ate the set of all Walrasian equilibria in particular cases (Roth and Pos-
tlewaite, 1977). The idea of combining the "queue" and the Gale algo-
rithm came to me owing the work of Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998),
where these rationing schemes have been investigated under the as-
sumption of strict agents' preferences. The schemes belonging to ℜ do
not need this assumption.
Definition. Agent g 's effective demand (see Grandmont, 1993, p. 908)
with respect to signal σ = (p, I+, s−) is a trade offer containing each
i∈Jg \ {d(g), 0} such that wg(i) > wg( j) for all j∈I+(g) \ {i}. 
In other words, if a dwelling i∈Jg \ {d(g), 0} is a unique best choice for
agent g subject to (specified with the signal) the constraints of demand
for the dwellings other than i but without taking into consideration the
constraint of demand for i, then an effective demand should contain i.
Definition. Equilibrium with respect to rationing scheme ρ is a vector
ζ∈DA(σ(ρ)) such that there exists some collection Θ = (Θg | g∈G) of ef-
fective demands with respect to signal σ(ρ) satisfying the following con-
ditions:
wg(ζg) = Ug(σ(ρ)) for all g,          (24)
ζg∈Θg ∪ {d(g), 0} for all g,          (25)
if s −(ρ, Θ, g(i)) = 0, then i∉{ζg | g ≠ g(i)},     (26)
if i∉{ζg | g∈G} ∪ {0}, then s−(ρ, Θ, g(i)) = 0.    (27)
Conditions (26) and (27) in conjunction with Assumption 4 ensure market
clearing under fixed prices.
Theorem 4. If ρ ∈ℜ, then ζ(ρ) is an equilibrium with respect to scheme ρ.
An equilibrium with respect to any scheme ρ∈ℜ exists by Theorem 4;
Theorem 5 proves the uniqueness of this equilibrium on the condition
that for all g∈G,
if d(g) ≠ 0 and wg(i) = wg(d(g)), then ng(i) ≥ ng(d(g)).    (28)
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Condition (28) means that each agent examines his own dwelling before
the other equivalent ones. If we consider t(g, A) as the choice made by
agent g from set A, then (28) can be interpreted as some voluntariness
condition: agent g should not leave d(g) ≠ 0 for i without gaining some
profit (even if d(g) and i are equivalent for him and his move from d(g) to
i is profitable for some other agent).
Theorem 5. If ρ∈ℜ and condition (28) is true, then ζ(ρ) is a unique equi-
librium with respect to scheme ρ.
Note that in an equilibrium with respect to scheme ρ, a consumer, g,
owning a dwelling with a non-zero price can leave it, yet still remaining
the owner of this dwelling (if t(g) ≠ d(g), pd(g) ≠ 0, and s
−(g) = −1); that is
impossible in Walrasian equilibria.
Let us prove the efficiency of equilibria with respect to schemes belong-
ing to ℜ. Let E(ℜ) = {ζ(ρ) | ρ∈ℜ} be the set of all equilibria with respect
to such schemes. For ζ∈DA, put F(ζ) = (I \ {ζg | g∈G}) ∪ {0} (the set
of all dwellings vacant in allocation ζ).
Definition. ξ ∈DA weakly dominates ζ∈DA (ζ ! ξ) if there exists some
sequence λ = 〈g(1), …, g(n)〉 of distinct elements of G1 (augmentative
sequence) such that
if 1 ≤ s < n, then either ξ g(s) = δ(g(s+1)) ≠ 0, or ξ g(s) = ζg(s+1) ≠ 0, (29)
ξ g(n)∈{δ(g(1)), ζg(1)} ∪ F(ζ); if ξ g(n)∈F(ζ), then n = 1,      (30)
if 1 ≤ s ≤ n and ξ g(s) ≠ ζg(s), then wg(s)(ξ g(s)) > wg(s)(ζg(s)),     (31)
wg(s)(ξ g(s)) > wg(s)(ζg(s)) for at least one s.         (32)
We shall say that allocation ζ∈DA lies in the core under fixed prices p
(fix-price core) and write ζ∈FPC if ζ ! ξ is not true for any ξ and wg(ζg) =
max{wg(i)|i∈Jg} for all g∈G2.
In other words, allocation ζ lies in the core if the suppliers are not con-
strained in their choice, and there is no coalition of consumers such that
some of its members can become better without changing the other
members' choices as revealed by allocation ζ and by choosing only the
dwellings either vacant in ζ, or occupied in ζ by the coalition members,
or initially occupied by the coalition members.
Theorem 6. FPC = E(ℜ).
Note that theorems 4 and 6 do not use condition (28). But for unique-
ness of an equilibrium (Theorem 5), some rule is necessary in order to
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uniquely specify agent g 's decision in the case of wg(d(g)) = wg(0) =
Ug(σ(ρ)); condition (28) is one of the variants for such a rule.
3. MECHANISM OF EQUILIBRATING THE MARKET
"The theory concerning adjustment processes developed thusfar has not
so much value as a description of reality" (Elzen, 1993, p. 5). Neverthe-
less, the market mechanism described below is plausible enough.
Changing prices and allocations, it leads the market to some Walrasian
equilibrium through a finite sequence of equilibria belonging to E(ℜ) (see
Section 2.2). That is, the equilibrium appears naturally "as a result of in-
dividual actions … but without being designed by any individual" (Hayek,
1955, p. 39)
Existence of such mechanism is especially important in the case of mul-
tiplicity of equilibria and gives the theoretical basis for comparative stat-
ics analysis and policy implications; see Elzen (1993, p. 4).
We assume that choosing dwellings under fixed prices, the market
agents are subject to some rationing scheme ρ∈ℜ and attain the equilib-
rium with respect to this scheme. While searching for a dwelling, as well
as in some equilibrium with respect to a rationing scheme, an agent can
discover binding constraints of demand and/or supply. He reacts to such
constraints by changing the price of his own dwelling. To simplify the
further reasoning, we assume that after each change in prices, a new
stage in the "work" of the mechanism starts. The procedure is finite un-
der the natural assumptions. Stabilization of prices means absence of
constraints and, therefore, the emergence of some Walrasian equilibrium
with respect to the market situation of the last stage. So, Walrasian equi-
libria are not only desirable (efficient), but also the natural states of the
considered market.
We shall describe the "work" of the mechanism by some EQ-procedure.
This procedure may be considered as a generalization of MacRae's
(1982) "stack-algorithm" (this algorithm, in particular, assumes that, ini-
tially, all dwellings are tenantless and all prices are equal to zero). The
EQ-procedure acts by stages, and each stage consists of steps. A vector
of current compatible prices π s∈P and the corresponding vector of cur-
rent prices ps = r(π s) are known at the beginning of any stage s ; π1 is
the vector of prices at the beginning of the period, π s for s > 1 is deter-
mined at the end of the stage s−1. The prices are invariable within a
stage and some bargains may be carried out under the current prices at
every step.
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Let us denote by G2(s) the set of all suppliers at stage s. Clearly,
G2(1) = G2, while G2(s+1) is the result of excluding from G2(s) those
suppliers who had sold their dwellings at the stage s. Now we can define
the set of all market agents at stage s : G(s) = G1 ∪ G2(s).
Denote by δ(s, g) and d(s, g), respectively, the dwelling occupied and
the dwelling owned by agent g at the beginning of stage s. If g∈G2(s),
then d(s, g) = d(g). Let us generalize Assumption 2 as follows.
Assumption 5. If g∈G1 and d(s, g) ≠ δ(s, g) then d(s, g) = 0. 
To justify Assumption 5, let us remember that in a Walrasian equilibrium
a consumer may own a non-dummy dwelling that he doesn't live in only
if this dwelling is of zero price (Section 2.1). In other words, a consumer
lives in the dwelling that he owns until he sells it or becomes convinced
that it is impossible to sell this dwelling. In the last case, if he chooses a
new dwelling and maintains ownership of the property, then he would
bear the current fixed costs connected with this property without any
profit; therefore, he would be better off resigning the dwelling (with zero
current price) that he owns.
Assumption 6. Each stage has a duration of one "year" and the
changes in agents' annual incomes are caused only by their actions in
the housing market in the preceding "year."
A consumer's fixed costs connected with the choice of dwelling may de-
pend on the dwelling he occupies, and an agent's reservation prices can
depend on his previous actions in the market. These dependencies were
irrelevant for us up to now, but now we should take them into account.
We shall use the following notation for g∈G(s): bgi(s), i∈Jg , are the agent
g 's reservation prices at stage s; bgi(1) = bgi;  qgi (j) =
2
giq ( j) + ρ 1giq ( j)
is the "flow equivalent" of fixed costs connected with the choice of dwell-
ing i by agent g who occupies dwelling j; q(g, i, s) = qgi(δ(s,g)); ψgi(s) =
bgi(s) − q(g, i, s); wg(s) is the agent g's budget restriction at stage s,
wg(1) = wg. Let us accept the following, obviously natural, assumptions.
Assumption 7. If g∈G2(s), then bgi(s) = bgi, q(g, i, s) = qgi, and wg(s) =
wg ; if g∈G1, then 
2
giq ( j) = 
2
giq  and qg0( j) = qg0; 
1
giq (i) = 0 with i ≠ 0 for
all g.
Assumption 7 means that suppliers' reservation prices, fixed costs, and
annual incomes do not depend on s, a consumer's recurrent fixed costs
connected with choice i, as well as his minimum expenses for sufficing
the housing needs beyond the considered market, are not dependent on
the dwelling he occupies, and non-recurrent fixed costs are absent if an
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agent does not move. The last condition is analogous to the convention
we had introduced in Section 1.1 ( 1giq = 0 if i = δ(g) ≠ 0).
Let g∈G1, i = δ(s, g), and j = δ(s+1, g). In agreement with Assumption 6,
the values of wg(s+1) are defined as follows: wg(s+1) = wg(s) if i = j,
wg(s+1) = wg(s) +
s
s,gd )(π −
s
jπ  − ρ⋅ 1gjq (i) if i ≠ j∈I1, and wg(s+1) =
wg(s) +
s
s,gd )(π − ρ⋅ 1gjq (i) if i ≠ j and j∉I1.
At stage s, an agent g has the utility function ugs(y, i) = y + bgi(s), where
y is the value of non-housing consumption within year s, and the agent's
budget restriction under prices p is y + c(pi) + q(g, i, s) − c(pd(s,g)) ≤
wg(s). Thus, if agent g has chosen dwelling i at stage s under prices p,
then ygi(s, p) = wg(s) + c(pd(s,g)) − c(pi) − q(g, i, s) is his maximum pos-
sible non-housing consumption and vgi(s, p) = ygi(s, p) + bgi(s) is the
maximum possible value of his utility function. Hence we can assume
that agent g evaluates dwelling i∈Jg at stage s under current prices ps
using the following criterion:
u(i, g, s) = ψgi(s) + sd(s,g)π − siπ ;        (33)
this criterion differs from vgi(s, ps) by the constant wg(s).
For supplier g, we have Jg = {0, d(g)}. It follows from Assumption 7 that
using criterion (33) he will choose 0 (will offer d(g) for sale or rent) if
s
gd )(π > ψgi, and he will choose d(g) (will leave the market) if ψgi > s gd )(π .
Analogously to the notation used for describing rationing schemes
(Section 2.2), let ng(s, i) for g∈G be the numbering of dwellings in Jg
in order of non-increasing values of u(i, g, s); define ts(g, A) =
argmin{ng(s, i) | i∈A} for g∈G(s) and A ⊆ Jg. Let also n(g) be the num-
bering of market agents. As in schemes belonging to ℜ, n(g) determines
the order of agents' appearance on the market, and ng(s, i) is the order,
in which agent g examines the dwellings at stage s. We assume that the
numbering ng(s, i) creates the same ordering of any two dwellings j and
k at each stage s such that u( j, g, s) = u(k, g, s). (This assumption can
be eliminated easily; see comments at the end of this section.) Let us
modify condition (28) as follows:
if g∈G1 and u(i, g, s) = u(δ(s,g), g, s), then ng(s, i) ≥ ng(s, δ(s,g)) (34)
(a consumer "examines" his occupied dwelling, prior to examining other
equivalent dwellings).
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If g(i)∈G2 and 
s
iπ < ψg(i)i , then the supplier g(i) will not offer i for sale or
rent at stage s (he will choose i ). Therefore, we introduce a vector of
minimal compatible prices π0 = (
0
iπ | i∈I) as follows: 
0
iπ = ψg(i)i if g(i)∈G2,
zero otherwise. For s = 1, we assume that
s
iπ ≥
0
iπ  if g(i)∈G2(s) and i∈{δ(s, g) | g∈G1}    (35)
(if a dwelling owned by a supplier is rented at the beginning of stage 1,
then its current price is not less than the minimum one, otherwise the
owner would not lease it out). The procedure will make condition (35)
true in subsequent stages.
If k > 1, then the sets 
k
sA  (of those consumers who had not chosen the
dwelling δ(s+1, g) before step k), ksD  (of those dwellings that are the
possible choices at step k), and ksF  (of the dwellings vacant at step k)
are determined at step k−1 of stage s. Before step 1 of stage s we de-
fine: 1sA = G1, 
1
sD = {i∈I |
s
iπ ≥
0
iπ }, 
1
sF = {0} ∪ (
1
sD \ {δ(s, g) | g∈G1}). It
follows from (35) that δ(s, g)∈D1s  for s = 1 and g∈G1.
At step k of stage s, each agent g∈A ks  chooses a dwelling, tsk(g)∈
k
sD .
Assume that each consumer g remembers his last choice, L(g) (at every
step k we set L(g) = tsk(g)), and repeats this choice while it remains
the best possible choice. The choice rule (the choice of the best acces-
sible dwelling taking into account the numbering ng(s, i), with inertia): if
s > 1 and L(g) maximizes u(i, g, s) over 
k
sD , then tsk(g) = L(g); otherwise
tsk(g) = ts(g,
k
sD ). It follows from (34) that tsk(g) = δ(s, g) if δ(s, g) maxi-
mizes u(i, g, s) over ksD .
For a sequence λ = 〈g1, …, gn〉, where gi ∈G1 for all i, we shall use the fol-
lowing terminology. The sequence has the priority max{n(gj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}. It
is feasible at step k of stage s if gj∈A
k
s  for all j, tsk(gj) = δ (s, gj+1)
whenever 1 ≤ j < n, and tsk(gn)∈F
k
s
 ∪ {δ (s, g1)}. A feasible sequence is
maximal if it is not a proper subsequence of another feasible sequence.
A feasible sequence is correct if, with i = δ (s, g1), either tsk(gn) = i, or
s
iπ =
0
iπ  and u(i, g1, s) < u(tsk(g1), g1, s).
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A feasible sequence describes the consumers' moves realizable at step
k of stage s; it is a cycle if tsk(gn) = δ(s, g1), and it is a chain if
tsk(gn)∈
k
sF . The definition of a correct sequence requires, above all, that
each agent would gain exactly the utility he expected as the result of
carrying out the bargains corresponding to this sequence. If λ is a chain,
then the preceding condition is true for the owner of dwelling i = δ(s, g1)
only in the case of siπ =
0
iπ . In addition, the first participant of a chain
should become better off (otherwise he has no need to enter the se-
quence).
It is easy to see that feasible sequences exist if ksA  ≠ ∅. The smaller the
priority of a sequence, the sooner it will appear if agents make their
choices in the ascending order of numbers n(g).
The mechanism "works" in the following way. The correct sequences are
being realized (the bargains are carried out at current prices). If correct
sequences are absent and there exist feasible (and, therefore, the
maximal feasible) sequences, then, in every maximal feasible chain, ei-
ther the first dwelling is the best for the agent who occupies it, or the
price of this dwelling is greater than the minimum one and its owner is
constrained in supply. In the first case, agent g1 chooses δ(s, g1); in the
second case, the owner of the dwelling δ(s, g1) reduces its price. If fea-
sible sequences are absent, then each consumer is a member of some
correct sequence and some equilibrium belonging to E(ℜ) is constructed
under current prices. As this takes place, some suppliers probably are
constrained in supply and so they will decrease the prices. If no agent
perceives constraints, then the market is in Walrasian equilibrium. Let us
make the following easy assumption.
Assumption 8. The numbers egi, 
1
igq ( j), 
2
giq , wg , 
0
gy , and 
1
ip  are inte-
gers for all i, j, g ; ρ is a rational.
Denote by N the denominator of the rational ρ and put δ = N −1. It follows
from Assumption 8 that 1iπ  and ρ⋅ 1igq ( j) are rationals. Then qgi(j), ψgi,
0
iπ  are rationals too. It is easy to see that all these numbers are multi-
ples of δ.
Now let us describe the EQ-procedure in a formal way. Assume that
k
sD = 
k
sF  ∪ {δ(s, g) | g∈ ksA }        (36)
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(at step k, a consumer can choose either a vacant dwelling or a dwelling
occupied by an agent, g, who had not make his choise δ(s+1, g) yet;
this condition is fulfilled at step 1 of stage 1 and the EQ-procedure en-
sures it at the subsequent steps and stages). At step k of stage s, either
some correct sequence appears or the owner of some dwelling changes
the price of this dwelling. As stated above, one should define the sets
1
sA , 
1
sD , and 
1
sF  before step 1 of stage s. Let us consider three possible
situations at step k of stage s.
(1) The correct sequences exist. Let us select the correct sequence
〈g1, …, gn〉 with the least priority and assume that the bargains
corresponding to this sequence (consumer gj moves from δ(s, gj) into
tsk(gj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n) are carried out at current prices. By definition, put:
δ(s+1, gj) = tsk(gj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n ; 1+ksD = ( ksD \ {tsk(gj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}) ∪ {0};
1+k
sA = 
k
sA \ {gj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}; 
1+k
sF = 
k
sF  if tsk(gn) = δ(s, g1), otherwise
1+k
sF = (
k
sF \ {tsk(gn)}) ∪ {0, δ(s,g1)}. Pass on to step k+1 of stage s.
(2) Case 1 does not happen and the feasible sequences exist. Let
us select the maximal feasible sequence λ = 〈g1, ..., gn 〉 with the least
priority. It follows from definitions of correct and maximal sequence that
tsk(gn) ≠ δ(s, g1) and δ(s, g1)∉{tsk(g) | g∈ ksA } (the first participant of the
chain occupies the unsaleable dwelling). Put j = δ(s, g1). The following
subcases are possible.
(2a) sjπ >
0
jπ . By definition, put: 
1+s
jπ =
s
jπ − δ, 1+siπ = siπ  for i ≠ j ;
δ(s+1, g) = δ(s, g) for all g∈G1 such that δ(s+1, g) is not defined yet;
r(s) = k (hereafter r(s) is the number of the last step of stage s). We
proceed to step 1 of stage s+1.
(2b) sjπ =
0
jπ . Then u(j, g1, s) = u(δ(s,g2), g1, s) because λ is not a cor-
rect sequence. The dwellings j and δ(s, g2) = tsk(g1) are equivalent for
agent g1; he leaves the chain and remains in j : δ(s+1, g1) = δ(s, g1).
One bargain is carried out. The completion of the case is the same as
that in case (1). Pass on to step k+1 of stage s.
(3) Cases (1) and (2) do not happen. Then ksA = ∅. Hence it follows that
each consumer g had participated in some bargain carried out at some
step m < k, and δ(s+1, g) maximizes u(i, g, s) over msD . Note that if a
dwelling, i, was occupied at some preceding step and is tenantless at
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step k (i∈ ksF ), then 
s
iπ =
0
iπ  (see case (2a)). The following subcases are
possible.
(3a) siπ >
0
iπ  for some i∈
k
sF  (the owner of such a dwelling is constrained
in supply). From Assumption 5 and (2a) it follows that g(i)∈G2(s)
(dwelling i is owned by a supplier). By definition, put h =
argmin{n(g) | g∈G2(s), 
s
gd )(π  > 
0
)(gdπ }. Then we define 
1+s
hd )(π  =
s
hd )(π  − δ,
and 1+siπ =
s
iπ  for i ≠ d(h). At last we put r(s) = k and pass on to step 1
of stage s+1.
(3b) Case (3a) does not happen and there exist some i∈I and g∈G1 such
that i = ts(g, I) and u(i, g, s) > u(δ(s+1,g), g, s) (consumer g is con-
strained in demand for dwelling i). Then i∉ ksF  (a feasible sequence
would exist otherwise). Let us select the first such pair (g, i) in the lexi-
cographic ordering created by the numberings n(g) and ng(s, i). For
i belonging to this pair, we set 1+siπ  = 
s
iπ + δ; prices of other dwellings
are invariable. Note that in this case, the price may be increased
for a dwelling, i, owned by some supplier, g, who does not offer i for
sale or rent at stage s (d(g)∉ 1sD ). Put r(s) = k and pass on to step 1 of
stage s+1.
(3c) Neither case (3a) nor case (3b) happens. Put r(s) = k and finish the
procedure.
We shall say that the EQ-procedure at stage s defines allocation
ζ s = ( j(s, g) | g∈G(s)), where j(s, g) = δ(s+1, g) if g∈G1, j(s, g) = 0
if g∈G2(s) and d(g)∈{δ(s+1, h) | h∈G1}, j(s, g) = d(g) otherwise.
The allocation ζ s and the price vector ps create a distribution,
z(s) = (zg(s) | g∈G(s)), with zg(s) = (ygj(s,g)(s,ps), j(s,g)).
The sets G1, G2(s), I1, I2, and the vectors (
1
giq ( j)), (
2
giq ) (δ(s, g) | g∈G1),
(d(s, g) | g∈G(s)), (bgi(s)) determine the market situation A(s) at the be-
ginning of stage s. If stage s is concluded by case (3), then, obviously,
the EQ-procedure operates exactly as ρ-algorithm (Section 2.2) for
some rationing scheme ρ∈ℜ, and ζ s = ζ(ρ) is the equilibrium with respect
to scheme ρ under prices ps in situation A(s). So, if stage s is not the last
one, then the EQ-procedure determines the price vector ps+1 and the
allocation ζ s; at some stages this allocation is a non-Walrasian equilib-
rium (belonging to E(ℜ)) under prices ps.
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Theorem 7. If τ is the final stage of the EQ-procedure, then (z(τ), pτ) is
a Walrasian equilibrium for situation A(τ).
Now we shall find out how the consumers' reservation prices change
during the EQ-procedure and then we shall prove the finite convergence
of this procedure. At stage 1, the reservation prices are determined as
described in Section 1.2. Let us formulate the analogous definition of
consumer g's reservation prices bgi(s) at stage s > 1 using the utility
function ug,s−1(y, i) and the budget restriction wg(s).
For g∈G1 and i ≠ d(s, g), we denote by ∆bgi(s) the maximal over p∈P
value of βi(s, p) = c(pi) + q(g, i, s) − c(pd(s,g)) − q(g, d(s,g), s) subject to
ygi(s, p) ≥ 0gy  and ug,s−1(ygi(s,p), i) ≥ ug,s−1(ygd(s,g)(s,p), d(s,g)).
Definition. If g∈G1, then the reservation prices bgi(s) at step s > 1 are a
unique solution to the set of equations
bg0(s) = qg0, bgi(s) − bgd(s,g)(s) = ∆bgi(s) for i ≠ d(s, g).   (37)
For g∈G2(s) and i∈Jg, define bgi(s) = bgi. If g∈G1, then we denote for
short Qgj(s) = ρ⋅ 1gjq (δ(s, g)), agj(s) = s s,gd )(π  + wg(s) − Qg j(s) − 0gy .
Lemma 8. If g∈G1, j = δ(s+1, g), and i∈I, then bgi(s+1) = bgi(s) in the
case when j∈I1 ∪ {δ(s, g)} and bgi(s+1) = min{bgi(s), agj(s)} otherwise.
Corollary. min{0, bgi(1)} ≤ bgi(s+1) ≤ bgi(s) for all g∈G1, i∈I, s ≥ 1.
So, the reservation prices do not increase and are bounded below during
the EQ-procedure.
Lemma 9. Suppose g∈G, i = j(s, g) and case (3) holds at the last
step of stage s. Then bgi(s) − q(g, i, s) ≥ 
s
iπ . If, additionally, g∈G1, then
ygi(s, ps) ≥
0
gy .
It follows from Lemma 9 that at every stage of the EQ-procedure each
consumer is solvent: he should pay no more than he was going to
pay within the year, keeping the acceptable level of non-housing con-
sumption.
Let Al = {ζ s | s ≥ 1} and Pr = {π s | s ≥ 1} be the set of all allocations
and, respectively, the set of all vectors of current prices created with the
EQ-procedure.
Lemma 10. The sets Al and Pr are finite.
It follows from Lemma 10 in particular that the current prices are
bounded.
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Lemma 11. If the bargains corresponding to a sequence λ = 〈g1, …, gn 〉
are carried out at stage s of the EQ-procedure and n > 1, then
u(δ(s,g), g, s) < u(δ(s+1,g), g, s) for some g∈{g1, …, gn}.
Lemma 11 states that at least one member of each realized non-trivial
sequence of bargains becomes better off. Lemma 12 and Theorem 8
prove the finiteness of the EQ-procedure.
Lemma 12. There exists an integer M such that either the EQ-procedure
will be finished before stage M +1, or bgi (s) − bgi (s+1) ≥ δ > 0 for some i,
g∈G1, and s ≤ M.
Theorem 8. The EQ-procedure is finite under Assumption 8.
So then, the EQ-procedure terminates on some stage τ (Theorem 8) and
creates some Walrasian equilibrium for situation A(τ) (Theorem 7).
In concluding this section, let us make some comments about the
EQ-procedure.
1. One may suppose that the numbering of market agents depends on
the stage, and the numberings of dwellings are constrained only by con-
dition (34). All results of Section 3 remain true, but, in the proof of
Lemma 12, it should be taken into account that the set of all possible
numberings is finite. Therefore, the numberings do not restrict the vari-
ety of market agents' behavior.
2. In the EQ-procedure, the end of a stage is the signal for changing
prices. The market agents cannot, certainly, "catch" this moment in
reality, but this is not important. If an owner wants to sell (rent out) his
dwelling but cannot do this for quite a long period, then he reduces
the price. The reason for increasing the price of a dwelling is simply an
offer to buy (rent) this dwelling made to its owner when the dwelling is
occupied.
3. Under Assumption 8, all parameters of the EQ-procedure are multiples
of δ (one can consider them integers with respect to a suitable unit of
measurement). Therefore, if some dwelling was a unique best for an
agent before the prices changed at some stage, then it will remain the
best (although possibly not a unique best) for him at the next stage. The
inertia of choice provides stability of a feasible non-correct sequence
until this does not contradict the interests of the participants of this se-
quence.
4. Why will the price of a dwelling, i, occupied by the first participant of a
feasible but non-correct chain decrease at some stage s? The dwelling i
is not in demand at the current prices because the chain is a maximal
one. Put g = g(i). In the case of g∈G1 (the dwelling is owner-occupied),
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the participation in the chain would be profitable for agent g if he sold i
for sip . But this is impossible. Agent g is looking for the maximal price
providing a non-zero demand for i. Without information on other con-
sumers' reservation prices for i, he "gropes" for this price, decreasing
s
iπ  by δ. Eventually, at some price such that participation in the chain is
profitable for g, the demand for i will possibly arise, the chain will elon-
gate, and g will not have already been the first member of it; or the
agent will find out that participation in the chain is not profitable for him
at any positive price for i. If g∈G2 (i is a rental dwelling), then, after find-
ing a more suitable dwelling, the occupant informs the owner about ter-
minating a lease. Then supplier g is looking (groping) for the price that
maximizes his profit. Eventually, either demand for i will arise under
some price not less than ψgi, or agent g will choose i and leave the mar-
ket at price ψgi for i.
5. The utility function value increases for the first participant of the im-
plemented chain and doesn't decrease for all of its other participants.
Therefore, the first participant is interested in realizing all bargains and
can "redistribute" his gain (for instance, to refund the part of fixed costs
connected with each bargain) so that each participant of the chain be-
comes better off.
6. Using Theorem 2, it is easy to prove that the price vector pτ equili-
brates allocation ζτ with respect to situation A(1), if ψgi(τ) = ψgi for all
(g, i)∈ G1×I and ψgd(g) = 0 for g∈G2. The analogous statement for more
general cases has not been proved.
4. AGGREGATING THE MODEL
In this section, we shall construct a linear programming problem that de-
scribes all essentially different Walrasian equilibria disregarding inessen-
tial details.
Definition. The dwellings i and j are of the same type (i ∼ j) if the fol-
lowing conditions hold: (a) either {g(i), g( j)} ⊆ G1, or {g(i), g( j)} ⊆ G2 and
ψg(i)i = ψg( j)j, or i = j = 0; (b) for any g∈G1, δ(g)∉{i, j} implies ψgi = ψgj
and δ(g)∈{i, j} implies bgi − 2giq = bgj − 2gjq .
We interpret ψgi as the pure utility of choice i to consumer g, and
bgi − 
2
giq  may be called the pure utility of occupying dwelling i. Thus
condition (b) of the preceding definition requires that for dwellings of the
4. AGGREGATING THE MODEL 37
same type, the pure utilities of occupying were equal for a consumer oc-
cupying one of these dwellings, and the pure utilities of choice were the
same for a consumer occupying some other dwelling. If 0 = i ≠ j, then
condition (a) of the preceding definition does not hold (because g(0) is
not defined); hence, a dummy dwelling and a non-dummy one cannot be
of the same type. Note also that i ∼ i for all i.
Definition. A Walrasian equilibrium (z, p) is called normal if the dwellings
of the same type have the same price: pi = pj whenever i ∼ j.
Lemma 13. For any Walrasian equilibrium (z, p), some normal equilib-
rium (z0, p0) exists such that ζ(z0) = ζ(z).
Definition. The consumers g and h are of the same group (g ≈ h) if the
following conditions hold: either {g, h} ⊆ G1 or {g, h} ⊆ G2; {g, h} ⊆ G1
implies wg = wh, ψgi = ψhi for i∉{δ(g), δ(h)}, and bgi − 2giq = bhi − 2hiq  for
i∈{δ(g), δ(h)}; {g, h} ⊆ G2 implies d(g) ∼ d(h).
Lemma 14. Suppose (z, p) is a normal equilibrium and g ≈ h. If
{g, h} ⊆ G1 and δ(g) ∼ δ(h), then ug(z) = uh(z); if {g, h} ⊆ G2, then
ug(z) − uh(z) = wg − wh.
Definition. A normal equilibrium (z, p) is standard if for g∈G1,
j(z, g) ∼ δ(g) implies j(z, g) = δ(g) (a consumer does not change the
dwelling he occupies for a dwelling of the same type).
Theorem 9. For any normal equilibrium (z, p), some standard equilib-
rium (z0, p) exists such that j(z0, g) ∼ j(z, g) for all g∈G1.
Thus, from an arbitrary equilibrium, one can come to normal equilibrium
changing prices of some dwellings and the distribution of money. Then,
substituting the dwellings chosen by some agents with equivalent dwell-
ings, one can come to a standard equilibrium. Among all equilibria de-
scribed with problems T and T*, only the standard ones can appear in a
natural way as a result of market competition with full information. Now
we shall construct a linear programming problem that describes all stan-
dard equilibria in the same way as problem T describes all Walrasian
equilibria.
We shall use the following notation: I(n) is the set of all dwellings of type
n (dummy dwellings have the type 0); agent g of group h is (n, h)-agent
if δ(g)∈I(n) (then suppliers of group h are (0, h)-agents); GC is the set of
all consumers groups and GS is the set of all suppliers groups. If h∈GS,
then all suppliers of group h own dwellings of the same type; denote this
type by τ(h). G(h, n) is the set of all (n, h)-agents, in particular, if h∈GS,
then G(h, 0) is the suppliers group h.
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The statement of Lemma 15 obviously follows from Assumption 2 and
the definitions: the dwellings of type τ(h) are just the dwellings owned by
the suppliers of group h.
Lemma 15. If h∈GS, then I(τ(h)) = {d(g) | g∈G(h, 0)}.
Let U be the set of all triplets (n, k, h) such that I(k) ∩ (∪g∈G(h,n) Jg) ≠ ∅
(some (n, h)-agents can choose some dwellings of type k). For
(n, k, h)∈U, we define the quantities ankh as follows: if h∈GC, g∈G(h, n),
and i∈I(k), then ankh = ψgi for k ≠ n and annh = ψgδ(g); if h∈GS and
g∈G(h, 0), then a00h = ψg0 = 0 and a0τ(h)h = ψgd(g). Lemma 16 justifies
the interpretation of ankh as the pure utility of dwellings in I(k) to
(n, h)-agents.
Lemma 16. The quantities ankh are well defined.
Let us put Cn = |I(n)|, Dhn = |G(h, n)|. For each triplet (n, k, h)∈U, we
introduce the variable Xnkh : the number of (n, h)-agents choosing dwell-
ings of type k.
The AT problem (aggregative problem T) has the form
max ∑n,k,h ankh ⋅Xnkh s.t.           
∑k Xnkh = Dhn,              (38)
∑m,h Xmkh ≤ Ck,             (39)
X ≥ 0.                  
We assume that C0 in (39) is sufficiently large. Obviously, if xgi are vari-
ables of problem T and Xnkh = ∑g∈G(h,n)∑i∈I(k) xgi, then (38) is the result of
summing constraints (12) over g∈G(h, n), and (39) is the result of sum-
ming constraints (13) over i∈I(k).
The dual problem AT* has the form:
min (∑ h,n D hn⋅γ  hn + ∑ k C k ⋅π k) s.t. γ hn + πk ≥ a nkh, π k ≥ 0.    
Lemma 17 states that the allocation corresponding to some feasible so-
lution of the AT problem meets the following consequence of Assumption
1: a consumer can choose the dwelling owned by a supplier only if this
supplier will choose zero.
Lemma 17. If h∈GS and X is a feasible solution of the AT problem, then
∑ m∑ a∈GC Xmτ  (h)a ≤ X 00h .
Theorem 10. Suppose (z, p) is a standard equilibrium, x = x(z),
Xnkh = ∑g∈G(h,n)∑i∈I(k) xgi for (n, k, h)∈U, γ hn = α g(z, p) for g∈G(h, n), and
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πk = c(pi) for i∈I(k); then X and (γ, π) are optimal solutions of the AT and
AT* problems respectively. If X is an integral optimal solution of AT
(in particular, a basic one), (γ, π) is an optimal solution of AT*, iπ = πk
for i∈I(k), and π = ( iπ | i∈I), then there exists some basic optimal
solution x of T such that (z(x, π ), r(π )) is a standard equilibrium and
Xnkh = ∑g∈G(h,n)∑i∈I(k) xgi.
So, the AT and AT* problems describe just all standard equilibria.
To each integral optimal solution of AT corresponds, generally speaking,
some set of equilibrium distributions with minor distinctions: only
in dwellings of type k allocation among (n, h)-agents for some trip-
lets (n, k, h).
Consider a dwelling, i, owned by a supplier, g. We can assume that
in an equilibrium, the compatible price π i is not less than ψgi (Lemma 3).
If π i > ψgi, then the dwelling is occupied by some consumer (Lemma 2);
if π i = ψgi, then 0 and i are equivalent for agent g and we can suppose
he chooses i. Thus the following assumption is reasonable.
Assumption 9. In equilibrium, each supplier chooses his own dwelling if
it is not in demand.
Now, in the AT problem, condition (39) with k = τ(b) may be written as
an equality: ∑m∑h∈GC Xmkh + X0τ(b)b = Ck . Condition (38) with n = 0 and
h = b∈GS has the form X00b + X0τ(b)b = Db0. From here, using Db0 = Cτ  (b)
(Lemma 15), we obtain ∑m∑h∈GC Xmτ(b)b = X00b. Put by definition bnkh =
= ankh − a0kb  if k = τ(b), ankh otherwise.
Each variable X00h enters in the objective function of the AT problem
with coefficient a00h = 0, thus ∑n,k,h ankh ⋅Xnkh = ∑n,k∑h∈GC ankh ⋅Xnkh +
+ ∑h∈GS a0τ(h)h ⋅X0τ(h)h = ∑n,k∑h∈GC bnkh ⋅Xijh + ∑h∈GS a0τ(h)h ⋅Dh0. Let
us eliminate the variables X0τ(b)b for b∈GS using the equalities corre-
sponding to conditions (39). We shall obtain the ATC problem:
max∑n,k∑h∈GC bnkh⋅Xijh subject to ∑k Xnkh = Dhn for h∈GC, ∑m∑h∈GC Xmkh ≤
≤ Ck , X ≥ 0. The ATC problem does not depend on the variables con-
nected with suppliers; we shall use this property of the problem in Sec-
tion 6.
The AT and ATC problems are equivalent under Assumption 9. There-
fore, the ATC and ATC* problems describe all standard equilibria satis-
fying Assumption 9. It is easy to see that the dual price of constraint (39)
in the AT problem exceeds the corresponding dual price in the ATC
problem by ψbk if k = τ(b), otherwise these dual prices are equal. In
other words, if a dwelling, i, is owned by a supplier, g, then the ATC
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problem separates the "competitive addition" to the minimum price ψgi
from the compatible price for this dwelling.
5. COMPARATIVE STATICS
A given market situation does not determine a unique equilibrium, as a
rule; thus, a comparative statics analysis is complicated in the consid-
ered model. The different price systems may equilibrate the same allo-
cation and different allocations may be equilibrated with the same price
system. Aggregation (Section 4) does not remove this problem. That is
why by now only consequences of the emergence of an additional
dwelling have been rather scrupulously analyzed. The results of this sec-
tion are in line with the analysis of consequences of stimulating housing
construction in the book "Æèëèùíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà" (1996, p. 130 – 131).
The price of an additional dwelling in some equilibrium for the new situa-
tion can be compared only with the price of some dwelling of the same
type in the initial equilibrium, thus let us consider the standard equilibria
described by the AT problem.
Let f0(A) be the optimal value of the objective function in the AT problem
for market situation A. By Theorem 9 and Corollary 1 from Theorem 2, all
Walrasian equilibria for initial situation A have the invariant characteristic:
F0(A) = ∑g wg + f0(A); it is the total of all agents' utilities in any equilib-
rium for situation A. Bevia, Quinzii, and Silva (1999, p. 9) interpret F0(A)
as the social welfare created by the dwellings set I. Suppose that the
sets of consumers, initial allocations, and utilities of dwellings coincide in
some situations A1 and A2, while there is an additional tenantless dwell-
ing, d, of type j in situation A2. The tenantless in situation A2 dwelling d
may be owned only by some supplier. Thus the definition of a dwelling
type implies that all dwellings of type j are owned by suppliers, and there
is one additional supplier f in situation A2. One can consider that in
situation A1 this supplier does not offer dwelling d for sale or rent
and, thus, he has utility wf + ψf j. Then, in an equilibrium for situation A1,
the total utility over all agents participating in situation A2 is equal to
F0(A1) + wf + ψf j . Hence, the "social utility" of dwelling d can be esti-
mated by the difference δ = F0(A2) − [F0(A1) + wf + ψf j]. Denote by Π(A)
the set of all vectors of compatible prices corresponding to price sys-
tems for standard equilibria in situation A. Proposition 3.1 by Bevia,
Quinzii, and Silva (1999) is equivalent in our case to Theorem 11.
Theorem 11. max{π j | π∈Π(A2)} − ψf j ≤ δ ≤ min{π j | π  ∈Π(A1)} − ψ f j.
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Bevia, Quinzii, and Silva (1999, p. 9) interpret δ as the social utility of a
dwelling of type j in situation A2 as well as the utility of such a dwelling in
its "next best use" in situation A1 (δ ≥ 0 by Lemma 3). From Theorem 11
it follows that δ is the lower bound for compatible prices of dwellings of
type j in standard equilibria for A1 and it is the upper bound for compati-
ble prices of such dwellings in standard equilibria for A2. The additional
dwelling of type j will not be in demand if min{πj | π∈Π(A1)} < ψf i . If
max{πj | π∈Π(A2)} > ψf j, then the dwelling of type j will be in demand.
Theorem 10 indicates how to calculate δ. Besides, the minimum (maxi-
mal) compatible price for dwellings of type j in any situation A can be
found by minimizing (maximizing) πj subject to γhi + πk ≥ aikh , F(A; γ, π) ≤
f0(A), π ≥ 0 (here F(A; γ, π) is the objective function of the AT* problem
for situation A. So, we can calculate the bounds of prices in standard
equilibria and find out whether the additional dwelling of each type will
be in demand.
The caused by variation (appearance of a new tenantless dwelling)
change in the equilibrium can be observed in more detail if we assume
that the market is in equilibrium in the moment of variation. We shall
work with the basic (not aggregated) model.
For an initial situation, A, we define the corresponding allocation
ζ(A): ζg(A) = δ(g) if g∈G1, ζg(A) = 0 if g∈G2 and d(g)∈{δ(g) | g∈G1}, and
ζg(A) = d(g) otherwise.
Definition. An allocation, ζ = (ζg | g∈G), is an equilibrium one if there
exists some equilibrium (z, p) such that ζ = ζ(z) (see Section 1.1).
Assume that the market is equilibrated in situation A1, i.e., the allocation
ζ(A1) is an equilibrium one. Then there exists an equilibrium e1 = (z1, p1)
such that ζ(A1) = ζ(z1), in particular, δ(g) = j(z1, g) for all g∈G1. Put
π1 = c(p1). Let us denote by F the set of all tenantless dwellings in
the situation A1, F = {0} ∪ (I \ {δ(g) | g∈G1}). After adding the tenant-
less dwelling j to I and including the owner-supplier g( j) of this dwelling
into G2, we shall transform A1 into the new situation A2. Let
λ = 〈  j(1), …, j(n+1)〉 be some sequence of elements from I ∪ { j }.
Definition. Sequence λ is feasible if the following conditions hold: j(s) ≠
j(k) whenever s < k ≤ n, j(s) ≠ 0 whenever 1 < s ≤ n, j(n+1)∈F  ∪ {j(1), j},
and, for each s ≤ n, there exists an agent, h(s), such that j(s) = j(z1, h(s))
and j(s+1)∈Jh(s).
A feasible sequence λ describes the agents' movements possible in situa-
tion A1: agent hs, who has chosen dwelling j(s) in the initial equilibrium,
chooses j(s+1). Let us call such a sequence a cycle if j(n+1) = j(1), call it a
chain otherwise. By the definition, zero can be only the extreme element
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of a chain. The last participant of a chain chooses either a tenantless
dwelling in situation A1 (a chain of the first type) or j (a chain of the sec-
ond type).
Definition. Suppose λ = 〈  j(1), …, j(n+1)〉 is a feasible sequence and
j(s) = j(z1, h(s)) for s ≤ n ; λ is actualized in an equilibrium e = (z, p) for
situation A2 if j(s+1) = j(z, h(s)) for s ≤ n, and λ is non-trivial if n > 0.
Given a sequence λ = 〈  j(1), …, j(n+1)〉, we put I(λ) = {j(s) | 1 ≤ s ≤ n+1}
(the set of dwellings involved in the sequence). Let P(A) be the set of
all equilibrium price systems for situation A. Put by definition δi(p) =
1
iπ  − c(pi) for p∈P(A2) and i∈I (the difference of compatible prices for
dwelling i in equilibria e1 and (z, p)).
Lemma 18. Let e = (z, p) be an equilibrium for situation A2 and λ =
〈 j(1), …, j(n+1)〉 a sequence actualized in e. (a) If j(s+1) ≠ j, then
δj(s)(p) ≤ δ j(s+1)(p). (b) If λ is a cycle, then all δi(p) with i∈I(λ) are equal.
(c) If λ is a chain and i∈I ∩ I(λ), then δi(p) ≥ 0. (d) If λ is a chain of the
first type and i∈I(λ), then δi(p) = 0.
Dwelling j is absent in situation A1 and 
1
jp  is not defined. That is why we
exclude j in statements (a) and (c) of Lemma 18. Certainly, if the market
is in equilibrium e1, then only one chain of the second type may be actu-
alized as a result of market adjustment after the appearance of dwelling j
(the agents cannot become better off owing to other feasible moves).
But Lemma 18 compares an arbitrary equilibrium for A2 with e1. The
non-trivial and non-improving "sequences of distinctions" between the
equilibria are possible in this case. By Lemma 18, compatible prices c(pi)
in comparison with prices 1iπ  change by the same value in an actualized
cycle, do not change in an actualized chain of the first type, and do not
increase in an actualized chain of the second type. In a chain of the sec-
ond type, the nearer a dwelling is to j, the more it cheapens. Assuming
that the actualized chain of the second type leads from the "worse"
dwellings to the "better" ones, it may be concluded that a "better"
dwelling falls in price no less than "worse" ones.
Let e = (z, p) be some equilibrium for situation A2. Obviously, each agent
g∈G is involved in some actualized sequence (possibly, a trivial one); one
of these sequences is maximal by embedding; we denote it by λg(z).
Lemma 19. If (z, p) is some equilibrium for situation A2 and j∉I(λg(z)),
then vgδ(g)(p) = ug(z).
It follows from Lemma 19 that the allocation obtained by means of "abo-
lition" of all bargains corresponding to cycles and chains of the first type
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in some equilibrium (z, p) for situation A2 may be equilibrated by price
vector p. The following definition is connected with this reasoning.
Definition. An equilibrium e = (z, p) for situation A2 is simple if the only
sequence actualized in e is a chain of the second type.
Let SE be the set of all simple equilibria, and denote by λ(e) for e∈SE
a unique sequence (a chain of the second type) actualized in equilibrium
e. Put by definition L = {λ(e) | e∈SE} and SE(λ) = {e∈SE | λ(e) = λ}.
All equilibria in SE(λ) create the same allocation, denoted by ζ(λ). Just
the allocations ζ(λ) for λ ∈L may appear when the market, being in equi-
librium e1, adjusts to situation A2. If L ≠ ∅, then it follows from Theorem 2
that L is the set of all feasible sequences 〈  j(1), …, j(n+1)〉 maximizing
∑ ns 1= (ψh(s)j(s+1) − ψh(s) j(s)) subject to j(s) = j(z1, h(s)) for s ≤ n  and
j(n+1) = j. A method of constructing all elements of L is described
below.
Put J = I ∪ {j}, H2 = G2 ∪ {g( j)} (the sets of dwellings and, respectively,
of suppliers in the situation A2). In situation A2, an agent g chooses a
dwelling from set Kg : Kg = J if g∈G1, Kg = {d(g), 0) if g∈H2.
Put k(g) = j(z1, g) for g∈G. Let us consider a graph Γ = (J, U) with
the set of vertices J and the set of arcs U = {(k(g), i) | g∈G,
i∈Kg} ∪ {(0, d(g)) | g∈G2} ∪ {(0, 0)}. A weight c(k, i) of the arc (k, i) is
defined as follows: c(k, i) = ψgi − ψgk if k = k(g), c(k, i) = ψgi if
(k, i) = (0, d(g)) with g∈G2, c(0, 0) = 0. A pass µ = 〈i1, …, ik 〉  in the graph
Γ has the weight ∆(µ) = ∑s c(is , is+1).
Let Γ1 be the graph obtained from graph Γ by adding the arc ( j, 0) with
the weight c( j, 0) = −ψg( j) j. As e1 is an equilibrium, then Theorem 2 im-
plies that each simple and maximal by embedding path of positive weight
in Γ1 corresponds to some chain of the second type (in particular, there
are no chains of the first type nor cycles of positive weight in Γ1). Then
there exists a simple path of maximal weight to any vertex of Γ1. Clearly,
SE ≠ ∅ if and only if there exists a chain λ of the second type (a simple
unclosed path in graph Γ with the last vertex j) with the weight
∆(λ) ≥ ψg( j)j. All simple paths of maximal weight with the last vertex j can
be found using one of the known effective algorithms; see e.g. Minieka
(1978, Section 3.2). If the weight of these paths is not less than ψg( j)j,
then each of them corresponds to some sequence λ ∈L  and thus gener-
ates a simple equilibrium.
Let us fix λ = 〈  j(1), …, j(n), j(n+1) = j 〉∈L. In what follows we assume that
e = (z, p)∈SE(λ). Clearly, if a price system, p, is the result of market ad-
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justment to situation A2 from the initial equilibrium e1 (e.g., by means of
mechanism described in Section 3), then p ≤ p1. But, generally speaking,
in an equilibrium belonging to SE(λ), some prices may be greater than
those in e1. Theorem 12 shows that such prices can be reduced to the
level of p1.
For p∈P(A2), let us put ip = min{
1
ip , pi} if i∈I, jp = pj, and p  = ( ip | i∈J ).
Theorem 12. If (z, p)∈SE(λ) and gz = (ygj(z,g)( p ), j(z,g)), then
( z , p )∈SE(λ).
In other words, the allocation ζ(λ) equilibrated by price vector p, may be
equilibrated by prices p  too. Demange and Gale (1985, p. 881), and for
a more general model, Bevia, Quinzii, and Silva (1999, Theorem 3.10)
have proved that the set of all equilibrium price systems is a lattice. This
is true for the considered model too: the set P(A) is a lattice for any
situation A. But Theorem 12 does not follow therefrom, because the
definition of p  uses equilibrium prices for two different situations.
Lemma 3 justifies the following assumption.
Assumption 10. If g(i)∈G2, then 
1
iπ ≥ ψg(i)i.
Put H = G ∪ {g( j)} (the set of all market agents in situation A2). By
modifying the construction suggested by Quinzii (1984, Theorem 3), we
shall develop two interesting equilibrium price systems for the allocation
ζ(λ) = ( j(λ, g) | g∈H).
In the graph Γ, let µi for i∈J be a simple path of maximal weight with the
last vertex i. Put π
"
= (∆(µi) | i∈J), p
"
= r(π
"
) (see Section 2.1), zg(λ, p
"
) =
(ygj(λ,g)( p
"
), j(λ,g)), z(λ, p" ) = (zg(λ, p
"
) | g∈H), and e(λ, p" ) = (z(λ, p" ), p" ).
Theorem 13. e(λ, p" )∈SE(λ) and ip
"
≤ 1ip  for i∈I.
Corollary 1. If i∈I, then ip
"
≤ min{pi | p∈P(A1)}.
Corollary 2. If (z, p)∈SE(λ), then pi ≤ ip
"
 for i∈I(λ).
Corollary 3. If i∈I, k∈I(µi), and kp
"
< 1kp , then ip
"
< 1ip .
Notice that ip
"
< 1ip  (Theorem 13) and Corollary 3 with i∈I(λ) are covered
by Lemma 18, because this lemma is true for any price vector in P(A2).
So, p
"
 is an equilibrium price system for situation A2. The vector p
"
 de-
termines the upper bounds of prices for dwellings involved in the se-
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quence λ; these bounds and the prices of other dwellings in equilibrium
e(λ, p" ) do not exceed the minimum equilibrium prices for situation A1
(Corollary 1). If the price of a dwelling, k, decreases in equilibrium
e(λ, p" ), then the prices of all dwellings i such that in graph Γ, the path of
maximal weight with the last vertex i comes through k, decrease too
(Corollary 3). On the "main" path λ, closer a dwelling is to j, the more it
falls in price (Lemma 18).
It is easy to see that in equilibrium e(λ, p" ), the prices of dwellings not in-
volved in sequence λ should not necessarily be the maximal equilibrium
prices; and what is more, if I(µi) ∩ I(λ) = ∅, then ip
"
 is the minimum
equilibrium price for dwelling i. We shall construct the system of mini-
mum equilibrium prices for arbitrary situation A. The notation for pa-
rameters of situation A will be the same as that for situation A1, but we
do not assume that the market is equilibrated in situation A.
Let ζ = (ζ(g) | g∈G) be some equilibrium allocation for situation A.
Consider a graph Γ(ζ) = (I, U) with the set of vertices I and the set of
arcs U = {(ζ(g), i) | g∈G, i∈Jg} ∪ {(0, d(g)) | g∈G2} ∪ {(0, 0)}. Let us as-
sign a weight c(k, i) to the arc (k, i) as follows: c(k, i) = ψgi − ψgk if
k = ζ(g), c(k, i) = ψgk if (k, i) = (0, d(g)) with g∈G2, and c(0, 0) = 0.
Theorem 2 implies that there are no cycles of positive weight in Γ(ζ).
Thus, for each vertex i, there are paths of maximal weight with
the last vertex i, and there is a simple path among these paths; denote
it by µi. Put π~ = (∆(µi) | i∈J), p~ = r )~(π  (see Section 2.1), zg( p~ ) =
(ygζ(g)( p~ ), ζ(g)), z( p~ ) = (zg( p~ ) | g∈G), and, finally, e( p~ ) = (z( p~ ), p~ ).
Theorem 14. In situation A, e( p~ ) is an equilibrium. If p∈P(A) and
c(pd(g)) ≥ ψgd(g) for all g∈G2, then p~ ≤ p.
So, p~  is the system of the minimum equilibrium prices in the class of
equilibria (z, p) satisfying condition c(pd(g)) ≥ ψgd(g) for all g∈G2. This
condition is not restrictive (see Lemma 3). Applying Theorem 14 to allo-
cation ζ(λ), one can find the system of the minimum equilibrium prices
for situation A2.
Lemma 20. Suppose e = (z, p) is some equilibrium for situation A2,
p ≤ p1, and g∈G1; then ug(z1) ≤ ug(z).
It follows from Theorem 12 that any equilibrium allocation for situation A2
can be equilibrated by prices not exceeding p1. According to Lemma 20,
no consumer becomes worse off in comparison with e1 at such prices
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(the statement of this lemma is trivial for a consumer g who owns no
dwelling, but it is not quite obvious if d(g) ≠ 0). The following example
shows that emergence of an additional dwelling may change the equilib-
rium without changing prices and values of consumers' utility functions.
We shall consider the AT problem and use the corresponding notation
(Section 4).
Assume, for example, that in some aggregated situation A there is a se-
quence of triplets (i(s), j(s), h(s)), 1 ≤ s ≤ n, satisfying the conditions
Dh(s)i(s) > 0 and Dh(s)i(s+1) > 0 (there are dwellings of both types i(s) and
i(s+1) occupied by agents of group h(s)); ∆ = ∑ 11−=ns (ai(s) j(s+1)h(s) −
ai(s)i(s)h(s)) > 0; j(s) = i(s+1) for s < n . Let us select a sequence λ maxi-
mizing ∆ among those satisfying the above conditions. For simplicity, we
set ψgd(g) = 0 for g∈G2 (each supplier is willing to sell or to lease out his
dwelling at any price). Suppose the market is in equilibrium e1 = (z1, p) in
situation A. Assume that π i(1) = 0 and put π = c(p). Denote by AT(A) and
AT*(A) the AT and AT* problems for situation A, and let x and (γ, π) be
some optimal solutions of these problems. It may be considered that
xiih = Dhi (for all i, h) and xijh = 0 if i ≠ j (there are no moves). Then
γi(s)h(s) + πi(s) = ai(s)i(s)h(s), γi(s)h(s) + πi(s+1) ≥ ai(s)i(s+1)h(s),
γ i(s+1)h(s) + π i(s+1) = ai(s)i(s+1)h(s), γ i(s+1)h(s) + π i(s) ≥ ai(s)i(s)h(s).
Therefrom one can easily obtain γ i(s)h(s) = γ i(s+1)h(s). Thus
ai(s)i(s+1)h(s) − ai(s)i(s)h(s) =
              = (γ i(s+1)h(s) + πi(s+1)) − (γ i(s)h(s) + πi(s)) = πi(s+1) − πi(s)
and
∆ = ∑ 11−=ns (π i(s+1) − π i(s)) = π i(n) − π i(1) = π i(n) (since π i(1) = 0).
The appearance of a tenantless dwelling of type i(n) creates a new situa-
tion B such that parameter Ñi(n) in B is greater by one than that in A.
Let us define a vector y : yi(s)i(s)h(s) = xi(s)i(s)h(s) − 1, yi(s)i(s+1)h(s) = 1, and
yijh = xijh for all other triplets (i, j, h) (one (i(s), h(s))-agent moves to a
dwelling of type i(s+1)). Denote by AT(B) and AT*(B) the AT and AT*
problems for situation B. It is easy to check that y and (γ, π) are feasible
solutions of AT(B) and AT*(B) respectively. Let f, gA, and gB be the ob-
jective functions of the AT(A), AT*(A), and AT*(B) problems correspond-
ingly. Then f(x) = gA(γ, π) and ∆ = f(y) − f(x) = πi(n) = gB(γ, π) − gA(γ, π).
Thus f(y) = gB(γ, π), and, consequently, y and (γ, π) are optimal solutions
of the AT(B) and AT*(B) problems correspondingly. By Theorem 10, the
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allocation detected by vector y corresponds to some equilibrium
e2 = (z2, ð) for situation B. The value of an (i, h)-agent's utility function
is wh + γ ih + π d(h) in both equilibria e1 and e2.
The EQ-procedure (Section 3) explains why the moves can happen that,
seemingly, gave no benefits to consumers.
Assume that an additional dwelling j of type i(n) enters the market at a
compatible price πi(n). At stage 1 of the EQ-procedure, each consumer
will choose the dwelling he occupies. At the last step, case (3a) will hap-
pen, hence the price for j will become πi(n) − δ. At prices p, for
(i(s), h(s))-agents, the dwellings of types i(s) and i(s+1) are equivalent
(as ai(s)i(s+1)h(s) − ai(s)i(s)h(s) = πi(s+1) − πi(s)), and, under the same condi-
tions, such dwellings are not worse than the others. That is why dwelling
j will be the best for (i(n−1), h(n−1))-agents at stage 2. With suitable
numberings of the agents and dwellings, a chain 〈gn−1〉 with
gn−1∈G(h(n−1), i(n−1)) will appear. This chain will be actualized if
π i(n −1) = 0.
If the chain 〈gn−1〉 is not correct, then the price of some dwelling jn−1 of
type i(n−1) occupied by agent gn−1 will decrease by δ according to case
(2a), and this dwelling will become the best for (i(n−2), h(n−2))-agents,
and so on. Note that the chain will not "fall apart": once the agent gn−s
has chosen dwelling jn−s, he continues choosing it at the subsequent
steps and stages (because L(gn−s) = jn−s). It follows from pi(1) = 0 that
with suitable numberings of the agents and dwellings the bargains corre-
sponding to sequence λ will be actualized at some stage. Then the equi-
librium with respect to some scheme ρ∈ℜ will appear and case (3b) will
happen (since Dh(s)i(s+1) > 0). As a result, the prices of all dwellings in-
volved in chain λ will increase by δ and then return to the initial level. A
new equilibrium will appear. On further increasing the number of tenant-
less dwellings of type i(n), the prices will decrease only after all
(i(s), h(s))-agents occupy the dwellings of type i(s+1) (for some s).
6. APPLICATIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING POLICY
The literature devoted to housing policy and the ways of regulating the
housing markets is quite extensive (e.g., Cullingworth, 1967; Donnison,
1967; Yeates and Garner, 1976; Rothenberg and Galster, 1991;
Áåññîíîâà, 1993, "Æèëèùíàÿ ïîëèòèêà …", 1998; "Æèëèùíàÿ
ýêîíîìèêà", 1996). However the models taking into consideration the
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indivisibility of dwellings, to my knowledge, haven't been applied to the
problem of housing market regulation.
State regulation of the housing market is necessary even in advanced
countries, and it is all the more important in Russia. Yeates and Garner
(1976, p. 412) wrote: "There is now fairly general acceptance ... of the
need for public intervention in the private housing market, stemming ei-
ther from the fact that people find the housing conditions of the poor
morally shocking in an affluent society or because they fear that such
conditions are a threat to the very existence of that society." Moreover,
the authors of the book "Æèëèùíàÿ ïîëèòèêà …" (1998, p. 46) point
out that "in the theory of local public administrating, there is no scientifi-
cally established methodology for developing a local housing policy."
The approaches to developing local housing programs suggested below
are not universal but may be useful in many cases.
6.1. Statement of the problem
Rothenberg and Galster (1991, p. 293) have formulated the goal of
housing policy in a most general view as "improvement of a housing
market behavior." Housing policy is usually aimed at providing sufficient
housing supply, supporting socially acceptable standards, and financially
supporting families unable to pay market prices. Donnison (1967) recog-
nizes the following types of "interrelations" between the state and hous-
ing market.
1. Support of free market (Turkey, Greece). The state makes efforts to
increase housing construction regardless of the types of the dwellings
being built. For that purpose, the authorities stimulate private building
businesses and conduct institutional reforms enabling them to channel
more means to housing construction.
2. Social housing programs together with a free market (Great Britain,
Switzerland). Government housing programs serve specific groups of the
population and are supposed to have a provisional impact on the free
market. The state doesn't take responsibility for the housing conditions
of all its citizens.
3. All-embracing housing policy (Sweden, France). The state establishes
and controls the housing market to such an extent that the responsibility
for the housing conditions of most of the population falls on to the state.
Housing policy is combined with other social policies to achieve national
goals.
In the former USSR, the third type of housing policy has been actualized
before the first and second. The state social guaranties can hardly be
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reduced to an acceptable level now because of political reasons and be-
cause of the low incomes of most of the population. On the other hand,
the budget provides no possibility of allocating sufficient funds for social
housing programs. That is why the current housing policy of the Russian
authorities combines elements of all three approaches. In the Law of the
Russian Federation "On foundations of the federal housing policy" (in the
version of the Federal laws of 12.01.96 ¹ 9-ÔÇ, of 21.04.97 ¹ 68-ÔÇ,
of 10.02.99 ¹ 29-ÔÇ, of 17.06.99 ¹ 113-ÔÇ), the goals and instru-
ments of the housing policy are formulated as follows.
The goal of federal housing policy is: to provide social guarantees in the
realm of citizen's housing rights; to implement the construction of gov-
ernment, municipal, and private housing facilities; to create conditions
for attracting non-budgetary financial sources; to stimulate private own-
ership; to develop competition in the construction, maintenance, and
reparation of housing facilities. The state helps its citizens who are not
provided with dwellings that meet living standards by constructing state
and municipal housing facilities and using a system of compensation
(subsidies) and privileges to pay for housing construction, maintenance,
and reparation. The state authorities and local officials should en-
sure that conditions for renting dwellings within the limits of the social
standards are available for citizens, that the possibility of credit support
and tax privileges for acquiring or renting a housing is available; they
also should carry out housing construction within the budgeted costs in
order to provide citizens with dwellings via renting, or purchasing. The
state authorities and local administration should provide citizens with
compensation (subsidies) in order to make possible the payments for
housing within the social standards for living space and for public utilities
consumption, taking account of a household's total income.
In fine, the law provides the authorities with the possibility to regulate the
housing market and makes them responsible for this regulation. But the
authorities cannot influence the market to a sufficient extent due to
budgeted deficit at all levels. Mortgage lending and other long-term
regulatory measures are being implemented very slowly for obvious
reasons: overall instability, low incomes of most of the population, the
underdeveloped banking system, difficult access to legal services, and
so on.
We leave aside the wide and interesting field of investigation concerning
the analysis and comparative study of various methods of housing mar-
ket regulation. We shall only describe some models, which may be useful
tools for such investigation. Taking into account the specific features of
the model presented in Section 1.1, we shall speak only about a short-
term housing policy of city authorities. In terms of the AT problem (Sec-
tion 4), this task may be stated as follows.
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Assume that before the beginning of the considered period the policy
developer (Regulator) forecasts a market situation, A0, at the beginning
of the period, solves the corresponding AT and AT* problems, and de-
termines the forecasted equilibrium e0. Probably, in this equilibrium,
consumers of some groups occupy socially unacceptable dwellings (too
bad, or too expensive as compared with incomes, or located in unfavor-
able regions, etc.) and some suppliers take their "good" dwellings off
the market because there is no demand for these dwellings. It is neces-
sary to change the parameters of the initial situation so that a resultant
equilibrium would be free from these disadvantages whenever possible.
It is clear that regulation of a market by means of changing some pa-
rameters of the initial situation requires expenses. The limitation of these
expenses should be taken into account. In Section 6.4, we shall discuss
the possible sources of means for covering such expenses. Now let us
suppose that expenses are restricted by an amount K.
In the AT problem, only two groups of parameters are partially con-
trolled: components of vectors
Ñ = (Ñi | i∈I) and a = (aijh | (i, j, h)∈I2×H),
where I and H are the sets of dwellings types and consumers groups,
correspondingly. By increasing Ñi (the number of dwellings of type i), we
influence the market from the supply side. To increase aijh (the "pure"
utility of a dwelling of type j to a representative (i, h)-agent g), one can
either subsidize this agent under the condition that he moves into a
dwelling of type j (owing to this bgj increases) or grant him some privi-
leges in fixed payments (owing to this qgj decreases). Thus a variation of
aijh is an impact on the market from the demand side.
The Regulator's problem is to work out a program of housing construc-
tion (to distribute the amount K of money among dwellings types) or a
program of housing subsidies (to distribute the amount K among market
agents). Each regulatory program creates a new market situation Areg.
The Regulator's goal is to select a program as to maximize the number
of those consumers who occupy acceptable dwellings in equilibria for
this situation.
Let D(h) be the set of types of those dwellings that are acceptable for
consumers of group h. Then W = {(i, j, h)∈U | j∈D(h)} is the set of ex-
pedient moves (the set U was introduced in Section 4). Consider a linear
programming problem
max ∑(i,j,h)∈W xijh s.t.            (40)
∑i,h xijh ≤ Cj,                (41)
∑j xijh = Dhi, f(x) ≥ f0, x ≥ 0,          (42)
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where f(x) is the objective function of the AT(A0) problem and f0 is the
best value of f(x) in this problem.
The polytope of the problem (40) − (42) is an optimal face of the
polytope corresponding to the AT(A0) problem . Therefore, any basic op-
timal solution of the problem (40) − (42) is a basic optimal solution of
AT(A0), and so it determines some equilibrium emax with the greatest
number of the agents occupying acceptable dwellings. Similarly we can
find the worse (with respect to attainment of the goal) equilibrium emin.
6.2. Market regulation from the supply side
The local authorities can stimulate housing construction and/or finance it
directly. The incentives can be aimed at either decreasing a producer's
expenses (tax privileges) or attracting investments (insuring mortgage
credits). Such indirect stimulation provides long-term effects, which,
unfortunately, cannot be taken into consideration in the framework of the
studied model. Therefore, we shall assume that the authorities develop
some housing construction program and intend to invest sum K in it.
Let N be the set of all pairs (i, h) such that some (i, h)-agents occupy
the socially unacceptable dwellings in the forecasted equilibrium e0.
Then the set of target agents (the consumers who should be helped by
the future program) has the form ∪(i,h)∈N G(h, i).
As we saw in Section 5, each programmatic dwelling gives rise to some
chain of moves. This chain is useful for achieving the Regulator's objec-
tive if it involves a move of a target consumer into an acceptable dwell-
ing. The useful chain may incorporate the moves of non-target agents if
these moves vacate some dwellings acceptable for target agents. It is
easy to find out what types of dwellings are acceptable to target agents
by social standards. However, constructing dwellings of other types may
be also convenient. If one maximizes and minimizes the function
∑(i,h)∈N∑j∈D(h) xijh under restrictions (41) and (42) (Section 6.1) and then
compares the obtained equilibria, then he can discover the dwellings
target and non-target agents are competing for. Such dwellings are
worthy of being built. The dual prices of constraints (41) indicate the
relative usefulness of dwellings types for attaining the program's goal in
the best equilibrium: it is necessary to construct the dwellings of the
types having positive dual prices. However this reasoning, first, is true
only in the area of constant dual prices (this area can be easily de-
scribed; see, e.g., Ãäàëåâè÷, 1975, p. 35), and second, it does not indi-
cate how many dwellings of each type should be built.
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On the other hand, for any given housing construction program one
can solve the corresponding AT(Areg) problem, find the best value, f0, of
its objective function, and, using the problem analogous to the problem
(40) − (42), determine regmaxe  and 
reg
mine : the best and the worst equilibria,
from the Regulator's point of view, for situation Areg. Comparing these
equilibria, one can evaluate the considered program. So, by varying
components of vector Ñ, one can empirically select a rational housing
construction program.
Let us now go to the description of a problem, which finds a convenient
distribution of sum K among dwellings types for an arbitrary (forecasted)
initial situation.
Let I be the set of dwellings types in the forecasted situation A0 and IP
the set of dwellings types acceptable for construction within the scope of
a program in the Regulator's opinion (programmatic types). Then J =
= I ∪ IP is the set of dwellings types in situation Areg resulting from the
program. Note that in situation Areg, the number of dwellings of type
i∈IP \ I may be equal to zero (if it appears that construction of such
dwellings is not expedient).
Regulator plays the role of an owner-supplier (hence all dwellings of
programmatic types should be owned by suppliers). Regulator specifies
the reservation price of a programmatic dwelling; this price may be less
than, or equal to, or greater than the flow equivalent of construction
costs.
The arguments in Sections 2.2 and 4 show that the composition of a
chain created by a programmatic dwelling depends on the order of
agents' appearance on the market. If access to a programmatic dwelling
is free, then a target agent may be beaten in competition; even a com-
petitive agent may be left without this dwelling if another agent is ahead
of him. Then the program would provide more rich or more active agents
with dwellings. Therefrom the natural constraint appears: only target
agents have access to the dwellings built at the budgeted cost (this
doesn't exclude the stimulation of constructing dwellings intended for
other consumers). The generally received rule is the following: access to
non-programmatic dwellings is free; a target agent has access to a pro-
grammatic dwelling if this dwelling matches the socially guaranteed
minimum for this agent.
The rules of access to programmatic dwellings may differ from those for
existing dwellings of the same type; if so, let us integrate the program-
matic dwellings into some new type. Note that the ban on (i, h)-agents'
access to dwellings of type j can be reflected by two equivalent ways in
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the ATC problem (Section 4). First, one can simply not introduce the
variable Xijh. Second, one can "suppress" this variable with a small value
of bijh (for instance, you can suppose that an (i, h)-agent g should offer
a bribe if he wants to violate the access rule so that the fixed payment
qgj is very large). Therefore, the ATC problem as well generates the
standard equilibria under access restrictions for some agents (rich, for
example) to some dwellings (belonging to a social housing resource, for
example). Let GC be the set of consumers groups in situation A0 (it is
the same in situation Areg). We describe access rules by a set V of trip-
lets (i, j, h)∈J 2×GC such that (i, h)-agents have access to dwellings of
type j ; assume that (i, i, h) and (i, 0, h) for all (i, h)∈J × GC are included
in V (a consumer has access to the dwelling initially occupied by him and
to a dummy one).
To validate the assumption (i, i, h)∈V, note that the strict access rules
act only in the case of putting a dwelling that belongs to or is subsidized
by the state at the disposal of citizens. If a dwelling has been already al-
located to some household then a change in the household's character-
istics (increase of income, change in family size, and so on) may lead to
an increase in fixed costs (e.g., payments for public utilities) but not to
eviction from this dwelling.
Let us introduce a vector y = (yi | i∈J), where yi is variable if i∈IP and yi =
0 if i∉IP (yi is the number of programmatic dwellings of type i). Denote
by ai > 0 the amount of budgetary expenses for constructing one dwell-
ing of type i. The problem of housing market regulation from the supply
side (PSR) with variables y and x = (xijh | (i, j, h)∈V) has the form
max ∑i,j,h bijh ⋅xijh s.t.            (43)
∑j xijh = Dhi,               (44)
∑i,h xijh ≤ Cj + yj, (C0 is large enough)      (45)
∑i ai⋅yi ≤ K, (budget restriction)        (46)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0,              (47)
y is an integral vector.           (48)
Here Dhi is the number of (i, h)-agents and Cj is the number of dwellings
of type j in situation A0. Each vector y satisfying conditions (46) − (48)
generates some initial situation Areg = A(y). This situation may differ from
situation A0 only in the quantities of tenantless dwellings of types i∈IP
with restricted (possibly) access. The right-hand side of restriction (45)
expresses the number of dwellings of type j in situation A(y). Quantities
ai⋅yi determine the appropriation of funds among dwellings types; the
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vector x, taking into account Assumption 9, describes the allocation. Let
(x1, y1) be some optimum solution to PSR. By substituting values 1jy  into
the problem (43) − (45), (47), we obtain the ATC problem for situation
A(y1). Surely, x1 can be replaced by any optimum solution of this prob-
lem. Theorem 10 implies that each integral (e.g., basic) optimum solu-
tion of the ATC problem for the A(y1) situation determines an allocation
corresponding to some standard equilibrium for this situation.
So, by solving PSR, one can find y1 and then analyze the equilibria
that is possible in situation A(y1) using criterion (40), as described in
Section 6.1.
PSR gives a reasonable approach to working-out a program of municipal
housing construction: the target agents may choose dwellings either in
the free market or among program dwellings (they compete for these
dwellings), while other agents may be better off due to decreasing prices
and/or to vacating the dwellings. The target agents' housing needs usu-
ally exceed the supply of program dwellings, and so these dwellings will
be occupied by those target agents who can pay more (the richest ones
among the poor).
Note that PSR does not minimize expenses. Some constraints (45) with
yj > 0 may be not active in the optimal solution of PSR. Surely, the "un-
necessary" dwellings should be excluded from the program. Such
dwellings will not appear if, after solving PSR, one shall find the "true"
value of the program budget, K0, and solve PSR once again, substituting
K with K0. One can detect value K0 as a solution of the following prob-
lem: minK under conditions (44) − (48) and f(x) ≥ f0, where f(x) and f0,
respectively, are the objective function (43) and the best value of this
function in PSR with initial program budget K.
The poorer a consumer is, the less sensitive he is to the quality of a
dwelling. Under the low solvency of target agents, the following situation
is possible in the equilibrium generated by the optimal solution of PSR:
some target agents remain in non-acceptable dwellings and, simultane-
ously, either there exist tenantless dwellings suitable for these agents or
the program budget is underused. Some program for subsidizing the
target agents (see Section 6.3) is necessary in this case in order to
stimulate their moves into acceptable dwellings.
6.3. Market regulation from the demand side
We shall study only one of the possible approaches to housing market
regulation from the demand side: subsidizing the consumers. This ap-
proach can be carried out in various forms: by paying the excess to les-
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sors; by limiting rental rates in the government sector; by providing con-
sumers with housing coupons, vouchers, certificates (USA) or "housing
money" (Germany), see "Æèëèùíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà" (1996, p. 189 − 195),
"Æèëèùíàÿ ïîëèòèêà …" (1998, p. 41, 42, 100).
The designer of a program subsidizing consumers should decide whom,
to what extent, and with what aim it is necessary to subsidize. The main
goal of subsidizing, as a rule, is to provide socially acceptable dwellings
to those who are not able to buy or rent such dwellings without a sub-
sidy. Preventing the decline of housing facilities is the spillover result
and, often, one of the program goals.
Consider the forecasted equilibrium e0 (Section 6.1). Taking into account
Lemma 3, we can suppose that the compatible equilibrium price for a
dwelling, i, tenantless in this equilibrium, is ψg(i) i if g(i)∈G2 and zero if
g(i)∈G1. A zero price does not mean that some consumer h may receive
dwelling i free of charge: he has to pay fixed expenses qhi. The possible
strategies of an agent owning a tenantless dwelling are: conservation,
conversion, and relinquishment of the dwelling. The dwelling will be with-
drawn from the market (forever, in two last cases). The worse thing is
that relinquishment of a housing property may "trigger a chain reaction."
Thus, a whole city district may turn into slums ("Æèëèùíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà",
1996, p. 120 − 123). Though some of the dwellings tenantless in e0 pos-
sibly fit into the sanitary standards and can provide socially acceptable
conditions to low-income households within the minimum subsidy. Thus
the program designer should first pay attention to consumers dislodged
into unacceptable dwellings as well as to dwellings that are not in de-
mand. Such consumers and dwellings can be detected while analyzing
e0, as well as the equilibria emax and emin, the best and the worst ac-
cording to the social criterion (Section 6.1).
Assumption 11. An (i, h)-agent can get a subsidy of type (i, j, h) (or
(i, j, h)-subsidy) only under the condition that he chooses a dwelling of
type j.
Let δijh be the value of an (i, j, h)-subsidy, GC and GS the sets of all con-
sumers and, respectively, of all suppliers in situation A0. If h∈GC, then it
is natural to assume that δijh = 0 if j∉D(h) or j = 0 (moves into unaccept-
able dwellings and outside the considered market are not subsidized). If
h∈GS, then a (0, h)-agent (a supplier of group h) can choose a dwelling
of type τ(h) or 0. Assume that δ0τ(h)h = 0 (a supplier is not stimulated to
leave the market). A subsidy of type (0, 0, h) is worthwhile if it is condi-
tioned with a decrease, by the value of the subsidy, in the reservation
price of the dwelling owned by the supplier. Nevertheless, to simplify the
subsequent reasoning, we put δ00h = 0 for h∈GS. It is not a restrictive
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assumption: instead of a subsidy to a supplier of group h, one could give
the (i, τ(h), g)-subsidy of equal value to some consumer g. To obtain this
subsidy, the consumer should choose a dwelling of type τ(h) and, con-
sequently, "to transfer" the subsidy to some supplier of group h. In
terms of the ATC problem, a (0, 0, h)-subsidy with h∈GS decreases
ψ0τ(h)h, and therefore increases biτ (h)g for all i and g∈GC.
The rules of access we describe by a set, V, of triplets (i, j, h)∈I2×GC. As
in Section 6.2, we assume that V includes the triplets (i, 0, h) and (i, i, h)
for all (i, h)∈I×GC.
Under the assumption made, we shall think that for each t = (i, j, h)∈V,
Regulator specifies the value δt ≥ 0 of each t-subsidy and the number of
t-subsidies.
The occupation of vacant dwellings by dislodged agents is the most
natural variant of a program. More complicated variants may be also
considered. Assume that i∈D(h) \ D(g), j∈D(h) ∩ D(g), an (i, h)-agent, A,
chooses a dwelling of type j in the equilibrium e0 since the occupied
dwelling of type i is too expensive for him, and a (k, g)-agent, B,
chooses some non-acceptable dwelling. Then the (i, i, h)-subsidy may
be offered to agent A (in order that he remains in his initial dwelling) and
the (k, j, g)-subsidy may be offered to agent B. In other words, one may
try to weaken agent A and support agent B in the competition for dwell-
ing j. But, first, some other agents may compete for this dwelling, and
second, i may be acceptable for other target agents. Therefore, a model
for analyzing the consequences of any suggested policy is necessary.
Equilibrium e0 corresponds to some optimal solutions x and (γ, π) of
the AT and AT* problems. Repeating the reasoning of Lemma 4, it is
easy to show that γ ≥ 0. The triplet (x, γ, π) provides us with important
(but unfortunately not complete) information for determining the values
of δijh . Suppose that (i, j, h)∈V, xikh > 0 (some (i, h)-agents choose
dwellings of type k), and j ≠ k. Then (see constraints of the AT* problem)
γ ih + πk = aikh and γ ih + π j ≥ aijh. An (i, h)-agent g certainly will not
choose j if δijh will be less than γ ih + πj − aijh = γ ih + (πj + qgj) − bgj ≥ 0,
where bgj is agent g's reservation price for a dwelling of type i; the
bracketed expression is the full annual value of a dwelling of type j for
agent g. For example, in the case of rental dwelling j, if γ ih = 0 and bgj is
no more than 30% of wg , then we have the known principle: "Subsidy =
Actual rent (for a standard dwelling) — 0.3⋅Income," see "Æèëèùíàÿ
ýêîíîìèêà" (1996, p. 190, 191). Note that in Russia, "the own expenses
for housing and public utilities within the social mark of the living space
and standards of public utilities consumption for those citizens who have
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total per capita household revenue lower than the established cost of
living, should not exceed half of the minimal rate of remuneration estab-
lished by federal legislation" (the Law of Russian Federation "On founda-
tions of the federal housing policy" in the version of the Federal laws of
12.01.96 ¹ 9-ÔÇ, of 21.04.97 ¹ 68-ÔÇ, of 10.02.99 ¹ 29-ÔÇ, of
17.06.99 ¹ 113-ÔÇ).
On the other hand, δijh ≥ γ ih + πj − aijh = (aikh − π k) − (aijh − π j), that is,
(i, j, h)-subsidy should provide an agent, if he chooses j, utility not less
than that in the case of choice k. In fact, the (i, j, h)-subsidy should make
j more useful than k to (i, h)-agents, in order that an agent "feels the
difference": δijh = γih + πj − aijh + ε, ε > 0. In particular, if xijh > 0, then, for
(i, h)-agents, the dwellings of type j are available without subsidy and are
equivalent to dwellings of type k. Then the (i, j, h)-subsidy is minimal
(δijh = ε); it is useful if either k∉D(h), or there are tenantless dwellings of
type j, or the dwellings of type k are "needed" for other agents.
Consider the special case where the value of a subsidy may be substan-
tiated. Suppose ψaj ≥ ψbj for all j, a∈G(h, i), b∈G(g, i) (fixed costs being
equal, this is true if, for example, the agents of groups h and g have the
same preferences, but the income of the agents of group h is greater
than that of the agents of group g). Let γ be a vector of dual prices for
constraints ∑j xijh = Dhi in the problem (40) − (42). If γ ih > γ ig, then the
"transfer" of some (i, g)-agent into group h will increase the maximum of
social criterion (40) by γ ih − γ ig. By setting δijg = ψaj − ψbj (this difference
does not depend on a and b, see Section 4) for all j, we can implement
such a "transfer."
Note also that an (i, j, h)-subsidy may be expedient if the corresponding
constraint (41) is not active in the AT problem and has a positive dual
price in the problem (40) − (42).
Thus one can estimate the advisability of subsidizing some moves
and the values of some subsidies. And then, using this information,
one can establish a subsidizing program. Assume that value δt (possibly,
zero) and the number of t-subsidies are defined for all t∈V. For
each (i, j, h)∈V, let us combine all recipients of (i, j, h)-subsidies into
one group. By Assumption 11, in the new market situation Areg, the
pure utility of a dwelling of type j for a consumer who has obtained an
(i, j, h)-subsidy (corresponds to parameter aijh in situation A0) is equal to
aijh + δijh. Now one can construct the AT(Areg) problem, calculate the
best value of its objective function, and, using the problem analogous to
(40) − (42), determine regmaxe and 
reg
mine : the best and the worst equilbria,
from the Regulator's point of view, for situation Areg. By comparing these
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equilibria one can evaluate the considered program. Thus, varying the
subsidies in size and number, one can fit an expedient program of
housing subsidies empirically. Let us go to the description of a model
that determines the number of subsidies of each type if the values δt for
all t∈V are given.
Suppose g∈G(h, i), k∈I( j); the direct subsidies for purchasing or renting
dwellings of type j by (i, h)-agents increase bgk, the indirect subsidizing
through payments to owners of such dwellings decreases qgk (some
owner's expenses can be included in qgk) and/or ψg(k)k. In any case, bijh
in the objective function of the ATC problem increases by δijh. Let us use
the total pure utility of subsidized dwellings for recipients (including zero
subsidies) as a criterion for the choice of a subsidy program. Denote by
yt (variable) the number of granted t-subsidies and put y = (yt | t∈V).
The problem of housing market regulation from the demand side (PDR),
which determines the best (under the chosen criterion) subsidizing pro-
gram y, has the form
max ∑t∈V (bt + δt)⋅yt s.t.               
∑j yijh = Dhi; ∑i,h yijh ≤ Ñj ; ∑t δt ⋅yt ≤ K ; yt ≥ 0, integers.   (49)
Under conditions (49), the number of subsidies allocated to (i, h)-agents
does not exceed the number of these agents; the number of subsidies
conditional upon moving into dwellings of type j does not exceed the
number of these dwellings; the budget restriction is satisfied. Put
U0 = {t | δt > 0}. Let us assume that some program y has been accepted
and the subsidized agents have been selected (but an (i, h)-agent will
obtain his (i, j, h)-subsidy only if he will choose a dwelling of type j). A
new market situation Areg = A(y) appears. In this situation, for each t∈U0,
yt potential recipients of the t-subsidy form a new t-group of consumers;
and those (i, h)-agents who didn't get a subsidy, for each t = (i, j, h)∉U0,
form a t-subgroup of the group h ; this subgroup consists of yt potential
"recipients" of the t-subsidy with δt = 0. Notice that an (i, h)-agent being
selected as a recipient of a non-zero (i, j, h)-subsidy can, nevertheless,
choose a dwelling of type k ≠ j.
We define the pure utility at(k) of a dwelling of type k for members of
the t-group or t-subgroup (t-agents) as follows: if t = (i, j, h), then
at(k) = bikh whenever k ≠ j, and at( j) = bt + δt (for (i, h)-agents, the
subsidy of type (i, j, h) increases the utility of dwellings of type j
by δijh and does not change the utilities of other dwellings). Put
W(i, h) = {(i, j, h) | δijh = 0}.
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The ATC problem for situation A(y) has the form
max ∑t,k at(k)⋅xt(k) s.t.            (50)
∑k∑(i, j,h)∈W (i,h) xijh(k) = ∑k∑(i,k,h)∈W (i,h) yikh,       (51)
∑k xt(k) = yt for t∈U0,            (52)
∑t xt(k) ≤ Ck, xt(k) ≥ 0,            (53)
where xt(k) is the number of t-agents choosing dwellings of type k.
Condition (51) corresponds to constraint (38) for a group consisting of
all t-subgroups with t∈W(i, h): the number of agents in this group should
be equal to the number of dwellings chosen by them. Condition (52)
corresponds to constraint (38) for the t-group.
The allocation that would appear if all t-agents used t-subsidies
corresponding to a plan of subsidizing y we describe with vector
x(y) = (xt(k, y) | t∈V, k∈I), where xijh(k, y) = 0 if k ≠ j, and xijh( j, y) = yijh.
Theorem 15. Let y be an optimal solution of PDR. Then x(y) is an opti-
mal solution to problem (50) − (53). Under Assumption 11, x(y) deter-
mines some equilibrium allocation for situation A(y).
So, PDR determines both a rational subsidizing program and one of
those equilibria that may appear in the case of implementing this pro-
gram.
6.4. Concluding comments
Voluntariness of choice. The arguments in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 show
that some standard equilibrium ereg in the considered market corre-
sponds to any optimal solution of PSR or PDR. Suppose that some equi-
librium e arose as a result of implementing a housing program. The vol-
untariness of market agents' choices is restricted only by access rules,
and the numerosity of equilibria does not allow us, generally speaking, to
assert that e = ereg. Nevertheless, in equilibrium e, the non-target agents
do not occupy programmatic dwellings (because of access restrictions),
and each (i, j, h)-subsidy is granted to an agent only if he has chosen an
acceptable dwelling of type j. Theorem 2 implies that an arbitrary system
of equilibrium prices equilibrates any equilibrium allocation. Therefore,
the dwelling a target agent would occupy in ereg is the best choice (pos-
sibly, not a unique best) for him in e too. It seems obvious that a close
approximation to one of the equilibria ereg may be achieved by combin-
ing the construction of programmatic dwellings, housing subsidies, and
advance advertizing.
ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM EQUILIBRIA IN A HOUSING MARKET60
Variants of the Regulator's objective function. We have considered (Sec-
tion 6.1) a linear in variables of the AT problem Regulator's objective
function. In an analogous way, one can analyze an objective function, R,
linear in variables (γ and π) of the AT* problem (e.g., the sum of prices
for dwellings of some types). If Q is the polytope of the AT* problem,
then Q0 = {(γ, π)∈Q | ∑h,n Dhn ⋅γhn + ∑k Ck ⋅πk ≤ f0} is the optimal face of
this polytope. Thus, Regulator can compare the best and the worst val-
ues of R over all equilibrium price systems by solving the corresponding
linear programming problems over Q.
Coordination of housing programs. Market regulation from the supply
side through municipal housing construction without subsidizing the con-
sumers is reasonable if there exists a solvent demand of target consum-
ers for programmatic dwellings at prices recouping expenses. Disre-
garding this condition results in the "construction of extra quantities
of new flats offered for sale by municipal authorities in some regions,
while … some groups of the population are strongly in need of dwellings"
("Æèëèùíàÿ ïîëèòèêà …", 1998, p. 210). On the other hand, subsidiz-
ing the consumers, not supported by a housing construction program, is
meaningful if there are enough tenantless or vacant (withdrawn) dwell-
ings appearing on the market. Otherwise, either subsidies will not be
used or the prices of the dwellings acceptable for target consumers will
increase. Consequently, a joint program for market regulation is neces-
sary. Maybe, combining PSR and PDR, it is possible to construct a
model for selecting such program.
Government sector. Considering the budget financing of housing pro-
grams we, in fact, introduce the sector of government dwellings with lim-
ited access and regulated prices into the initial market model. The price
regulation in this sector is a form of subsidizing. The local authorities can
establish different prices for different groups of consumers.
Financing the housing programs. Under the above considered ap-
proaches to regulating the housing market, the regulation costs (pa-
rameter K in problems PSR and PDR) are covered by the budget to a
great extent. In developed countries, as a rule, the central budget subsi-
dizes local budgets to implement local housing programs, see
Áåññîíîâà (1993, p. 57, 139). The Russian federal program "Dwelling"
(approved by Council of Ministers and Government of the Russian Fed-
eration Act No 595 of June 20, 1993) indicates sources of means for
subsidizing and creating housing facilities for social use. The federal
sources are the following: the budget, state guaranteed credits, funds of
the State Employment Fund (establishment of a public works program in
the housing sphere), a share of federal export quotes, etc. The local
sources include the following: the tax on profits from selling state dwell-
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ings, a share of the real estate tax, a share of the profit from selling pre-
pared building plots by local authorities.
After further revision of this program (Basic directions of the new stage
in the state goal-oriented program "Dwelling," approved by the President
of the Russian Federation, Decree No 431 of 29.03.96), the central
budget share in financing local housing programs has been strongly re-
duced. In particular, enterprises and organizations managing municipal
housing facilities should grant housing subsidies to citizens at the cost of
their own means. As additional sources of financing, the means from
selling some constructed dwellings at commercial auctions and the profit
from municipal rents have been indicated. A part of profits obtained from
increasing prices for housing and public utilities can be used for com-
pensating payments for housing and public utilities (Standing on proce-
dure of granting compensation (subsidies) for housing and public utilities
payments; approved by the Government of the Russian Federation Act
¹ 595 of 18.06.96). Therefore, the local authorities can finance "loss-
making" housing programs at the expense of profitable programs or ac-
tivities.
When selling the dwellings from municipal housing facilities in a free
market, the local authorities play the role of a profit-maximizing supplier.
The AT problem allows one to select a seller's maximal reservation price
such that his own dwelling would be in demand at this price. If municipal
authorities finance the construction of some dwellings in order to sell
them in a free market, then PSR with unrestricted access (V = I2×H) may
help allocate the means among dwellings types.
In many cities, some part of the dwellings constructed by private inves-
tors comes to be at the disposal of local authorities free of charge. Such
a rule has been enacted, for instance, in St. Petersburg ("Æèëüå", 1998,
p. 53). Also, in Novosibirsk, the city authorities receive free of charge 5%
of the new dwellings (Ñìîðîäèíîâ, 1999). The expected private housing
construction volume determines the total space, S, of dwellings to be
transferred to the local authorities. This total space can be distributed
among types of dwellings with the help of the PSR problem, measuring
the regulation expenses not in money but in dwelling-space (i.e., by let-
ting ai be the space of one dwelling of type i and K = S).
Developing the approach suggested by Gustafsson, et al. (1980, p. 88,
89), the duals can be used for "negative subsidizing" some bargains in the
housing market. Let x and (γ, π) be some optimal solutions of the AT and
AT* problems determining some equilibrium e0 for situation A0. Assume
that in this equilibrium some (i, h)-agents choose dwellings of type j and
have in this connection a positive consumer's surplus: γ ih = aijh − π j > 0.
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Let us select δ such that 0 < δ < γih and put J(i, h) = {k∈I | γ ih =
aikh − πk}. J(i, h) is the set of all dwellings types equivalent to j for (i, h)-
agents at prices p = r(π) (see Section 1.1). Put β = (βkg | (k, g)∈I × H),
where βih = γ ih − δ and βkg = γkg if (k, g) ≠ (i, h). It is easy to see that x
and (β, p) are optimal solutions of the AT and AT* problems for situation
B, obtained from A0 by replacing aikh with aikh − δ for k∈J(i, h). In other
words, if you decrease aikh by δ for all k∈J(i, h), then (i, h)-agents
will not change their choices and both the allocation and price vector
will be the same in the new equilibrium as in e0. In this case, from
the bargain corresponding to a triplet (i, k, h), k∈J(i, h), the local authori-
ties may have a budgetary gain of annual income δ for financing housing
programs. For this purpose, it is enough to introduce, with respect to
(i, h)-agents, some additional fixed payment for dwellings of types
k∈J(i, h). It may be either the recurrent payment δ or the non-recurrent
payment δ⋅ρ−1.
Thus, the models offered above can be useful for working-out profitable
programs and activities in housing markets. To simplify the analysis one
can assume that profitable and lossmaking programs are separated in
time: the profits obtained by a local budget within the current period of
time is invested in lossmaking programs of the next period, the local
authorities first accumulate means and then spend them.
Approximate solutions of PSR and PDR. Formally, PSR and PDR are in-
teger linear programming problems of a transportation type with one
knapsack restriction. They are NP-hard: the problem "INTEGRAL KNAP-
SACK" (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1982, Section 15.7) is reducible to
each of them. Thus, solving these problems under actual dimensions is
very cumbersome. The author has suggested a method for approximat-
ing the solution of PSR. The ponderous description and substantiation of
the method are not included in this publication and will be published in
the article by Khutoretsky (forthcoming).
The idea is to analyze non-integer components of an arbitrary bfs (x, y)
for the linear relaxation of PSR (denote this linear relaxation by LPSR). It
turns out that these components create some specific structure, a route.
A route consists of all links (i, j, h) such that xijh is not integer. A link
(i, j, h) has the beginning i, the source (i, h), and the end j. If two links of
a route are neighboring then either they have the common source (or
the beginning, or the end), or the beginning of one of these links coin-
cides with the end of the other. Therefore, the direct and inverse links
can be distinguished in a route. The beginnings and the ends of links are
vertices of a route.
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The route µ created by all non-integer components of x is not closed.
Only the components corresponding to extreme links of µ can be non-
integer in the vector y.
A feasible solution (x, y) of the LPSR problem is called economical if, for
any i, either yi = 0 or the corresponding constraint (45) is active (unused
dwellings are not financed). Given a basic optimal solution to LPSR, one
can construct an economical basic optimal solution of this problem.
Taking account of the results listed above, let us consider that (x, y) is
some optimal, basic, economical, non-integral solution of LPSR, and µ is
the route created by this solution.
It appears that in vector x, the components corresponding to the links of
the same (direct or reverse) orientation have the same fractional part,
and the sum of the fractional parts of two components corresponding to
oppositely orientated links is equal to unity. Besides, the fractional parts
of the non-integer components in vectors x and y are adjusted such that
it is possible to "round-off" the solution (x, y) correctly along route µ. As
a result, we shall obtain the optimal solution of LPSR with the right-hand
side of constraint (46) replaced by some number K1. Moreover, if i and j
are the extreme vertices of the route µ, then |K1 − K| ≤ 0.5⋅max{ai, aj}.
That is, K1 differs from K by no more than half the cost of some financed
dwelling. Obviously, if an optimal solution of LPSR is integral, then it is an
optimal solution to PSR with the same right-hand side of constraint (46).
In other words, we can solve PSR with a slightly modified program
budget. It seems that such accuracy is enough for economic applications
(the limitation K is not rigid, as a rule). We can find an optimal distribu-
tion (among types of dwellings) of the sum, which differs from the limit of
means assigned for housing construction by not more than half the cost
of the most expensive financed dwelling.
Applying the described approach to PDR, we consider its linear relaxa-
tion LPDR. Put εijh = δijh − δiih for i ≠ j. As we have done for PSR, each
non-integral basic optimal solution y of PDR can be "correctly rounded-
off" as to obtain an integral optimal solution y1 to LPDR with the slightly
modified right-hand sides of constraints. It is enough to replace the
right-hand side of the condition ∑t δt ⋅yt ≤ K with some number K1 such
that |K1 − K| ≤ max{εt | yt > 0}, and to increase by unity the right-hand
side of one condition ∑i,h yijh ≤ Ñj (say, Ck). It is clear that y1 is an opti-
mal solution to PDR with the same (modified) right-hand sides of con-
straints.
This vector describes a rational distribution (in the form of subsidies) of a
sum, differing from K by not more than the value of one subsidy. When
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knowing y1, one can construct the corresponding equilibrium allocation
(Theorem 19) for a hypothetical situation A1 with one additional (in com-
parison with the forecasted situation A0) tenantless dwelling of type k.
Some standard equilibrium with this allocation would be possible in
situation A1 under the subsidizing policy y1.
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1SUPPLEMENT 1
Theorem 1. If gÎG1, then bgi = egi - eg0 + qg0 for all i.
Proof. Condition (4) is equivalent to bgi(p) £ egi - egd(g), (5) is equivalent to
bgi(p) £ egi - egd(g). Therefore, Dbgi = min{egi - egd(g), wg - 0gy - qgd(g)}. It follows
from (2) that Dbgi = egi - egd(g). Then bgi = egi - eg0 + qg0 is a unique solution
of system (6). Q.E.D.
Lemma 1. Condition (9) is equivalent to ygj(z,g) - ygi ³ c(pj(z, g)) - c(pi) for all g
and iÎJg .
Proof. Put j = j(z, g). Condition (9) is equivalent to vgj(p) ³ vgi(p) for all g and
iÎJg. Now the statement of the lemma follows from (1), Theorem 1, and the
definition of ygi. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Let (z, p) be some equilibrium, and put p = c(p).
(a) For all g, ug(z) = wg + ygj(z, g) + pd(g) - pj(z,g); if gÎG2, then ug(z) = wg +
max{ygd(g), pd(g)}.
(b) If gÎG1, then y(z, g) ³ 0gy .
(c) If gÎG2, then pd(g) ³ ygd(g) whenever d(g)Î{j(z, h) | hÎG1} and ygd(g) ³ pd(g)
otherwise.
Proof. Let (z, p) be an equilibrium, and put p = c(p). Statement (a) is obvi-
ous. Suppose gÎG1. It is easy to see that ygi(p) is a monotone decreasing
function of bgi(p). Thus ygi(p) ³ 0gy  if bgi(p) £ Dbgi. Then ygi(p) < 0gy  implies
(c(pi) + qgi) - (c(pd(g)) + qgd(g)) > Dbgi = bgi - bgd(g), whence ygi - ygd(g) < c(pi) -
c(pd(g)). If i = j(z, g), then the last inequality conflicts with (9) (Lemma 1), and
(b) is proved. To prove (c) let us take some gÎG2. If d(g)Î{j(z, h) | hÎG1},
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2then j(z, g) = 0 by (8). From Lemma 1 with i = d(g), taking into account that
p0 = yg0 = 0, we obtain 0 ³ ygd(g) - pd(g). If d(g)Ï{j(z, h) | hÎG1}, then, by
(10), either j(z, g) = d(g) or pd(g) = 0. If j(z, g) = d(g), then ygd(g) ³ pd(g) follows
from Lemma 1 with i = 0; otherwise ygd(g) ³ pd(g) since ygd(g) ³ 0 for gÎG2 by
the definition. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. Assume that pÎP, p = c(p), and the vectors p1, p1 are defined as
follows: if g(i )ÎG2, then 1ip  = max{pi, yg(i)i}, pi otherwise; 1ip  = r(
1
ip ) for all
iÎI. If (z, p) is an equilibrium, then (z, p1) is an equilibrium too.
Proof. Suppose pÎP and j = j(z, g). Consider gÎG1. Either g( j )ÎG2 and pj ³
yg( j)j by Lemma 2, or g( j)ÎG1, or j = 0; in any case 1jp = pj. Applying Lemma 1
to equilibrium (z, p), we obtain 0 £ (ygj - ygi) - (pj - pi) £ (ygj - ygi) - ( 1jp - 1ip )
for all i. Consider gÎG2. If 1 )(gdp = pd(g), then 1ip = pi for all iÎJg , in particular,
1
jp = pj.  Then, as in the previous case, ygj - ygi ³ 1jp - 1ip  for iÎJg . Assume
that 1 )(gdp ¹ pd(g). Then pd(g) < ygd(g), j = d(g) by (9), 1 )(gdp = ygd(g) and ygj - yg0 =
1
jp  - 10p . So, ygj - ygi ³ 1jp - 1ip  for all g and iÎJg, thus condition (9) is true for
(z, p1) by Lemma 1. If 1ip  ¹ pi , then g(i)ÎG2 and, as were shown above,
j(z, g(i)) = i. Consequently, 1ip  = pi for iÏ{j(z, g) | gÎG}, and (z, p
1) satisfies
condition (10). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. If (a, p) is the optimal solution of problem T*, then a ³ 0 and pÎP.
Proof. Constraint (14) is not active for any optimal solution of T by the choice
of S0, thus p0 = 0 and pÎP ; (6) implies yg0 = 0. Then, in (17) with i = 0, we
obtain ag ³ 0. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2. If (z, p) is an equilibrium, then x(z) is a basic optimal solution of
T and (a(z,p), c(p)) is an optimal solution of T*. If x is a basic optimal solu-
tion of T and (a, p) is an optimal solution of T*, then (z(x,p), r(p)) is an equi-
librium.
3Proof. (1) Let (z, p) be an equilibrium. Put x = x(z). It follows from (8) that x
belongs to the polytope defined by constraints (12) - (15); this polytope is
imbedded into unit cube and x is an integral vector, thus x is a vertex of the
polytope and x is a bfs to problem T. Take gÎG, iÎJg. Put z
1
 = (ygi(p), i )ÎZg.
It follows from (9) and (1) that ag(z, p) = ug(z) - wg - c(pd(g)) ³ ug(z
1) - wg -
c(pd(g)) = ygi - c(pi). Thus (a(z,p), c(p)) is a feasible solution of T*.
We claim that the functions (16) and (11) of (a, p) = (a(z,p), c(p)) and x =
x(z), respectively, take the equal values. Indeed, put A = {j(z, g) | gÎG}. Note
that, by (10), pi = 0 if iÏA. Using Lemma 2, we obtain åg, i ygi ×xgi = åg ygj(z, g) =
åg [ug(z) - wg - c(pd(g)) + c(pj(z,g))] = åg ag(z, p) + å i ÎA c(pi) = åg ag(z, p) +
å i c(pi). Thus x(z) and (a(z,p), c(p)) are optimal solutions of T and T* re-
spectively (by the first duality theorem).
(2) Suppose x is a basic optimal solution of problem T, (a, p) an optimal so-
lution of T*. It is pointed out in section 2.1 that x is an integral vector. Put z =
z(x, p) and p = r(p); surely, (z, p)ÎZ´P. Take gÎG. By the definition of z(x, p)
we have j(z, g) = k(x, g). By the second duality theorem, ag + pj(z, g) = ygj(z, g)
(since xgk (x, g) = 1), and, taking into account (17), ygj(z, g) - pj(z, g) ³ ygi - pi for all
iÎJg.  The last inequality is equivalent to (9) (Lemma 1). Condition (8) is true
for z by the definition of z(x, p). If iÏ{j(z, g) | gÎG}, then (13) is not active for
i, pi = pi = 0, and (10) is true for z(x, p). Then (7) is true as well (Mas-Collel,
Whinston, Green, 1995, Lemma 10.B.1, p. 316). Q.E.D.
Corollary 1. If zÎFD, then ågÎG ug(z) = åg wg + åg, i ygi ×xgi(z); in particular, if
zÎE, then ågÎG ug(z) = F0.
Proof. Suppose zÎFD. Using (7), we obtain: åg ug(z) = åg [y(z, g) + bgj(z, g)] =
åg [bgj(z, g) - qgj(z,g) + wg ] = åg [ygj(z, g) + wg ] = åg wg + åg, i ygi ×xgi(z). If zÎE, then,
by Theorem 2, åg, i ygi ×xgi(z) = f0 and, consequently, åg ug(z) = F0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2. If zÎFD, x(z) is a basic optimal solution of problem T, and there
exists an optimal solution of problem T* such that ug(z) = ag + wg + pd(g) for
all gÎG, then (z, r(p)) is an equilibrium.
4Proof. Suppose z and (a, p) satisfy the conditions of Corollary 2, p = r(p),
and z1 = z(x(z), p). By Theorem 2, (z
1, p) is an equilibrium, and obviously
z(z1) = z(z). If i = j(z, g) = j(z
1, g), then xgi(z) = 1 and the corresponding con-
straint (17) is active; thus ag = ygi - pi. The definition of z(x, p) and Lemma 2
imply y(z1, g) = wg + pd(g) - pi - qgi = wg + pd(g) + ag - (ygi + qgi) = ug(z) - bgi =
y(z, g). Then z = z1, hence (z, p) is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. If zÎÑ, then ågÎG ug(z) = F0 and ug(z) ³ wg + ygd(g) for all gÎG.
Proof. Suppose zÎÑ and z1 is some equilibrium distribution. Then åg ug(z) £
åg ug(z
1) = F0 by Corollary 1. Assume that åg ug(z) < F0. Put e = (|G|
-1)×[F0 -
åg ug(z)] > 0 and yg = e + ug(z) - ug(z
1). Let us consider distribution z0 = ( 0gz |
 gÎG), where 0gz = (yg + y(z
1,g), j(z
1,g)). Obviously, åg yg = 0 and z
0ÎFD,
while ug(z
0) = ug(z
1) + yg = ug(z) + e. So, coalition G blocks z contrary to the
assumption zÎÑ. Therefore åg ug(z) = F0. If ug(z) < wg + ygd(g), then coalition
Q = {g} blocks z with distribution (wg - qgd(g), d(g))ÎFD(Q); therefore ug(z) ³
wg + ygd(g ) for all gÎG. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6. Assume that zÎÑ, x = (xgi | gÎG, iÎJg), and cgi = ygi - ug(z) + wg
for all gÎG, iÎJg . Then the following problem is bounded:
max åg, i xgi ×cgi   s.t.                                                       (18)
x ³ 0   and   åg xgi - åj xg(i)j  £ 0   for i ¹ 0.                         (19)
Proof. Suppose zÎÑ and problem (18) - (19) is not bounded. Then there
exists a feasible solution x of this problem such that åg, i xgi ×cgi > 0. Take such
x ; it is clear that {(g, i) | xgi > 0} ¹ Æ. A sequence l = áh(1), i(1), ¼, h(n), i(n)ñ
will be called maximal with respect to x if the following conditions hold: h(s)Î
G, i(s)ÎJh(s), and xh(s)i(s) > 0 for all s; h(s+1) = g(i(s)) (and thus i(s) ¹ 0) when-
ever 1 £ s < n ; if i(n) ¹ 0, then h(1) = g(i(n)); if i(n) = 0, then either åg xgd(h(1)) =
0 or d(h(1)) = 0. It follows from (19) that there exists some maximal with re-
spect to x sequence l. Put A(l) = {(h(s), i(s)) | 1 £ s £ n}, L(l) = å(g, i )ÎA(l) cgi
(weight of the sequence l), e = min{xgi | (g, i)ÎA(l)} > 0. Assume that L(l) £
0. In this case let us put ygi = xgi - e if (g, i )ÎA(l), xgi otherwise. It is clear that
5the vector y = (ygi) satisfies (19) and åg, i ygi ×cgi = åg, i xgi ×cgi - L(l)×e > 0. But l
is not a maximal sequence with respect to y since ygi = 0 for some pair
(g, i )ÎA(l).
Proceeding repeatedly, we shall construct a vector x satisfying (19) such that
åg, i xgi ×cgi > 0 and each sequence maximal with respect to x is of positive
weight. Let l = áh(1), i(1), ¼, h(n), i(n)ñ be such sequence. Put e = L(l)×n-
1
 >
0, Q = {h(s) | 1 £ s £ n}. Then we put j(h(s)) = i(s) for all s (moving of the
members of coalition Q in concordance with l), y(g) = ug(z) - bgj(g) + e, zg =
(y(g), j(g))ÎZg for each gÎQ, and z
1 = (zg | gÎQ). Using the definitions of e,
L(l), cgi , and ygi , we obtain ågÎQ y(g) = ågÎQ [wg - qgj(g)]. Hence z
1Î FD(Q).
But ug(z
1) = y(g) + bgj(g) = ug(z) + e for all gÎQ, thus coalition Q blocks z, a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3. E = Ñ Í PM. If |G| ³ 2, then E Ì PM.
Proof 2. The inclusion E Í C is well-known (e.g. see Mas-Collel, Whinston,
Green, 1995, p. 654). Let us prove that C Í E. Suppose zÎC. Then x(z) is a
feasible solution to T. It follows from Lemma 5 and Corollary 1 of Theorem 2
that åg, i ygi ×xgi(z) = åg ug(z) - åg wg = F0 - åg wg = f0, thus x(z) is an integral
(and, therefore, a basic) optimal solution of problem T. Put p0 = 0 and con-
sider the following system of inequalities: 
p ³ 0,   pi - pd(g) ³ ygi - ug(z) + wg    for gÎG, iÎJg,            (54)
where pi with i ¹ 0 are variables (we place p0 in the left sides of some ine-
qualities for uniformity).
The problem dual to system (54) has the form (18), (19). This is bounded by
Lemma 6, thus system (54) is solvable; let (pi | iÎI \ {0}) be some solution to
this system. Vector p = (pi | iÎI) is completely defined now. Put a = (ag | gÎ
G), where ag = ug(z) - wg - pd(g). By (54), (a, p) is a feasible solution of prob-
lem T*. Using the definition of ag, we obtain åg ag + åi pi = åg [ug(z) - wg ] =
f0 (the last equality is proved above). Then (a, p) is an optimal solution of
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6problem T*, and zÎE by Corollary 2 of Theorem 2.
Let us prove that C Í PM. Suppose the converse: zÎC \ PM. From zÏPM it
follows that åg ug(z
1) > åg ug(z) for some z
1ÎFD. Applying Lemma 5 and Cor-
ollary 1 of Theorem 2, we obtain the impossible inequality åg, i ygi ×xgi(z
1) =
åg [ug(z
1) - wg ] > åg [ug(z) - wg ] = f0.
Suppose {1, 2} Í G (there are at least two agents in the market). Let us
construct a distribution in PM \ E. Take zÎE . Put y1(1) = y(z, 1) - e, y1(2) =
y(z, 2) + e, y1(g) = y(z, g) for gÎG \ {1, 2}. Let z(e) be the vector with com-
ponents (y1(g), j(z, g)) for gÎG. Obviously, z(e)ÎFD. Assume that there exists
z0ÎFD such that ug(z
0) ³ ug(z(e)) for all gÎG with at least one strict inequality.
Put y2(1) = y(z
0, 1) + e, y
2(2) = y(z
0, 2) - e, y
2(g) = y(z
0, g) for gÎG \ {1, 2}.
Consider a distribution, z2, such that 2gz  = (y
2(g), j(z
0,g)) for all gÎG. It is
clear that z2ÎFD and ug(z
2) ³ ug(z) for all g with at least one strict inequality;
this contradicts the inclusion E Í PM proved above. Hence z(e)ÎPM for any
eÎR. If e > u1(z) - (w1 + y1d(1)), then u1(z(e)) = u1(z) - e < w1 + y1d(1), and z(e)Ï
C = E by Lemma 4. So, z(e)ÎPM \ E if e > u1(z) - (w1 + y1d(1)). Q.E.D.
Lemma 7. If rÎÂ, then s(r) is an orderly signal and conditions (21) - (23)
are satisfied for any collection of trade offers Q = (Qg | gÎG).
Proof. Suppose the demand constraint for dwelling i is binding to agent gÎ
G1: wg(i ) > wg(t(g)). By the definition, t(g) = t(g, D
k) for some k ³ 1. Then iÏ
Dk. By construction of the sets Dn for n £ k, it is clear that iÎ{t(h) | hÎG}.
Thus s-(r, g(i)) = -1 and the constraint of supply is not binding to agent g(i ),
therefore s(r) is an orderly signal. It follows from I+(r, g) = {0, d(g), t(g)} that
Qg Ç I
+(r, g) Í {t(g)}; the last relation is enough to meet conditions (21) -
(23). Q.E.D.
Theorem 4. If rÎÂ, then z(r) is an equilibrium with respect to scheme r.
Proof. Obviously, z(r)ÎDA(s(r)). Let us put Qg(r) = ({iÎJg | wg(t(g)) < wg(i )} È
{t(g)}) \ {0, d(g)} and Q(r) = (Qg(r) | gÎG). It is easily seen that the condi-
tions (25) - (27) with Q = Q(r) and (24) with gÎG2 are true for distribution
7z(r). Suppose gÎG1. Then, for some k, gÎAk and t(g) = t(g, Dk). The initial
conditions of step k imply Dk Ê I
+(r, g). Then wg(t(g)) = max{wg(i ) | iÎ Dk} ³
max{wg(i) | iÎI
+(r, g)} = Ug(s(r)), and max{wg(i ) | iÎI
+(r, g)} ³ wg(t(g)) since
t(g)ÎI+(r, g). Therefore, (24) is true for gÎG1. Now we need only to verify
that for each gÎG, Qg(r) is agent g's effective demand with respect to signal
s(r). This is true for gÎG2 because Jg = {d(g), 0}. Take gÎG1. If iÎI
+(r, g) \
{d(g), 0}, then i = t(g)ÎQg(r). If iÎJg \ I
+(r, g) and wg(i ) > wg( j ) for all jÎ
I+(r, g), then iÏ{d(g), 0}, wg(i) > wg(t(g)), and thus iÎQg(r). So, Q(r) is a
collection of effective demands with respect to signal s(r). Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. If rÎÂ and condition (28) is true, then z(r) is a unique equilib-
rium with respect to scheme r.
Proof. Let z be an equilibrium  with respect to some scheme rÎÂ. Then
zÎDA(s(r)). Recall that zg(r) = t(g) and r relates the signal s(r) independent
of Q to any collection of trade offers Q.
Consider gÎG2; then d(g) ¹ 0. If t(g) = d(g), then s-(r, g) = -1 by the defini-
tion, and t(g)ÏI+(r, h) for hÎG1, thus zh ¹ t(g) for hÎG1; now zg = 0 contra-
dicts condition (27) for z, therefore zg = d(g). If t(g) = 0, then (28) implies
wg(0) > wg(d(g)), and zg = 0 by (24). So, zg = t(g) for gÎG2.
Take gÎG1. The following cases are possible: t(g) ¹ 0, 0 = t(g) ¹ d(g), and 0 =
t(g) = d(g). If t(g) ¹ 0, then t(g) = d(f) for some fÎG, and s-(r, f) = -1 by the
definition. If hÎG1 \ {g, f}, then t(g)ÏI
+(r , h), thus zh ¹ t(g) for hÎG1 \ {g, f}.
It follows from t(g) = d(f) that t(f) ¹ d(f), and thus (28) implies wf(t(f)) >
wf(d(f)); therefore t(g) = d(f) ¹ zf by (24). So, zh ¹ t(g) for hÎG1 \ {g}. We
have proved above that zh = t(h) for hÎG2. So, zh ¹ t(g) for hÎG \ {g}. Then
zg ¹ t(g) would imply t(g) = d(g1)Ï{zh | hÎG} È {0} contrary to condition (27)
for z. If t(g) = 0 ¹ d(g), then (28) implies wg(0) > wg(d(g)), and zg = 0 by (24).
At last, if 0 = t(g) = d(g), then I
+(r, g) = {0}, thus zg = 0. So, zg = t(g) for all g.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 6. FPC = E(Â).
8Proof 3. 1. Let z = z(r), rÎÂ. Then wg(zg) = max{wg(i ) | iÎJg} for gÎG2 by
(24). Assume that zÏFPC, z p x , and l = ág(1), ¼, g(n)ñ is the corresponding
augmentative sequence. By the definition, put st(s) = k if the r-algorithm
determines t(g(s)) = zg(s) = t(g(s), Dk) at step k. Consider s < n. If zg(s) = xg(s),
then xg(s) ¹ zg(s+1) (as zÎDA) and (29) implies zg(s) = xg(s) = d(g(s+1)), i.e.
agent g(s+1) joins a feasible sequence not later than at step st(s): st(s) ³
st(s+1). If zg(s) ¹ xg(s), then wg(s)(xg(s)) > wg(s)(zg(s)) by (31) and xg(s)ÏD
st(s) by the
definition of t(g(s)). Furthermore, by (29), either xg(s) = d(g(s+1)) or xg(s) =
zg(s+1). In the first case, the initial conditions of step st(s) imply g(s+1)ÏA
st(s);
in the second case, t(g(s+1)) = zg(s+1) was defined before step st(s); in any
case st(s) > st(s+1). If xg(n)Î{d(g(1)), zg(1)}, then the analogous reasoning
gives st(n) ³ st(1) with strict inequality whenever wg(n)(xg(n)) > wg(n)(zg(n)). So, if
xg(n)Î {d(g(1)), zg(1)}, then st(1) ³ ... ³ st(n) ³ st(1) with at least one strict ine-
quality by (32), that is impossible. Hence xg(n)Ï{d(g(1)), zg(1)}, this implies
xg(n)ÎF(z ) and n = 1 by (30); then wg(n)(xg(n)) > wg(n)(zg(n)) by (31). But F(z ) Í
Dk for all k, in particular, xg(n)ÎD
st(n), thus wg(n)(zg(n)) ³ wg(n)(xg(n)), a contradic-
tion. Therefore, an augmentative sequence is impossible and z(r)ÎFPC.
2. Let zÎFPC. We shall construct a scheme rÎÂ such that z(r) = z. For this
purpose it is enough to determine the numberings n(g) for gÎG1 and ng(i )
for gÎG, iÎJg . Let us select the numberings ng(i) so that the following condi-
tions were satisfied:
if wg(i ) > wg( j), then ng(i) < ng( j);                               (55)
if i ¹ zg and wg(i) = wg(zg), then ng(i) > ng(zg).             (56)
Such numberings obviously exist. The numbering n(g) we shall define with
procedure described below. Some top bargains sequence consistent with
allocation z will be constructed at each step of this procedure.
Step 0. At the preliminary step 0 we put t(g) = t(g, Jg) for gÎG2 (it follows
from (56) that t(g) = zg). We define D
1, A1, and F1 as at the step 0 of the r-
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9algorithm. Put d(g) = 0 if gÎG1 and d(g)ÏD
1 (substantiation is the same as
that in the r-algorithm), J1 = {d(g) | gÎG1} \ {0}.
Step k+1. Suppose a top bargains sequence lm = ágm1, ¼, gmn(m)ñ is con-
structed for each m such that 1 £ m £ k, G(lm) = {gms | 1 £ s £ n(m)} Í Am,
G(li) Ç G(lj) = Æ if i ¹ j, and t(g) = zg for gÎÈm G(lm). Put D(lm) = {zg | gÎ
G(lm)} \ {0}, A
k+1 = G1 \ Èm G(lm), D
k+1 = D1 \ Èm D(lm), J
k+1
 = {d(g) | gÎ
Ak+1} \ {0}, F
k+1
 = D
k+1
 \ J
k+1. Note that F k+1 includes the initially vacant
dwellings (elements of F1) not occupied by members of the sequences l1,
¼, lm, and the dwellings vacated as a result of the described by these se-
quences moves. Clearly, zgÎD
k+1 is equivalent to gÎAk+1. Assume that d(g)Î
Dk+1 for all gÎAk+1 (this condition is fulfilled at step 1 and the procedure en-
sures that it is true for the subsequent steps). Suppose Ak+1 ¹ Æ. The fol-
lowing three cases are possible.
(1) zg = t(g, D
k+1)ÎF k+1 for some gÎAk+1; put lk+1 = ágñ.
(2) t(g, Dk+1)ÎF(z ) for some gÎAk+1; put lk+1 = ágñ.
(3) Cases (1) and (2) do not happen. Until the sequence lk+1 will be con-
structed, we repeat the following operations. If g1 is not defined yet, then let
us select an arbitrary g1ÎA
k+1. Assume that g1, ¼, gs are already defined and
agent ga occupies the dwelling ja in allocation z (1 £ a £ s). Put i = t(gs , D
k+1);
iÏF(z ) since case (2) does not happen.
(3a) iÎJ k+1. Then i = d(g) ¹ 0 for some gÎA
k+1. Put gs+1 = g if gÏ{gj | 1 £ j £ s},
and put lk+1 = ágm , ¼, gsñ if g = gm .
(3b) iÏJ k+1. Then iÎF k+1 and iÏF(z ) È {js}, since cases (1) and (2) do not
happen. Thus i = zg ¹ 0 for some gÎA
k+1, g ¹ gs, and zg ¹ t(g, D
k+1), because
case (1) does not happen. Put lk+1 = ágm , ¼, gsñ if g = gm , and put gs+1 = g
if gÏ{gj | 1 £ j £ s}.
Eventually, a sequence lk+1 = ágk+1,1, ¼, gk+1, n(k+1)ñ will be constructed. Put
G(lk+1) = {gk+1, s | 1 £ s £ n(k+1)} and t(g) = t(g,
 Dk+1) for gÎG(lk+1). By j k+1, a
denote the dwelling occupied by agent gk+1, a in allocation z. Let us define an
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allocation, x, as follows: xg = t(g) if gÎÈm £ k+1 G(lm), 0 otherwise. It is clear
that xÎDA. The conditions (29) and (30) are satisfied for x with l = lk+1 by
construction. It follows from the definitions of the sets Ak+1 and Dk+1 that
wg(zg) £ wg(t(g)) for gÎA
k+1. From (55) and (56) we obtain that t(g) = zg if gÎ
G(lk+1) and wg(zg) = wg(t(g)). Therefore, (31) is true for x with l = lk+1. If x
and l = lk+1 satisfy condition (32), then z p x, that is impossible since zÎ
FPC. Therefore, wg(xg) = wg(zg) for all gÎG(lk+1). Now from (55) and (56) we
obtain t(g) = zg for gÎG(lk+1). Therefore, case (3b) was not used during the
construction of lk+1, j k+1, s = d(gk+1, s+1) whenever 1 £ s < n(k+1), and
j k+1, n(k+1)ÎF
k+1 È {d(gk+1,1)}. Thus a top bargains sequence is separated in
allocation z. Let us assign the first free numbers in the numbering n(g) to
elements of G(lk+1), and finish step k+1. Since G(lk) ¹ Æ, we shall have Ar =
Æ for some r, and construction of the numbering n(g) will be completed at
step r-1. Numberings n(g) and ng(i) specify the scheme rÎÂ. It is easy to
see that z(r) = z. Therefore, FPC Í E(Â). Q.E.D.
Theorem 7. If t is the final stage of the EQ-procedure, then (z(t), pt) is a
Walrasian equilibrium for situation A(t).
Proof. The case (3c) happens at the last step of stage t. Cases (2a) and
(3a) of the EQ-procedure and the definition of j(s, g) ensure condition (10)
for z(t), p0 = 0. Then (Mas-Collel, Whinston, Green, 1995, Lemma 10.B.1, p.
316) condition (7) is fulfilled as well. Take some gÎG(t) and put j = j(t, g).
Suppose gÎG1. Case (3b) does not happen, thus u( i, g, t) £ u( j, g, t) for all
iÎJg. Whence ygj(t) - tp j ³ ygi(t) - tp i . Suppose now gÎG2(t); then jÎ{0, d(g)}.
If j = 0, then d(g)Î{ j(t, g) | gÎG1}; thus d(g)Î 1tD , and so ygd(g) - tp )(gd £ 0 =
yg0 - tp 0 . If j = d(g), then jÏ{ j(t, g) | gÎG1}. Thus either jÏ 1tD  or jÎ )(ttrF . Con-
sequently (see case (3a) of the EQ-procedure), ygd(g) - tp )(gd ³ 0 = yg0 - tp 0 .
In any case (9) is true for g by Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8. If gÎG1, j = d(s+1, g), and iÎI, then bgi(s+1) = bgi(s) in the case
when jÎI1 È {d(s, g)} and bgi(s+1) = min{bgi(s), agj(s)} otherwise.
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Proof. Put d = d(s, g), m = d(s+1, g). From (37) and the definition of Dbgi(s),
by repeating arguments of Theorem 1, we obtain: 
bgi(s+1) - bgm(s+1) = min{bgi(s) - bgm(s), wg(s+1) - 0gy  - q(g, m, s+1)}.  (57)
It follows from (2) and (57) that
bgi(s) - bgd(s,g)(s) £ wg(s) - 0gy  - q(g, d(s,g), s)   for all s.       (58)
(1) If d(s, g) = j, then wg(s+1) = wg(s), m = d, and (58) can be written as
bgi(s) - bgm(s) £ wg(s+1) - 0gy  - q(g, m, s+1). Now (57) implies bgi(s+1) -
bgm(s+1) = bgi(s) - bgm(s) for all i. But bg0(s+1) = bg0(s) = qg0, thus bgi(s+1) =
bgi(s) for all i.
(2) If d(s, g) ¹ j, then j = tsk(g) and the EQ-procedure determines d(s+1, g) as
tsk(g) at some step k of stage s. Then j maximizes u(i, g, s) over 
k
sD  and dÎ
k
sD  by Assumption 5 and (36), hence
bgd(s) - bgj(s) £ [ sdp -
s
jp ] + [q(g, d, s) - q(g, j, s)].             (59)
By summing this inequality with (58), we obtain:
bgi(s) - bgj(s) £ wg(s) - 0gy + sdp -
s
jp - q(g, j, s).                   (60)
(2a) jÎI1. Then m = j, wg(s+1) = wg(s) + sdp - sjp - Qgj(s). Using Assumption 7
and the definition of q(g, i, s), let us rewrite (60) in the form: bgi(s) - bgm(s) £
wg(s+1) - 0gy - 2gjq = wg(s+1) - 0gy - q(g, m, s+1). Therefrom, using (57), we
obtain bgi(s+1) = bgi(s) for all i, as in case (1).
(2b) jÏI1. Then m = 0, wg(s+1) = wg(s) + sdp - Qgj(s), agj(s) = wg(s+1) -
0
gy ,
and (57) takes the form bgi(s+1) - qg0 = min{bgi(s) - qg0, agj(s) - qg0}. Q.E.D.
Corollary. min{0, bgi(1)} £ bgi(s+1) £ bgi(s) for gÎG1, iÎI, s ³ 1.
Proof. The right-hand inequality follows from Lemma 8. Put d = d(s, g), j =
d(s+1, g), and assume that bgi(s+1) < bgi(s). Then, by Lemma 8, d(s, g) ¹ j
and bgi(s+1) = agj(s) = 
s
dp + wg(s) - Qgj(s) -
0
gy , while j = tsk(g) for some step
k of stage s. By (59), bgj(s) - bgd (s) ³ sjp -p sd + q(g ,  j, s) - q(g, d, s). Then
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(58) with i = j implies wg(s) - 0gy - q(g, d, s) ³ sjp - sdp + q(g , j, s) - q(g, d, s),
hence 0 £ wg(s) + sdp  - sjp - q(g ,  j, s) - 0gy  £ wg(s) + sdp  - Qgj(s) - 0gy  =
bgi(s+1). Therefore, bgi(s+1) ³ 0 if bgi(s+1) ¹ bgi(1). Q.E.D.
Lemma 9. Suppose gÎG, i = j(s, g) and case (3) holds at the last step of
stage s. Then bgi(s) - q(g, i, s) ³ sip . If, additionally, gÎG1, then ygi(s, p
s) ³ 0gy .
Proof. Suppose gÎG2(s), then ygi(s) = ygi. The statement of the lemma is ob-
vious with i = 0 (bg0 = qg0 =
s
0p = 0). If i ¹ 0, then i = d(g); in this case either iÏ
1
sD  (and 
s
ip < ygi by the definition of 
1
sD ) or iÎ
1
sD \ {j(s, h) | hÎG1} (and 
s
ip £
ygi by case (3a) of the EQ-procedure). Suppose now gÎG1. Then bg0(s) = qg0
by (37), yg0 = 0, 0Î ksD , and i maximizes u(i, g, s) over ksD . From u(i, g, s) ³
u(0, g, s) and (33) we obtain ygi(s) - sip ³ 0. So, bgi(s) - q(g, i, s) ³ 
s
ip  in any
case.
The condition ygi(p
s) ³ 0gy  for s = 1 is true by Lemma 2. Suppose this condi-
tion is true for s-1 (s ³ 2) and let us prove it for s. By the definition, i maxi-
mizes u(i, g, s) over ksD  for some k. If d(s-1, g) = d(s, g), then d(s-1, g) =
d(s, g) = d. Thus dÎ ksD  and, therefore, u(i, g, s) ³ u(d, g, s), whence ygi(s) -
ygd (s) ³ sip -
s
dp . From this, using (58), we obtain: ygi(s, p
s) = wg(s) - sip +
s
dp -
q(g, i, s) ³ bgi(s) - bgd(s) + q(g, d, s) + 0gy - sip +
s
dp - q(g, i, s) = [ygi(s) - ygd (s)] -
[ sip -
s
dp ] + 
0
gy ³ 0gy . Assume now that d(s-1, g) ¹ d(s, g). It is easy to see
that ygi(s, p) is a strictly decreasing function of bi(s, p). Therefore, ygi(s, p s) <
0
gy  would imply bi(s, p
s) = q(g, i, s) - q(g, d(s,g), s) + sip -
s
gsd ),(p > Dbgi(s) =
bgi(s) - bgd(s,g)(s) and thus ygi - ygd(s,g) < sip - s gsd ),(p  contrary to (59). Q.E.D.
Lemma 10. The sets Al and Pr are finite.
Proof. If case (3) of the EQ-procedure happens at step r(s) and i = j(s, g),
then 1+sip £
s
ip + d £ ygi(s) + d £ bgi(s) + d £ bgi(1) + d by Lemma 9 and Cor-
13
ollary from Lemma 8. If case (3) of the EQ-procedure does not happen at
step r(s) or iÏ{d(s+1, g) | gÎG}, then 1+sip £
s
ip .
It is easy to see that case (3) will necessarily happen at some stage; let m
be the number of the first such stage. Put K = max{max{bgi | gÎG, iÎJg} +d,
max{ sip | iÎI, s < m}}. It is clear that 0 £
s
ip £ K for all i, s. Since 
1+s
ip Î
{ sip ,
s
ip + d,
s
ip - d, 0ip }, Pr is finite. Finiteness of Al is obvious. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11. If the bargains corresponding to a sequence l = ág1, ¼, gnñ are
carried out at stage s of the EQ-procedure and n > 1, then u(d(s,g), g, s) <
u(d(s+1,g), g, s) for some gÎ{g1, ¼, gn}.
 Proof. If l is a chain then u(d(s,g1), g1, s) < u(d(s+1,g1), g1, s) by the defini-
tion of correct sequence. Let l be a cycle. Sequence l does not appear
before stage s (otherwise it would be carried out). Assume that l appears
for the first time at step k of stage s; tsk(gj) ¹ d(s, gj) for all j (as n > 1) and
tsk(gm) is not equal to L(gm) for some m at the beginning of step k (otherwise
this cycle would appear earlier). Then, for g = gm , we have u(d(s,g), g, s) <
u(tsk(g), g, s) and d(s+1, g) = tsk(g). Q.E.D.
Lemma 12. There exists an integer M such that either the EQ-procedure will
be finished before stage M +1, or bgi(s) - bgi(s+1) ³ d > 0 for some i, gÎG1,
and s £ M.
Proof. If iÏ 1sD  for all s then the values 
s
ip  do not decrease with respect to s.
Suppose iÎ 1sD  for some s and let s(i ) denote the smallest such s. Take
some t > s(i). The definition of 1sD  implies that 
)(is
ip ³
0
ip ; then 
t
ip ³
0
ip  too
(since all sip  are multiples of d), and thus iÎ
1
tD . Case (3b) of the EQ-
procedure assures us that
s ³ s(i ) and sip <
1+s
ip  imply iÎ{d(s+1, g) | gÎG1}.             (61)
Put Bs = {d(s, g) | gÎG1} (the set of the dwellings occupied by consumers
at the beginning of stage s). If tip >
1+t
ip  and iÏBt+1, then iÏBs for all s £ t (if
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dwelling i becomes tenantless at some stage s, then sip =
0
ip  by the defini-
tion of a correct sequence, and this price will not change while the dwelling
is occupied); hence, taking into account (61), s(i) < s £ t implies 1-sip ³ sip .
Therefore, both conditions tip >
1+t
ip  and iÏBt+1 can be true only for finitely
many stages t. Then there exists s0 ³ max{s(i)} such that
s > s0 and sip >
1+s
ip  imply iÎBs+1.                       (62)
The conditions (61) and (62) mean that prices of the dwellings belonging to
I \ Bs+1 cannot be changed at stages s > s0. Taking into account Lemma 10,
put M = s0 + |Al|×|Pr| +1.
 Assume that the EQ-procedure was not ended in |Al|×|Pr| stages after the
stage s0. Then there exist some stages a and b, s0 < a < b, such that p a =
p b and z a = z b = z (the initial allocations, as well as prices, coincide at the
stages a and b). The procedure is cyclic starting with stage a.
Assume that the allocation is invariable within the stages sÎ[a, b), z s = z .
Then Bs = Ba for sÎ[a, b) and, taking into account Lemma 8,
bgi(s) = bgi(a)   for sÎ[a, b) and all g, i.                   (63)
If s is not the last stage of the EQ-procedure, then either z s ¹ z
s+1 or p s ¹
p s+1. Thus p s ¹ p s+1 for sÎ[a, b). Let us consider a dwelling, i, such that i =
zg for gÎG1, g participates in a maximal feasible non-correct sequence at
some stage m ³ a, and after that i rises in price at a stage n : mip =
n
ip <
1+n
ip .
The agent g, possibly, participates in feasible non-correct sequences at
some stages sÎ[m, n); assume that prices of the dwellings occupied by
members of such sequences do not increase in this interval. Then g will be
the first member of a maximal feasible non-correct sequence at some step
of stage n; this is impossible since, for some hÎG1, u(i, h, m) > u(d(n,h), h, n)
and i = tn(h, I). Therefore, i(1), m(1), and n(1) exist such that 
(1)
(1)
m
ip =
(1)
(1)
n
ip <
1(1)
(1)
+n
ip , [m(1), n(1)) Ì [m, n), i(1) = zh(1), and agent h(1) is a member of a
maximal feasible non-correct sequence at stage m(1).
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It is clear that there exist i, m, and n such that a £ m < n and mip ³
1+m
ip =
n
ip <
1+n
ip (the price of dwelling i decreases at stage m and increases at
stage n). Then i = zg and g participates in a maximal feasible non-correct
sequence at stage m. As we have proved above, some stages m(1) and n(1)
can be found such that [m(1), n(1)) Ì [m(1), n(1)), the price of some dwelling
i = zh(1) is invariable in the interval [m(1), n(1)) and increases at stage n(1),
and agent h(1) participates in some feasible non-correct sequence at stage
m(1). Repeating this reasoning, we shall construct the infinite sequence of
intervals [m(k), n(k)) with integer extremities and monotonously decreasing
lengths, that is impossible. The contradiction is caused by the assumption z s
= z for all sÎ[a, b). Therefore, some non-trivial sequences of bargains are
actualized at stages sÎ[a, b).
By the rule of selecting the dwelling tsk(g) we have u(d(s+1,g), g, s) ³
u(d(s,g), g, s) for all g and s. It follows from (33) and Lemma 11 that
s
gs ) ,(dp - s gs ) 1,( +dp ³ ygd(s,g)(s) - ygd(s+1,g)(s)                    (64)
with strict inequality for at least one pair (g, s), gÎG1, sÎ[a, b). Summing
inequalities (64) over s from a to b-1, we get: 
å 1-=b  a s (
s
gs ) ,(dp - s gs ) 1,( +dp ) ³ å 1-=b  a s [ygd(s,g)(s) - ygd(s+1,g)(s)].            (65)
Since a ga ),(dp =
b
gb ) ,(dp , we have å 1=b  a s ( s s  ,p s gs ) 1,( +dp ) = å 1 1- + a ( gs ) (dp - ) ( gsdp ) +
ga ),p - 1 ),(-b gbdp = å b  a s 1+= (
s
gs ),(dp - 1 ),(-s gsdp ). By Corollary from Lemma 8, using
d(a, g) = d(b, g), we get ygd(a,g)(a) - ygd(b,g)(b-1) = ygd(b,g)(a) - ygd(b,g)(b-1) ³
ygd(b,g)(b) - ygd(b,g)(b-1). Then å 1-=b  a s [ygd(s,g)(s) - ygd(s+1,g)(s)] ³ å b  a s 1+= [ygd(s,g)(s) -
ygd(s,g)(s-1)]. If i = d(s, g), j = d(s-1, g), and gÎG1, then q(g, i, s) = qgi(i ) = 2giq
and q(g, i, s-1) = qgi(j) = 2giq  + Qgi(s-1). Let us put Rgs = ygd(s,g)(s) -
ygd(s,g)(s-1) = bgd(s,g)(s) - bgd(s,g)(s-1) + Qgd(s,g)(s-1). It follows from (65) that
å b  a s 1+= Rgs £ å
b
 a s 1+= (
s
gs ) ,(dp - 1 ) ,(-s gsdp ) with strict inequality for at least one g.
Summing over gÎG1, we get:
ågå b  a s 1+= (
s
gs ) ,(dp - 1 ) ,(-s gsdp ) > ågå b  a s 1+= Rgs.                     (66)
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(1) If Rgs ³ 0 for all g and s, then ågå b  a s 1+= ( s gs ),(dp - 1 ),(-s gsdp ) > 0. In the last
sum, the changes in prices are summed for all dwellings of the set Bs at
stage s-1. But (61) and (62) imply that the prices of dwellings outside this
set are invariable at stage s-1 if s > a. Thus åi( bip - aip ) = ågå b  a s 1+= ( s gs ),(dp -
1
),(
-s
gsdp ) > 0 contrary to p
b = p a.
(2) Suppose Rgs < 0 for some gÎG1 and sÎ[a+1, b]. Put i = d(s, g). From Rgs <
0 we get bgi(s-1) - bgi(s) > Qgi(s-1) ³ 0. Assumption 8 and EQ-procedure im-
ply that sip , wg(s), bgi(s), and Qgi(s-1) are rationals and also they are multi-
ples of d. Now it is clear that bgi(s-1) - bgi(s) ³ d > 0. Q.E.D.
Theorem 8. The EQ-procedure is finite under Assumption 8.
Proof. If the EQ-procedure was not ended in M stages, then bgi(s) - bgi(s+1) ³
d > 0 for some gÎG1, iÎI, s £ M (Lemma 12); d does not depend on g, i, s.
Let us apply Lemma 12 to the final situation of stage M. If the procedure will
not terminate in the following M stages, then some reservation price will de-
crease at least by d within these M stages. The reservation prices do not in-
crease and are bounded below by Corollary from Lemma 8; thus the proce-
dure is finite. Q.E.D.
Lemma 13. For any Walrasian equilibrium (z, p), some normal equilibrium
(z0, p0) exists such that z(z0) = z(z).
Proof. Let (z, p) be an equilibrium. By Lemma 3, there exists a vector, p
1,
such that (z, p1) is an equilibrium and c( 1 )(gdp ) ³ ygd(g) for all gÎG2. Put p
1 =
c(p1). Assume that equilibrium (z, p1) is not a normal one. Then there exist
some i and j such that i ~ j and 1ip >
1
jp ³ 0. If iÏ{ j(z, g) | gÎG1}, then g(i )Î
G2 since 1ip > 0. It follows from i ~ j that g( j)ÎG2 and 
1
ip >
1
jp ³ yg( j)j = yg(i)i,
contrary to Lemma 2. Therefore, i = j(z, h) for some hÎG1. If d(h)Ï{i, j}, then
(yhj - yhi) - ( 1jp - 1ip ) = 1ip - 1jp > 0. If d(h) = j, then (yhj - yhi) - ( 1jp - 1ip ) = (bhj -
bhi) - ( 2jhq - r × 1hiq - 2hiq ) - ( 1jp - 1ip ) = r × 1hiq + 1jp - 1ip > 0. In both cases we have
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a contradiction with Lemma 1. Therefore, j(z, h) = d(h) = i.
Let us define p 2ÎP : 2ip =
1
jp , 
2
kp =
1
kp  for k ¹ i. Let p
2 be a unique price
vector satisfying the condition c(p2) = p
2, and define z2ÎFD as follows: 2gz  =
(ygj(z,g)(p
2), j(z,g)) for all gÎG. Let us show that (z
2, p2) is an equilibrium.
Condition (10) is fulfilled for (z2, p2) because it is fulfilled for (z, p1) and p 2 £
p1. If k ¹ i, then, applying Lemma 1 to equilibrium (z, p
1), we obtain 2ip - 2kp <
1
ip -
1
kp £ yhi - yhk. Consider gÎG1 \ {h}. Then j(z, g) ¹ i and d(g) ¹ i. If k ¹ i,
then, applying Lemma 1 to equilibrium (z, p1), we obtain 2 ) ,( gzjp - 2kp =
1
) ,( gzjp -
1
kp £ ygj(z,g) - ygk. It follows from i ~ j that ygi = ygj if d(g) ¹ j, and ygi £ ygj if
d(g) = j. Thus 2 ),( gzjp - 2ip =
1
),( gzjp - 1jp £ ygj(z,g) - ygj £ ygj(z,g) - ygi . So, condition
(9) with gÎG1 is true for (z
2, p
2) (Lemma 1). If gÎG2 and d(g) ¹ i, then (9) is
fulfilled for g since 1kp =
2
kp  for all kÎJg. If gÎG2 and d(g) = i, then g( j )ÎG2
and ygi = yg( j)j £ 1jp = 2ip <
1
ip ; thus, j(z, g) = j(z
2, g) = 0 and ug(z
2) - vgi(p
2) =
2
ip - ygi ³ 0. Now (9) is proved for all gÎG. Hence, (z
2, p2) is an equilibrium.
Note that z(z2) = z(z) and 2ip =
2
jp . It is clear that, proceeding repeatedly, we
shall construct the desired normal equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Lemma 14. Suppose (z, p) is a normal equilibrium and g » h. If {g, h} Í G1
and d(g) ~ d(h), then ug(z) = uh(z); if {g, h} Í G2, then ug(z) - uh(z) = wg - wh.
Proof. Suppose (z, p) is a normal equilibrium, p = c(p), and g » h. Assume
that {g, h} Í G1 and d(g) ~ d(h). Then pd(g) = pd(h) and pd(g) = pd(h). Put i =
j (z, g). If iÏ{d(g), d(h)}, then ug(z) = wg + pd(g) - pi + ygi = wh + pd(h) - pi + yhi =
vhi(p) £ uh(z) by (9). If iÎ{d(g), d(h)}, then bgi - 2giq  = bhi - 2hiq = bhd(h) - 2 )(hhq d .
Recall that 1 )(ggq d = 
1
)(hhq d = 0. Thus, if i = d(g), then ug(z) = vgd(g)(p) = vhd(h)(p) £
uh(z). Also, if i = d(h), then ug(z) = wg + pd(g) - pi + bgi - qgi £ wg + pd(h) - pi + bhi -
2
hiq = vhi(p) £ uh(z). Hence, ug(z) £ uh(z) in any case. But g » h implies h » g,
thus ug(z) = uh(z). Assume now that {g, h} Í G2. Then d(g) ~ d(h), pd(g) = pd(h),
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and, using Lemma 2, we obtain ug(z) - wg = max{ygd(g), pd(g)} = max{yhd(h),
pd(h)} = uh(z) - wh . Q.E.D.
Theorem 9. For any normal equilibrium (z, p), some standard equilibrium
(z0, p) exists such that j(z0, g) ~ j(z, g) for all gÎG1.
Proof. Suppose (z, p) is a normal equilibrium (it exists by Lemma 13), and
put p = c(p). If (z, p) is not a standard equilibrium, then d(g) ~ j(z, g) ¹ d(g) for
some gÎG1. Let us take such g and put j = j(z, g), i = d(g). Then i ¹ 0, j ¹ 0,
pi = pj , bgi - 2giq = bgj - 2gjq , and ug(z) = wg + pd(g) - pj + bgj - qgj £ wg + pd(g) - pi +
bgi - 2giq = vgi(p). Taking into account (9), we obtain ug(z) = vgi(p) (the dwell-
ings i and j are equivalent to agent g). Put k(g) = i. If i = j(z, h) for some hÎ
G2, then i = d(h) (since Jh = {d(h), 0} and i ¹ 0) and pi £ yhi (Lemma 2). It
follows from i ~ j that g( j)ÎG2 and pj = pi £ yhi = yg( j)j. But j(z, g) = j implies pj ³
yg( j)j (Lemma 2). Therefore, pi = yhi (zero and i are equivalent to agent h).
Put k(h) = 0. If i = j(z, h) for some hÎG1, then (8) and Assumption 1 imply h ¹
g and d(h) ¹ i (as i ¹ 0). If d(h) = j ~ i = j(z, h), then, as we have proved above,
uh(z) = vhj(p). If d(h) ¹ j, then d(h)Ï{i, j} and yhi = yhj (as i ~ j); thus uh(z) -
vhj(p) = pj - pi + yhi - yhj = 0. In any case, the dwellings i and j are equivalent
to agent h. Put k(h) = j. At last, put k(f) = j(z, f) for all fÎG such that f ¹ g and
j(z, f) ¹ i. Obviously, k(h) ~ j(z, h) for all hÎG1. Put z
1
 = (z
1(h) | hÎ G), where
z1(h) = (yhk(h)(p), k(h)). It is easy to see that (z
1, p) is a normal equilibrium,
and, in this equilibrium, the number of agents violating the condition for a
normal equilibrium be standard is less than that in z. Proceeding repeatedly,
we shall construct some standard equilibrium (z0, p). Q.E.D.
Lemma 15. If hÎGS, then I(t(h)) = {d(g) | gÎG(h, 0)}.
Proof. Suppose hÎGS. Then all dwellings owned by suppliers of group h are
of type t(h). And conversely, if iÎI(t(h)), then i is owned by a supplier of
group h (see the definition of dwelling types). Q.E.D.
Lemma 16. The quantities ankh are well defined.
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Proof. Suppose ankh is defined, {i, j}ÎI(k) and {x, y} Í G(h, n); then x » y, i ~ j,
and {d(x), d(y)} Í I(n). It follows from x » y that either {x, y} Í G1 or {x, y} Í
G2. Assume that {x, y} Í G1. If k ¹ n, then {i, j} Ç {d(x), d(y)} = Æ; thus x » y
and i ~ j imply yxi = yyi = yyj. Whence, ankh is well defined. If n = k, then x » y
and d(x) ~ d(y) imply yxd(x) = bxd(x) - 2 )(xxq d = bxd(y) - 2 )(yxq d = byd(y) - 2 )(yxq d = yyd(y),
thus annh is well defined. Assume now that {x, y} Í G2. Then yx0 = yy0 = 0 by
the definition, and yxd(x) = yyd(y) since d(x) ~ d(y). Thus ankh is well defined for
kÎ {0, t(h)}. Q.E.D.
Lemma 17. If hÎGS and X is a feasible solution of the AT problem, then
åmåaÎGC Xmt(h)a £ X00h .
Proof. Suppose hÎGS and X is a feasible solution of the AT problem. Clearly,
ÈgÎG(h,0) Jg = {d(g) | gÎG(h, 0)} È {0}. By Lemma 15, variables X0kh are de-
fined only for kÎ{t(h), 0}. If k = t(h) and n = 0, then the conditions (39) and
(38) take the form: åmåaÎGC Xmt(h)a + X0t(h)h £ Ct(h) and X0t(h)h + X00h = Dh0. The
statement of the lemma follows now from Ct(h) = Dh0 (Lemma 15). Q.E.D.
Theorem 10.4 Suppose (z, p) is a standard equilibrium, x = x(z), Xnkh =
ågÎG(h, n)åiÎI(k) xgi for (n, k, h)ÎU, ghn = ag(z, p) for gÎG(h, n), and pk = c(pi) for
iÎI(k); then X and (g, p) are optimal solutions of the AT and AT* problems re-
spectively. If X is an integral optimal solution of AT (in particular, a basic
one), (g, p) is an optimal solution of AT*, ip = pk for iÎI(k), and p = ( ip | iÎI),
then there exists some basic optimal solution x of T such that (z(x, p ), r(p ))
is a standard equilibrium and Xnkh = ågÎG(h, n)åi ÎI(k) xgi.
 Proof. (1) Suppose (z, p) is a standard equilibrium and x = x(z). It follows
from the definition of a normal equilibrium and Lemma 11 that g and p in the
theorem formulation are well defined. Obviously, X is a feasible solution to AT
if Xnkh = ågÎG(h,n)åi ÎI(k) xgi. By Theorem 2, (a(z,p), c(p)) is an optimal solution
of T*, whence (g, p) is a feasible solution of AT*. Since (z, p) is a standard
                                         
4 The formulation and proof use the definitions introduced in section 2.1.
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equilibrium, i ~ d(g) and i ¹ d(g) imply xgi = 0. Thus ån,k,h ankh×Xnkh = åg, i ygi ×xgi
= åg ag(z, p) + åi c(pi) = åh,någÎG(h,n) ag(z, p) + åkåiÎI(k) c(pi) = åh,n Dhn ×ggn +
åk Ck ×pk. Consequently, X and (g, p) are optimal solutions to AT and AT* re-
spectively.
(2) Note that the AT problem is totally unimodular, therefore all its basic fea-
sible solutions are integral. Suppose X is an integral optimal solution to AT
and (g, p) is an optimal solution to AT*. Let us describe the procedure con-
structing a vector x. In the beginning, all components xgi of x are equal to
zero. Every time when we shall set xgi = 1, we shall mean that xgk = 0 for all
kÎJg \ {i}, and say that the vector xg = (xgk | kÎJg) is determined and dwell-
ing i (if i ¹ 0) is allocated now. For each pair (h, n) such that G(h, n) ¹ Æ and
hÎGC, let us select Xnnh representatives in G(h, n) so that xg was not still
determined for each chosen agent g (the choice is possible since Xnnh £
Dhn). Put xgd(g) = 1 for each chosen agent g. If n = t(b) for some bÎGS, then
the dwellings initially occupied by chosen agents are owned by suppliers of
group b; for each such supplier g, vector xg was not still determined, and we
put xg0 = 1.
The further construction is carried out step by step. For (n, k, h)ÎU, let us
denote by snkhX  the number of all (n, h)-agents g such that we had put xgi = 1
with iÎI(k) before step s. Clearly, snkhX  is the sum over gÎG(h, n) and iÎI(k)
of components xgi of all vectors xg determined before step s. Put I
s(k) =
ån,h snkhX  (if k ¹ 0, then Is(k) is the number of dwelling in I(k) allocated before
step s). It follows from the above construction that: 1nkhX = Xnkh if k = n and
hÎGC; 1nkhX = åaÎGC Xt(h)t(h)a £ X00h if n = k = 0 and hÎGS (Lemma 17); 
1
nkhX =
0 otherwise. Besides, I1(k) = åhÎGC Xkkh £ Ck by (39) if k ¹ 0, and I
1(0) =
åhÎGC X00h + åbÎGSåhÎGC Xt(b)t(b)h £ åh X00h £ C0 by Lemma 17 and (39). Let us
describe a step s ³ 1 now.
Assume that the following initial conditions hold before step s : if k ¹ 0 or hÎ
GC, then snkhX Î{Xnkh, 0}; if hÎGS and kÎ{t(h), 0}, then skhX0 £ X0kh; Is(k) £ Ck
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for all k. These conditions are true before step 1. The following cases are
possible.
(a) snkhX = 0 for some triplet (n, k, h)ÎU with hÎGC. Then k ¹ n. Let us select
Xnkh representatives in G(h, n) such that xg is not still determined for each
chosen agent g (the choice is possible since åm ¹ k snmhX + Xnkh £ åm Xnmh =
Dhn). Select also Xnkh unallocated dwellings in I(k) (the choice is possible
since Is(k) + Xnkh = å(m,a) ¹ (n,h) smkaX + Xnkh £ åm,a Xmka £ Ck). Let us establish an
arbitrary bijection i(g) between the set of chosen agents and that of chosen
dwellings. Put xgi(g) = 1 for all g. If k = t(b) for some bÎGS, then the dwellings
being allocated at step s are owned by suppliers of group b; for each such
supplier g, vector xg was not still determined (by construction, we determine
xg for gÎG2 only after d(g) was allocated), and we put xg0 = 1. Step s is com-
pleted. Note that the initial conditions are true for s+1. In particular, I s+1(0) =
åbÎGS ånåhÎGC 1 )(+s hbnX t  + ånåhÎGC 10+s hnX  £ ånåhÎGC Xn0h + åbÎGS ån  åhÎGC Xnt(b)h £
ån,h Xn0h £ C0 by Lemma 17 and (39), 100+s hX  = ånåaÎGC
1
)(
+s
ahnX t £ ånåaÎGC Xnt(h)a £
X00h for hÎGS by Lemma 17.
(b) Case (a) does not happen and s hX00 < X00h for some hÎGS. Then case (c)
did not happen before step s and thus s hhX )(0t = 0. Let us select X00h - s hX00
suppliers in group h such that xg was not still determined for each chosen
agent g (the choice is possible since Dh0 - s hX00 ³ X00h -
s
hX00 ). Put xg0 = 1 for
each chosen agent g. Step s is completed. The initial conditions for s+1 are
obviously true.
(c) The preceding cases do not hold and snkhX < Xnkh for some triplet
(n, k, h)ÎU. Then (n, k, h) = (0, t(h), h) for some hÎGS, s hX00 = X00h and
s
hhX )(0t = 0. Dh0 = X00h + X0t(h)h by (38), thus it is possible to select X0t(h)h sup-
pliers in group h such that, for each chosen agent g, xg was not still deter-
mined and, consequently, dwelling d(g) was not still allocated. Put xgd(g) = 1
for each chosen agent g. Step s is completed and the initial conditions for
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s+1 are true.
(d) snkhX = Xnkh for all (n, k, h)ÎU. The construction is completed.
After finitely many steps, the construction will be completed, vectors xg will
be determined for all g, and a feasible solution x to problem T will be con-
structed. Surely, ågÎG(h, n)åiÎI(k) xgi = Xnkh for all (n, k, h)ÎU. Put ag = ghn for gÎ
G(h, n) and put ip = pk for iÎI(k). Obviously, (a,p ) is a feasible solution to
T*. X and (g, p) are optimal solutions to T and T* respectively, then åg, i ygi ×xgi
= ån,k,h ankh×Xnkh = åh,n Dhn ×ghn + åk Ck ×pk = åg ag + åi ip ; thus x and (a,p )
are optimal solutions to T and T* respectively. Then x is a basic (because it
is integral) optimal solution to T. Theorem 2 and the definitions of x and p
imply that (z(x, p ), r(p )) is a standard equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Theorem 11. max{pj | pÎP(A2)} - yfj £ d £ min{pj | pÎP(A1)} - yfj.
Proof. If c(p) = pÎP(A), then (z, p) with some z is a standard equilibrium for
situation A. Then (g, p) with some g is an optimal solution to AT* (Theorem
10). Note that d = F0(A2) - F0(A1) - wf - yfj = f0(A2) - f0(A1) - yfj. Let us write
AT*(k), kÎ{1, 2}, for the AT* problem in situation Ak and denote by Fk(g, p)
the objective function in the AT*(k) problem. It is clear that the AT*(k) prob-
lems have the same set of feasible solutions D. Suppose p kÎP(Ak) and
(g k, p k) is an optimal solution to the AT*(k) problem. Then f0(A2) = F2(g
2, p
2) £
F2(g
1, p
1) = F1(g
1, p
1) + 1jp = f0(A1) + 
1
jp . On the other hand, for (g, p)ÎD, we
have F2(g, p) = F1(g, p) + pj ³ F1(g
1, p
1) + pj , whence, with (g, p) = (g
2, p 2), we
obtain f0(A2) ³ f0(A1) + 2jp . Therefore, 2jp £ d + yf j £ 1jp . The price systems p kÎ
P(Ak) were chosen arbitrarily, so the theorem is proved. Q.E.D.
Lemma 18. Let e = (z, p) be an equilibrium for situation A2 and l = á j(1),
¼, j(n+1)ñ a sequence actualized in e. (a) If j(s+1) ¹ j, then dj(s)(p) £ dj(s+1)(p).
(b) If l is a cycle, then all di(p) with iÎI(l) are equal. (c) If l is a chain and
iÎI Ç I(l), then di(p) ³ 0. (d) If l is a chain of the first type and iÎI(l), then
di(p) = 0.
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Proof. Without loss of generality we can consider that l is a maximal by em-
bedding actualized sequence. Put p = c(p), j(s) = j(z
1, h(s)). Lemma 1 (being
applied to the equilibria e1 and e) gives:
yh(s) j(s) - yh(s) j(s+1) ³ 1 )(sjp - 1 1)( +sjp    and   yh(s) j(s+1) - yh(s) j(s) ³ pj(s+1) - pj(s).   (67)
Then 1 )(sjp - 1 1)( +sjp £ pj(s) - pj(s+1), whence dj(s)(p) £ dj(s+1)(p). The statement (a)
is proved.
If l is a cycle, then (a) gives dj(1)(p) £ dj(2)(p) £ ¼ £ dj(n)(p) £ dj(1)(p), whence
(b) follows.
Let l be a chain. If j(1) = 0, then dj(1)(p) = 0. Assume that j(1) ¹ 0. Then j(1)Ï
{j(z, g) | gÎG}, pj(1) = 0 by (10), and dj(1)(p) ³ 0. Now (c) follows from (a).
Suppose l is a chain of the first type and k = j(n+1). The maximality of l im-
plies that kÎF. Then 1kp = 0 by (10), and Assumption 1 implies that kÏ{d(g) |
 gÎG1}. Assume that g(k) = gÎG2. By the definition of an actualized in e se-
quence, k = j(z, h) for some hÎG. If hÎG1, then, by Lemma 2, pk ³ ygk ³ 0 =
1
kp . If hÎG2, then h = g, l = á0, kñ, j(z
1, g) = 0, j(z, h) = k. Applying Lemma 2
to the equilibria e and e1, we obtain 0 = 1kp ³ ygk ³ pk; consequently, 
1
kp = pk =
0. If k = 0, then 1kp = pk = 0 once more. So, dk(p) £ 0 in any case. Now (a)
and (c) imply 0 £ dj(1)(p) £ ¼ £ dj(n+1)(p) £ 0, whence (d) follows. Q.E.D.
Lemma 19. If (z, p) is some equilibrium for situation A2 and jÏI(lg(z)), then
vgd(g)(p) = ug(z).
Proof. Suppose a = j(z
1, g) = d(g), b = j(z, g), jÏI(lg). It follows from (67) that
(yga - ygb) - ( 1ap -
1
bp ) ³ 0 ³ (yga - ygb) - (pa - pb). But lg is either a chain of
the first type or a cycle, thus da = db (Lemma 18), whence 1ap -
1
bp = pa - pb.
Then 0 = (yga - ygb) - (pa - pb) = vga(p) – ug(z). Q.E.D.
Theorem 12. If (z, p)ÎSE(l) and gz = (ygj(z,g)( p ), j(z,g)), then ( z , p )Î
SE(l).
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Proof. Put p  = c( p ). Let us show that ( z , p )ÎSE(l). The equilibria (z, p)
and ( z , p ) create the same allocation, thus ( z , p ) satisfies condition (10).
By Lemma 1, it is enough to check for ( z , p ) the condition: 
ygj(z,g) - )( gzj ,p ³ ygi - ip    for gÎG È {g( j )}, iÎKg.              (68)
This condition is true for g( j) since ip = pi for iÎKg( j). Let us take some gÎG
and put a = j(z
1, g), b = j(z, g). Since e1 and e are equilibria for situations A1
and A2 respectively, the following inequalities are true (Lemma 1):
yga - 1ap  ³ ygi -
1
ip    for iÎJg   and   ygb - pb ³ ygi - pi   for iÎKg. (69)
Consider gÎG1, then Kg = I È {j}. Assume that bÎI(l); then aÎI(l). By Lemma
18, bp = pb and ap = pa £
1
ap . Using (69), we obtain ygb - pb ³ yga - pa ³ yga -
1
ap ³ ygi -
1
ip  for iÎI. Whence, taking into account the second inequality in
(69), we have (68) for iÎI (since ip Î{
1
ip , pi}); (68) for i = j follows from (69)
and jp = pj . Assume now that bÏI(l). Then b = a, ygb - bp = max{ygb - pb ,
ygb - 1bp } by the definition of p . If iÎI, then (69) implies ygb - bp ³ max{ygi -
1
ip , ygi - pi} = ygi - ip . If i = j , then (69) gives ygb - bp ³ ygj - pj = ygj - jp .
Consider gÎG2, then Jg = Kg = {0, d(g)} and ygd(g) ³ 0 by the definition. If
j(z, g) = d(g), then pd(g) £ ygd(g) by Lemma 2, hence )(gdp £ ygd(g) as well. As-
sume that j(z, g) = 0, then pd(g) ³ ygd(g) by Lemma 2. If d(g)Î{j(z, h) | hÎG1} Í
{j(z1, h)| hÎG1}, then 1 )(gdp ³ ygd(g) by Lemma 2, thus )(gdp ³ ygd(g). If d(g)Ï
{j(z, h) | hÎG1}, then pd(g) = 0, whence )(gdp = ygd(g) = 0. In any case condi-
tion (68) is fulfilled. Q.E.D.
Theorem 13. e(l, pˆ )ÎSE(l), and ipˆ £
1
ip  for iÎI.
Proof. We claim that e(l, pˆ ) is an equilibrium. It is enough to check the con-
ditions pˆ ³ 0, 0pˆ = 0, (9), and (10). If g(i )ÎG2, then there is the path m =
á0, iñ in graph G, and ipˆ ³ D(m) = yg(i)i ³ 0. If g(i )ÎG1, then j(z
1, g) = i, there
is the path m = ái, iñ in graph G, and ipˆ ³ D(m) = 0. Finally, there is the path m =
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á0, 0ñ in graph G, thus 0pˆ ³ D(m) = 0. On the other hand, m0 is either a chain
of the first type or cycle, therefore 0pˆ = D(m0) £ 0 by Theorem 2 (since
(z1, p) is an equilibrium). Hence, pˆ  ³ 0 and 0pˆ = 0.
Suppose i ¹ 0 and iÏ{j(l, g) | gÎG}. Then iÎF È {j(1)}. If D(mj(1)) > 0, then
the weight of the path obtained by attachment of mj(1) to l from the left is
D(mj(1)) + D(l) > D(l), contrary to the choice of l. Thus (1)jpˆ = (1)jpˆ = 0. If iÎF,
then mi is a chain of the first type, and D(mi) £ 0, since (z
1, p) is an equilib-
rium. Whence, taking into account pˆ ³ 0, it follows that ipˆ = ipˆ = 0. So, (10) is
true for e(l, pˆ ).
Consider some gÎG and put a = j(z1, g), b = zg(l) = j(l, g). By Lemma 1,
condition (9) for e(l, pˆ ) is equivalent to ygb – bpˆ ³ ygi - ipˆ  for all iÎKg. As-
sume the contrary: iÎKg and
ipˆ < bpˆ - ygb + ygi.                                          (70)
Suppose bÎI(l). Then aÎI(l) and, by the choice of l, bpˆ = apˆ + ygb - yga.
From this and (70) we obtain ipˆ < apˆ + ygi - yga = apˆ + c(a, i) or D(mi) < D(ma) +
c(a, i), contrary to the definition of mi . Suppose now bÏI(l). Then a = b and
(70) gives ipˆ < apˆ + c(a, i ), this leads to contradiction, as in the previous
case. So, e(l, pˆ ) is an equilibrium, and e(l, pˆ )ÎSE(l) by construction.
If ipˆ = 0, then ipˆ £
1
ip ; in particular, (1)jpˆ = 0 (this was proved above) implies
(1)jpˆ £ 1(1)jp . Suppose iÎI \ {j(1)}, ipˆ ¹ 0, and m i = ái(1), i(2), ¼, i(n) = iñ. If (1)ipˆ >
0, then some path in graph G is greater than D(mi) in weight, contrary to the
choice of D(mi). Thus (1)ipˆ = 0. The weight of mi cannot be negative, and an
initial segment of zero weight can be excluded from mi ; at the same time,
)(sipˆ = D(ái(1), ¼, i(s)ñ). Therefore, we can consider )(sipˆ > 0 for s > 1 (in par-
ticular, i(2) ¹ 0). Then i(s)Î{zg(l) | gÎG} Í {j(z
1, g) | gÎG} for s > 1 (in other
words, dwelling i(s) is chosen by some agent in equilibrium e1). Suppose
that i(s) = j(z1, gs), s > 1. Lemma 1 for equilibrium e
1 implies c(i(s), i(s+1)) £
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1
1)( +sip - 1 )(sip . Summing these inequalities over s > 1, we get:
 ipˆ - (2)ipˆ = D(mi) - c(i(1), i(2)) £
1
ip - 1(2)ip .                        (71)
If i(1)Î{j(z1, g) | gÎG}, then, as above, Lemma 1 implies ipˆ - (1)ipˆ £
1
ip -
1
(1)ip £
1
ip . But (1)ipˆ = 0, thus ipˆ £
1
ip . If i(1)Ï{j(z
1, g) | gÎG}, then the arc (i(1), i(2))
has the form (0, d(g)) for some gÎG2 (since i(2) ¹ 0). Then (2)ipˆ = c(0, d(g)) =
ygd(g) £ 1(2)ip  by Assumption 10, and (71) implies ipˆ £
1
ip . Q.E.D.
Corollary 1. If iÎI, then ipˆ £ min{pi | pÎP(A1)}.
Proof. Suppose pÎP(A1). Then there exists some distribution z for situation
A1 such that z(z) = z(z
1) and (z, p) is an equilibrium for this situation (be-
cause each equilibrium price system equilibrates any equilibrium allocation,
see comments to Theorem 2). The graph G is completely determined by al-
location z(z1) and G does not depend on prices, thus we can replace p1 by p
in Theorem 13. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2. If (z, p)ÎSE(l), then pi £ ipˆ  for iÎI(l).
Proof. Suppose e = (z, p)ÎSE(l); put l(k) = á j(1), ¼, j(k)ñ (an initial segment
of l) and p = c(p). The path l has the maximal weight, thus )(kjpˆ = D(l(k)) for
k £ n+1. In equilibrium e
1, dwelling j(s), s £ n, is chosen by some agent h(s):
j(s) = j(z1, h(s)). In equilibrium e, this agent chooses j(s+1). Lemma 1 for e
implies c( j(s), j(s+1)) ³ pj(s+1) - pj(s). Summing these inequalities over s from
1 to k-1, we get pj(k) - pj(1) £ D(l(k)) = )(kjpˆ  for k £ n+1. By (10), it follows
from j(1)Ï{zg(l) | gÎH} that the dwelling j(1) has zero price in all equilibria
from SE(l). Then pj(k) £ )(kjpˆ  for k > 1. And pj(1) = (1)jpˆ = 0 since e(l, pˆ )ÎSE(l)
(Theorem 13). Q.E.D.
Corollary 3. If iÎI, kÎI(mi) \ {i}, and kpˆ <
1
kp , then ipˆ <
1
ip .
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Proof. Suppose mi = ái(1), i(2), ¼, iñ and put mi(s) = ái(1), i(2), ¼, i(s)ñ. The
definition of the path mi implies that )(sipˆ = D(mi(s)). The corresponding com-
ponents of the vectors pˆ  - p
1 and pˆ - p1 have the same sign. Thus kpˆ <
1
kp
and it is enough to show that ipˆ <
1
ip . If k = i(1) and kÏ{j(z
1, g) | gÎG}, then
1
kp = 0 by (10) and kpˆ ³ 1kp  contrary to hypothesis of the corollary. Thus k =
i(s) and either s > 1 or kÎ{j(z
1, g) | gÎG}. Let us put m = ái(s), i(s+1),¼, i ñ.
The arguments analogous to those used in the proof of inequality (71) give
us D(m) £ 1ip -
1
)(sip . Then ipˆ - )(sipˆ = D(m) £ 
1
ip  - 
1
)(sip , whence 
1
ip  - ipˆ ³ 
1
)(sip  -
)(sipˆ > 0 under hypothesis. . Q.E.D.
Theorem 14. In situation A, e( p~) is an equilibrium. If pÎP(A) and c(pd(g)) ³
ygd(g) for all gÎG2, then p
~£ p.
Proof. It is enough to prove conditions p~³ 0, 0p
~ = 0, (9), and (10). If g(i )Î
G2, then there is the path m = á0, iñ in graph G(z) and ip
~³ D(m) = yg(i)i ³ 0. If
g(i)ÎG1, then there is the path m = ái, iñ in graph G(z) and ip
~³ D(m) = 0. Fi-
nally, there is the path m = á0, 0ñ in graph G (z ), therefore 0p
~ ³ D(m) = 0. On
the other hand, the path m0 with the last vertex zero cannot be of positive
weight by Theorem 2 (since z is an equilibrium allocation). Consequently,
p~³ 0 and 0p
~ = 0.
Assume that i ¹ 0 and iÏ{z(g) | gÎG}. Then, as in the case of i = 0, D(mi) £
0 by Theorem 2. Whence, taking into account p~³ 0, we obtain ip
~= 0. So,
condition (10) is true for e( p~).
Take some gÎG and put b = z(g). We have D(mi) ³ D(mb) + c(b, i ) for any
iÎJg . Then ip
~< bp
~ - ygb + ygi , and this, by Lemma 1, is equivalent to condi-
tion (9) for e( p~). Hence, e( p~) is an equilibrium.
Suppose pÎP(A) and p = c(p). Take some iÎI. If ip
~= 0, then ip
~£ pi . Assume
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that ip
~> 0 and mi = ái(1), i(2), ¼, i(n) = iñ. A path with the last vertex zero
cannot be of positive weight by Theorem 2 (since z is an equilibrium alloca-
tion), thus we can suppose that i(k) ¹ 0 for k ³ 2. Then i(k)Î{z(g) | gÎG} for
k ³ 2 by the definition of the graph G(z). Let us assume first that i(1)Î{z(g) |
gÎG}; then i(k) = z(h(k)) for k ³ 1. By Lemma 1, yh(k)i(k+1) - yhk)i(k) £ pi(k+1) -
pi(k). Summing this inequalities over k from 1 to n-1, we get ip
~- (1)ip
~ £ pi -
pi(1) £ pi. But (1)ip
~ = 0 (since mi is the path of maximal weight with the last
vertex i), thus ip
~£ pi. Assume now that i(1)Ï{z(g) | gÎG}. Then (i(1), i(2)) =
(0, d(g)) for some gÎG2 and z(g) = d(g). Whence it follows that the arc
(i(2), 0) with the weight (-ygd(g)) £ 0 is a unique arc with the first vertex i(2) in
graph G(z ). Thus mi = ái(1), i(2)ñ, i = i(2), and ip
~= D(mi) = ygd(g) £ pi under
hypothesis. Q.E.D.
Lemma 20. Suppose e = (z, p) is some equilibrium for situation A2, p £ p
1,
and gÎG1; then ug(z
1) £ ug(z).
Proof. Put p = c(p), gÎG1, and e = ug(z) - ug(z
1). By condition (10), e ³
vgd(g)(p) - ug(z
1) = [pd(g) - 1 )(gdp ] - [pd(g) - 1 )(gdp ]. If 1 )(gdp = 0, then pd(g) = 0 under
hypothesis, and thus e ³ 1 )(gdp - pd(g) ³ 0. If 1 )(gdp > 0, then d(g) ¹ 0, and As-
sumption 1 implies that d(g) = d(g); thus e ³ vgd(g)(p) - ug(z
1) = 0. Q.E.D.
Theorem 15. Let y be an optimal solution of PDR. Then x(y) is an optimal
solution to problem (50) - (53). Under Assumption 11, x(y) determines some
equilibrium allocation for situation A(y).
Proof. Obviously, x(y) satisfies conditions (51) - (53). Let x = (x t(k)) be an
optimal solution to problem (50) - (53). The first statement of the theorem
follows from åt,k at(k)×xt(k) £ åt,k (b t + dt)×xt(k) = åt (bt + dt)×åk xt(k) = åt (b t +
dt)×yt = åt,k at(k)×xt(k, y). Now the second statement follows from Theorem 10
and the discussion of the ATC problem in section 4. Q.E.D.
